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SUMMARY 
The law-literature debate appears to be, at best, marginalised and often overlooked by legal 
scholars in the light of other inter-disciplinary jurisprudential pursuits such as the study of the 
relationships between law and politics, economics and sociology. 
This thesis seeks to reassert the importance of law-literature scholarship by examining the 
valuable contribution, with regard to an understanding of justice, which literature can bring to 
the law. I examine the differing interpretations of justice which law and literature possess 
and the manner in which the adoption of certain literary devices enable legal discourse more 
effectively to attain and maintain its objectives. In this regard, I view both disciplines (i.e. 
law and literature) as sharing a 'core of meaning' which finds expression through the notion 
of justice. Moreover, I submit that this shared endeavour is born of an attempt to re-order 
reality and instil some certainty into the chaos of human existence. Counter-balancing the 
drive towards 'justice', however, is the notion of 'justification' which is embedded within 
legal and literary discourses. This notion illustrates the fact that both discourses thrive on an 
element of uncertainty (the 'human factor') which provides them with a rationale of sorts for 
their continued existence and authority. 
In the light of these two potent and often vying forces ('justice' and 'justification'), I go on to 
explore new ways of interpreting and understanding the arena of legal discourse- as viewed 
with a post-modernist bias- by examining the capabilities and constraints of the law which are 
identified through the medium of certain literary texts. 
Ultimately, my objective is neither to malign the law unnecessarily, nor to promote the 
complete integration of legal and literary identities. Rather, I seek to emphasise the 
importance of inter-disciplinary research and the manner in which it can be utilised to provide 
challenging insights into various issues of human concern. 
Key terms: 
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literature; law in literature; law and literature; law as literature; legal discourse; literary 
discourse; inter-disciplinary research; legal understanding; literary understanding. 
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PREFACE 
In the race for efficiency, clarity and certainty which has arisen in recent years as a result of 
the legal profession being viewed as a 'service industry' governed by client demands, the role 
of jurisprudence has mistakenly come to be seen as an indulgent and non-essential academic 
activity. Legal practitioners feel uncomfortable in having to relate their daily professional 
responsibilities back to something as abstract as jurisprudence. Yet, the truth of the matter is 
that jurisprudence provides one with a wider understanding of the law and the concepts which 
underpin the legal process as well as encouraging one to question and critically develop one's 
own role in this process. 
Within the field of jurisprudence there are, of course, many avenues one can choose to 
explore, and I have taken as my focus the relationship between law and literature. The reason 
for this is threefold. First, the belief in the autonomy of legal discourse can no longer be 
-~-------···-·---··-----··--
upheld. This is due to the fact that since the 1960s, the spectrum of political opinion in law 
schools (particularly in America) has blossomed as a result of the end of the Cold War. 
Moreover, as a result of the decline in political consensus there has arisen a concurrent 
growth in disciplines complimentary to law (most especially, philosophy and economics). 
--""·-·-._- ·-···~"·. - --
Furthermore, the increasing reliance by the legal system on the statutes and constitutions (in 
place of the common law) as sources of law has led to ambiguity and difficulty of 
interpretation which has given rise to the realisation that some interdisciplinary perspective 
might assist the agents of the law in their interpretative duties. Secondly, both law and 
literature are products of the same tool - language - which is designed to communicate 
fundamental ideas and important beliefs between individuals. An interdisciplinary 
perspective, therefore, provides one with the means of assessing the ability and effectiveness 
of a particular discipline to reflect and convey its message through the medium of language 
while also encouraging one to explore new ways of understanding and interpretation. 
Thirdly, (as the content of my thesis will indicate), I examine the important connection 
between law and literature as evidenced through their respective search for justice and their 
particular conceptions of it. 
I begin my analysis of the relationship between law and literature by examining, in Chapter 1, 
three different arenas in which they interact and the ways in which the two discourses have 
historically impacted on each other through these arenas (i.e. 'Law of Literature'; 'Law in 
Literature'; 'Law and Literature'). Having discussed these arenas, I then go on to analyse an 
important facet of law-literature interaction, namely, 'Law as Literature'. This serves to 
develop certain elements of their relationship which are rooted (but remain largely 
unfulfilled) in the first three arenas of interaction under discussion. The analysis of this 
fourth dimension of their relationship also acts as an effective point of connection between 
the historic backdrop of law-literature study and the task ahead which is geared towards an 
exploration of their shared focus on justice. This leads into Chapter 2 which analyses the 
different conceptions of ~~~·wnich law and literature harbour based on their respective 
social obligations. I then reflect on the benefits of a fusion of legal and literary 
understandings of 'justice' as viewed in the context of the postmodern predicament in which 
we are all embroiled. This serves to emphasise the unspoken connectedness of law and 
literature while also seeking to de-mystify the deconstructive process and to show that it has 
an order and logic of its own out of which sense can be made and through which man's 
surroundings can be understood. However, while postmodern analysis does not stultify the 
human urge for certainty, it does problematise the desire in as much as it reawakens man's 
intellect to the justificational foundations of all human discourses which are themselves 
rooted in the uncertainty of human existence. Chapter 3 then develops this argument by 
examining the conceptual tension which filters between the identities o('justice' and their 
pluralistic 'justifications'. Finally, in Chapter 4, I analyse legal discourse through the 
__.....,_._ ___ ~"--- ~·---~~- -----~-~ -
medium of literary narrative. In so doing, I unite all the previously mentioned elements 
which constitute the mechanics of my argument and synthesise them into practical examples 
of the very principles and tensions under discussion. 
After all has been said, however, regarding the relationship between law and literature, it is 
just as well to return to some words of advice handed down in the mid-1950s by the 
American judge, Felix Frankfurter. A young teenage boy wrote to Mr. Justice Frankfurter 
expressing an interest in a career as a lawyer and requested advice on how he should prepare 
himself while still at school. The response he received was as follows: 
2 
My dear Paul, 
No one can be a truly competent lawyer unless he is a cultivated man. If I were you, I 
would forget all about any technical preparation for the law. The best way to prepare 
for the law is to come to the study of the law as a well-read person. Thus alone can 
one acquire the capacity to use the English language on paper and in speech and with 
the habits of clear thinking which only a truly liberal education can give. No less 
important for a lawyer is the cultivation of the imaginative faculties by reading 
poetry, seeing great paintings, in the original or in easily available reproductions, 
and listening to great music. Stock your mind with the deposit of much good reading, 
and widen and deepen your feelings by experiencing vicariously as much as possible 
the wondeiful mysteries of the universe, and forget all about your future career. 
3 
With good wishes, 
Sincerely yours, 
[Signed] Felix Frankfurter 
CHAPTER 1 
THE ARENAS OF LAW-LITERATURE INTERACTION 
Introduction 
Analysts of the law-literature association have to date generally confined themselves to 
evaluating the impact of the endeavour in the light of an accepted dichotomy between 'Law 
in Literature' and 'Law as Literature'. The former broadly referring to themes of a legal 
nature within literary contexts; and the latter concerning itself with superimposing a literary 
critique onto legal texts. 
However, I submit that this schism, on its own, fails to account for much of the work 
surrounding the points of connection between law and literature. Thus, I have chosen to 
analyse the law-literature relationship in terms of four sub-sections, namely, the 'Law of 
Literature', 'Law in Literature', 'Law and Literature', and 'Law as Literature'. 
I begin with the 'Law _QfLiterature' since this is the field in which the mechanisms of law are 
-----
seen at their most assertive from a legal perspective. 1 Moreover, it is through the mediums of 
copyright, obscenity and defamation that most legal scholars and professionals are initially 
'baptised' in literary waters. However, the disturbing reality is that for many legal analysts 
the extent of their appreciation of law-literature is confined to this narrow, technical element 
of the broader debate. In effect, there is no relationship between law and literature within the 
context of this particular perspective, since the law is simply imposed upon an alien entity 
called 'literature' .2 To this extent there is no unity of law-literature per se, since they retain a 
distinct (literary) cause and (legal) effect between each other. I refer to this exclusiveness of 
vision as 'disturbing' because, on its own, it denies the possibility of anything greater and 
more fulfilling in law-literature studies than a list of rules providing protections and 
prohibitions. 
The next area of discussion is 'Law in Literature'. This context is arguably the least complex 
of all the categories inasmuch as it encompasses all forms of literature which share a common 
2 
A 'legal perspective' in this sense embodies the desire to analyse the law's effects on 
human actions by means of legal sanctions in the form of statutes and legal reasoning 
- such as the law of copyright, defamation and obscenity. 
In the same way that law is imposed upon other entities which we refer to as 
'property', 'delict', 'crime' and so on. 
4 
identity through their depiction of some 'everyday' aspect of the law.3 However, this element 
of the law-literature endeavour has greater implications for the discipline as a whole, since it 
is at this juncture that the initial ideas of certain influential jurisprudential scholars (such as 
James Boyd White, Richard Posner, Robin West and Richard Weisberg) begin to filter into 
the reader's realm of understanding. It is here that one develops a burgeoning awareness 
(however fragile) of the broader potential of the task ahead. 4 
Such a discussion (i.e. of 'Law in Literature') which introduces the reader to certain 
law-literature proponents,5 their views, and the broader relationship of the two disciplines 
then leads into the arena of 'Law and Literature'. I regard this to be the broadest of all four 
categories under discussion, since it is in this context that the views of certain law-literature 
scholars are expounded, analysed and criticised in greater detail than the 'Law in Literature' 
section permitted. In 'Law and Literature', I do not confine myself to analysing the 
reasoning of any one particular school of thought,6 but rather aim to discuss a broad range of 
academic perspectives relating to the law-literature relationship. The one factor that all these 
different perspectives have in common, however, is their acknowledgement of an essential 
dichotomy between 'law', on the one hand, and 'literature' on the other. 
In essence, the degree to which law-literature scholars acknowledge or denounce the 
existence of an inherent dichotomy between 'law' and 'literature' has determined (in my 
estimation) whether I class them under 'Law and Literature' or 'Law as Literature' .7 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
e.g. Detective novels, literature revolving around criminal trials etc. 
The task being the search for justice and justification. 
I specifically avoid using the phrase 'the law literature movement' as far as possible 
due to the myriad (and oft-times conflicting) stated desires of individuals 
law-literature scholars. Although I will not elaborate on these conflicts of opinion at 
present, they will become increasingly apparent from reading the sections 'Law in 
Literature', 'Law and Literature' and 'Law as Literature'. 
Such as feminist critics (Caroline Resnik, Judith Heilbrun) or economics-biased 
scholars (Richard Posner). 
I am the first to concede that there is more 'art' than 'science' to the creation of this 
distinction, in as much as the position of certain theorists, such as Ronald Dworkin 
(with his concept of the 'chain novel'), appears to straddle the 'Law and Literature' 
and 'Law as Literature' divide. Far from creating spurious classifications, however, I 
hope that in dividing theorists (particularly those who are capable of 'theoretical 
mutation' such as Dworkin) into essentially 'Law and Literature' vs 'Law as 
Literature' camps, my decisions will be seen to be justified on the basis of my 
co-existing rationales for them. Such rationales will be enunciated in these respective 
sections which follow. 
5 
Finally, with regard to the 'La~ as Literature' category of my analysis - I regard this area as 
comprising the philosophical apex of the entire law-literature endeavour. It is within this 
context that the two disciplines are analysed in a manner which pierce~ their respective 
veneers and seeks out their underlying mutual commonality through the medium within 
which they operate (language) and the desire towards which they both strive Uustice). In 
essence, in my conception of 'Law as Literature', I establish the means with which to initiate 
a focused (although complex) exploration into the concepts of 'justice' and 'justification'. 
I must reiterate that I am fully aware of the inherent danger of categorising the law-literature 
debate into distinct 'compartments', however I have found the task necessary for two reasons. 
First, so that I can effectively order my own thoughts and convey them in an accessible (yet 
not pedantic) manner; and secondly, so that the reader can relate to my 'voyage of discovery' 
in the broad and conceptually treacherous seas ahead8 with at least a 'compass' with which to 
navigate. The intention of this initial four-pronged approach to law-literature, therefore, in no 
way presupposes a belief in the virginal autonomy of each category under discussion. On the 
contrary, I would assert that to effectively, and more importantly, in a worthwhile fashion go 
about one's duties as a l~gal analyst (whether as a scholar, academic or practitioner) in the 
'Law °-f Literature' field,9 one must have some conception and appreciation of the fields of 
'Law in Literature', 'Law and Literature' and 'Law as Literature'. Moreover, the same 
applies to the remaining three individual elements through which law-literature is analysed. 
In essence, therefore, I envisage an organic unity into which the four elements under 
discussion ultimately merge. However, the paradox of journeying towards such a unified 
understanding appears to be that it requires of the human mind an act of constraint and 
categorisation. 10 Only once equipped with such units of perception is it possible to appreciate 
their context and unite them in a coherent vision of what the law-literature endeavour 
ultimately represents - the search for justice and justification. It is this search towards which 
my analysis and reconstitution of the elements of the law-literature relationship hopes to 
8 
9 
IO 
"Broad and ... treacherous" because of the interdisciplinary nature of the task at hand, 
and the very real possibility of getting drowned in linguistic and philosophical 
discourses. 
i.e. The field with which legal analysts are obliged to interact by virtue of their 
professional standing and 'job description'. 
In as much as the entire thought process is broken down into distinctive and 
identifiable constituent parts, thereby preventing the abstract notion (in its entirety) 
from assaulting us with its grand dimensions, and effectively remaining beyond our 
comprehension. 
6 
guide the reader. Whether this search will culminate in a 'discovery' will only be explored in 
the chapters on 'Justice' and 'Justification'. However, at this stage it should not be presumed 
that I am being utterly indulgent and embarking on a convoluted 'phantom search', rather, I 
intend to ensure that the 'search' itself becomes a journey of discovery. 
1.1 Law of Literature 
As previously mentioned, this area of discussion is the one which legal analysts 11 tend to 
regard as presenting the total extent of law-literature interaction. Taken on its own, however, 
I maintain that the 'Law of Literature' as embodied in the law relating to copyright, 
defamation and obscenity provides nothing more than a hollow 'legalistic' glimpse into the 
complexities of the greater law-literature endeavour. 12 
Nonetheless, it provides an accessible point of entry into the law-literature debate, and will 
moreover prove to be of great value when regarded as one of the four component elements 
defining law-literature interaction. 
I shall look at the South African laws relating to copyright, defamation and obscenity, in turn, 
and discuss their impact in the light of a narrow 'legal' perspective, followed by a broader 
'literary' understanding of the task ahead. 
(a) Copyright 
The concept of copyright laws has arisen from man's growing appreciation of the existence 
and value of intellectual property and the need to regulate it through legally enforceable 
mechanisms. Moreover, such regulatory laws are rooted in the peculiarly Western notion of 
'private ownership', since early Eastern and African cultures regarded intellectual works as 
II 
12 
I use the term 'legal analyst' as a generic title to refer to legal scholars, academics, 
theorists and practitioners (including lawyers and judges). 
Paradoxically, it is worth noting at this point that J Hillis Miller inverts the 'Law of 
Literature' relationship by examining the ways in which literature instigates the 
establishment of legal measures and sanctions. However, she notes that the process is 
by no means straightforward or predictable since the avenue through which it operates 
is the individual reader's sense of 'justice'. Nonetheless, the result of such an exercise 
(as seen in Miller's analysis of Heinrich von Kleist's Michael Kohlhaas (1956)) is the 
attainment of a socio-historically effective, albeit unforeseen, legal structure upon 
which the inroads of literature can only be assessed ex post facto: See Miller 
Topographies (1995) at 80-104. 
7 
belonging to the community or society (rather than to the individual creator), and hence not in 
need of protection from infringement between individuals. 13 
In essence, therefore, the notion of 'intellectual property' (and more specifically the laws 
relating to copyright) are borne of Western cultural and economic dynamics, with the specific 
intention of "organising and controlling the flow of information in society" .14 
South Africa 
Copyright legislation in South Africa has, to date, undergone a three phase development 
beginning with the Designs and Copyright Act 9 of 1916, followed by the Copyright Act 63 
of 1965, and culminating in the Copyright Act 98 of 1978. Unlike the first two Acts, 
however, which relied heavily on British copyright legislation, 15 the present Copyright Act 98 
of 1978 (which superseded them), although containing many similarities, is largely reliant 
upon the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (as ratified in 
Paris on 24 July 1971). Moreover, since the present Copyright Act (1978) effectively repeals 
all previous copyright legislation, 16 all reference hereafter to copyright legislation in South 
Africa (unless otherwise specified) shall refer to the present Act. 
The present Copyright Act has brought South African copyright regulations in line with the 
provisions of the Berne Convention, and consequently allowed South Africa to become a 
signatory of the Convention.17 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
Regarding the specific time frame in which the notion of copyright emerged in 
Western culture is, however, a matter of great contention amongst theorists - some 
root copyright in the Greek culture of the sixth century BC, during which time 
authorial rights in works were acknowledged; other theorists locate copyright at a 
particular date in Western history - 1436, with the invention of the Gutenberg Press 
(since there could clearly be no right to the reproduction of a work without the initial 
ability to reproduce it); and still other theorists maintain that copyright only emerged 
in Europe in the eighteenth century when it became regulated by law: See EW 
Plowman and LC Hamilton Copyright - Intellectual Property in the Information Age 
(1980) at 4-21. 
Idem at 5. 
Particularly the Copyright Act 63 of 1965, which is based on the British Copyright 
Act of 1965. 
Nonetheless, providing in s46 that "any proclamation, regulation or rule having effect 
under any provision so repealed and in force immediately prior to the commencement 
of this Act, shall continue in force after such commencement and may be repealed, 
amended or altered as if it had been made under this Act". 
The fundamental benefit of signatory status is the reciprocity (i.e. equal rights and 
protections) granted to authors from signatory states. Moreover, the Berne 
8 
Regarding the nature of copyright as understood by our judiciary, the Appellate Division in 
Parktown North Video (Pty) Ltd v Paramount Pictures Corporation18 has acknowledged that 
a copyright is a form of intellectual property with rights separate from normal ownership. 
Thus, a copyright is a right given to the owner of a copyright in a work, entitling him to 
perform certain acts in respect of the work reserved exclusively for the "owner" as defined in 
the Copyright Act. 19 
In s2(1) of the Act various works (including literary works - s2(1)(a)) are then listed as being 
eligible for copyright protection. However in assessing the requirements for the subsistence 
of a copyright in such works, it is first necessary to distinguish between the requirements in 
terms of the common law, and the requirements in terms of the Copyright Act. 
Regarding the common law, two requirements are necessary before copyright protection will 
be granted. First, the work in question must not be contrary to public policy or good morals; 
and secondly, the work must be original. Therefore, the consequence is that works regarded 
as contrary to good morals and public policy may be indiscriminately reproduced since no 
one can copyright them.20 Moreover, regarding the standard of 'originality' in order for a 
work to gain common law protection, this standard is set very low inasmuch as the only 
requirement is that the work in question must not have been copied from another work. In 
effect, therefore, authors in different countries, who by chance happen to produce similar 
works, will all enjoy copyright protection provided they can show that they did not 'copy' the 
particular work. 21 
18 
19 
20 
21 
Convention requires no formalities (such as registration) for copyright protection, 
since compliance with certain requirements ensures the automatic application of such 
protections. 
1986 (2) SA 623 (A). 
The author of a particular work is prima facie entitled to the benefit of first ownership 
of copyright (except in regard to government controlled works) in terms of the Act. 
Into this category would fall material which is regarded as obscene. As the argument 
stands at present, it would seem to imply that obscene material can be freely 
reproduced and disseminated. However, this isc:dearly not the case, since such 
obscene material is regulated by other statutes preventing 'its reproduction and 
dissemination. 
Therefore, common law copyright protection is much weaker than patent protection, 
in as much as the common law does not protect the theme or idea underlying a work 
(in contrast to patent protection which does so), but merely protects the external 
expression of the work. 
9 
In contrast to the common law, the statutory requirements for the subsistence of a copyright 
are more developed, (although ideas are still not protected). Therefore, in terms ofs2(2)(b) 
of the Act a work is only protected once "written down, recorded or otherwise reduced to 
material form" .22 Moreover, the author of the work must be a "qualified person";23 and when 
he is regarded as such, it is not necessary for the work in question to be published in order to 
enjoy copyright protection. 24 
The duration of the copyright depends upon the nature of the work in question, and in respect 
of literary, musical, or artistic works this is deemed to extend over the author's lifetime and 
continue for a further 50 years from the end of the year in which the author died.25 Moreover, 
there may be more than one copyright in the same work, such as is the case in literary works 
in which the author (usually) retains a copyright in the text and content of the work, while the 
publisher possesses a copyright in the layout of the work. There are, however, certain 
exceptions to this general rule (as elucidated in s21 of the Act) which deem the author of the 
work to be the first owner of the copyright in the work.26 Irrespective of such exceptions, 
however, the law's concern at all times revolves around the rights of the owner of the 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
By implication, therefore, taping (which is a form of recording) is sufficient to reduce 
a work to a "material form". 
i.e. Someone who is a South African citizen, resident or at least domiciled here, or a 
juristic person registered in South Africa. Furthermore, this has been extended to all 
members of the Berne Convention. Therefore someone with citizenship, residence or 
domiciled in a member state enjoys the status of a "qualified person". 
Only in the case of a 'non-qualified person' (i.e. someone not fitting the description of 
a 'qualified person') is it necessary for the work to be published in South Africa or a 
signatory country to the Berne Convention, in order for it to enjoy copyright 
protection in terms of the Berne Convention. 
In contrast, copyrights in published editions subsist for 50 years from the end of the 
year in ·which the edition was first published; while copyrights in computer 
programmes subsist for 50 years from the end of the year in which the work was first 
made available to the public with the consent of the copyright owner. 
For example, where a literary work is made by an author in the course and scope of 
his employment by a newspaper, magazine or similar periodical, and intended for 
publication in such periodical, then the owner of the copyright in the work is the 
owner of the publication concerned. However, the owner of the periodical owns the 
copyright only for the purposes of publication in such periodical. Therefore, for all 
other purposes, the author of the work owns the copyright in the work. So, too, a 
person who commissions a work retains the copyright in such work made in 
pursuance to this commission. However, this exception only relates to works 
specifically mentioned in s21(1) of the Act.' Finally, work made in the course of an 
author's employment under a contract of service or apprenticeship, is copyrighted to 
the employer of such author. 
10 
copyright. For it is only the owner who is entitled to perform certain acts in respect of the 
work, such as reproducing the work (in any manner or form), publishing it, and adapting it 
(including translating the work). 
Therefore, s23(1) of the Act deems the copyright in a work to have been directly infringed if 
someone (without the permission of the copyright owner) performs an act reserved for such 
copyright owner. However, it must be proved that the copyrighted work was actually 
copied.27 Moreover, to prove such 'copying', the Appellate Division in Galago Publishers 
( Pty) Ltd v Erasmus28 maintained that the works in dispute should be compared through the 
eyes of a 'reasonable person' reading or analysing them. However, this is not the end of the 
matter in the law's eyes, since s12 of the Act provides a defence to claims based on direct 
infringement. This defence is termed "fair dealing" and includes the use of the copyrighted 
material forpurposes ofreseardi,-prfVate study, cifoCism or review, and reporting on current 
events in the news media. In order to constitute a valid defence, however, copying made for 
one of the above purposes is not, per se, sufficient, and must in addition be regarded as 'fair 
dealing', otherwise strict liability is imposed on the offending party. Regarding the term 'fair 
dealing', however, our courts provide no guidance as to its potential meaning, leaving one 
with the impression that some sense of justice and equity is envisaged, without fully 
elaborating on the manner in which it is to be attained. 
Direct infringement is not the only form of infringement, however, since s23(2) of the Act 
also specifies that a copyright is infringed when a person performs certain acts without the 
permission of the copyright owner. Such violations may be termed 'indirect infringements', 
and include situations in which a person imports work into South Africa for purposes other 
than domestic use; or where such person sells or leases out the infringing article in South 
Africa; or where such person distributes such article in South Africa for purposes of trade, to 
such an extent that the owner of the copyright is prejudicially effected. At all times, 
however, in order to constitute an 'indirect infringement' the person accused of such violation 
must be aware that his acts constitute an illegal action. 
Notwithstanding the different factors to be noted in respect of direct and indirect 
infringement, two remedies always remain available by virtue of the i!ery act of copyright 
27 
28 
Because of this requirement, the protection of a copyright owner is weaker than that 
given to the holder of a patent, who need not prove copying occurred. 
1989 (1) SA 276 (A). 
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violation, namely interdicts and damages. Moreover, such remedies favour the position of 
the copyright owner inasmuch as no fault (on the part of the infringing party) need be proved 
when claiming an interdict; and when claiming damages, provision is made29 for awarding 
additional damages based upon the flagrancy of the violation30 in situations in which the 
plaintiff is unable to estimate the extent of his loss. 
When one distances oneself from the technical confines of the language of the Act, however, 
one becomes aware of an ironical anomaly, namely that an Act which seeks to regulate works 
of a literary nature (amongst others) defines such works without any recourse or reference to 
'literary merit'. Thus, telephone directories and bus timetables are accorded the same 
reverence as the works of EM Foster or the poetry of TS Eliot. In my view, such linguistic 
callousness in the guise of legal impartiality is not to be lauded or admired for it only bolsters 
the law's delusional supremacy over other discourses of perception.31 Nevertheless, it is not 
my intention to deride legal reasoning per se, since I believe it to be founded upon principles 
of perceived 'fairness' and 'equity'; rather, what I will explore in the course of this thesis are 
the ways in which an infusion of literary ideals and expressions into legal understanding and 
discourse can aid the manifestation of the law's noble objectives, and facilitate its search for 
justice.32 
(b) Defamation 
The law of defamation relates to civil actions in which the plaintiff seeks compensation for 
the unlawful, intentional publication of defamatory material referring to him, which causes 
his reputation to be impaired. 
29 
30 
31 
32 
In terms of s24 of the Copyright Act 98 of 1978. 
This is a moral judgement not related to actual loss suffered but to the blameworthy 
nature of the infringement. 
One such discourse is literary discourse which readily admits to it own subjectivity 
(particularly modernist and post-modernist genres) and arrives at a more sensitive and 
poignant expression of the human condition. 
In this sense, what I propose is in conflict with Richard Posner's analysis of the effects 
of copyright legislation: See Posner Law and Literature - A Misunderstood Relation 
(1988) at 348-361, hereafter referred to as A Misunderstood Relation. For Posner 
asserts the inevitability of tension between copyright and creativity, and argues for a 
reduction in the scope of copyright regulation of literary material. In contrast, I 
maintain that this copyright/creativity dichotomy is not a necessary state of affairs. In 
fact, it is my assertion that if one infuses the legal discourse of copyright legislation 
with an appreciation of literary merit, then the resulting framework is likely to 
compliment and assist the creative process rather than detract from or stifle it. 
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South Africa 
It has always been accepted that natural persons are entitled to recover compensation for 
defamatory statements made against them, however it has only been in recent years that 
South African courts have extended this principle to juristic persons. 33 
In order to be actionable, however, such defamatory statement or matter must be published 
(i.e. made known - either orally or in writing), and the person to whom it was communicated 
must have understood its meaning.34 As previously stated, the effect of such defamatory 
matter must be to impair the plaintiff's reputation in some way. And this, in tum, is 
determined by asking whether the communication complained of would lower the plaintiff's 
reputation in the estimation of reasonable and ordinary people generally. 
However, when words are per se innocent, the plaintiff may still allege defamation on the 
basis of 'innuendo' given the particular context and manner in which such words have been 
used. Moreover, the defamatory matter need not necessarily refer to the plaintiff by name, 
and may identify him in another manner.35 Once publication has occurred in this manner, two 
presumptions automatically arise - first, that the statement was made intentionally (animus 
injuriandi); and secondly, that the publication was unlawful. The onus then shifts to the 
defendant who must either accept responsibility for his actions, or attempt to establish a 
defence negating the element of unlawfulness or that of fault. 36 
Literature clearly provides a fertile foundation for the launching of defamatory allegations 
and claims, whether in the form of newspaper articles, biographies or fictional novels. In this 
33 
34 
35 
36 
See: Multiplan Insurance Brokers (Pty) Ltd v Van Blerk 1985 (3) SA 164 (D) at 
168A-B; A Neumann CC v Beauty Without Cruelty International 1986 (4) SA 675 
(C) at 688C; Dhlomo NO v Natal Newspapers Ltd:. 1989 (1) SA 945 (A); Caxton Ltd 
v Reeva Forman (Pty) Ltd 1990 (3) SA 547 (A) at 560-61; Argus Printing and 
Publishing Co. Ltd. v Inkatha Freedom Party 1992 (3) SA 579 (A). 
Therefore publication is not deemed to have occurred if the words are published in a 
foreign language or secret code which the readers/hearers cannot comprehend. 
However, if such individuals (at a later stage) discover the meaning of the words used, 
then publication is deemed to have occurred. '\ 
Such as by an official title, a known nom-de-plume, a prominent physical feature or a 
known characteristic. 
Defences excluding unlawfulness include truth for the public benefit; fair comment; 
and privileged occasion. While defences negating intention include mistake; 
intoxication; provocation; jest; and insanity. 
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regard, Richard Posner37 alleges that a balance needs to be maintained between the competing 
interests of authorial integrity on the one hand, and the right of individuals not to be defamed 
on the other. However, this becomes particularly difficult in the context of fictional literature 
since real people are often subsumed into the world of the text in a manner which still makes 
them identifiable in the guise of fictional characters, who are themselves not subject to legal 
jurisdiction.38 The weakness of Posner's argument, in my opinion, is that he readily concedes 
the complexity (if not impossibility) of the task of regulating defamation within fiction, while 
maintaining that it is nonetheless necessary,39 yet he fails to suggest an effective method to 
facilitate the task ahead. 40 My submission is that we should approach the dilemma from a 
different perspective by acknowledging the frailty of legal discourse to comprehend (let alone 
control) the human condition, while simultaneously exploring the value of literary discourse 
in this same task.41 Moreover, by bridging the chasm between these. two discourses of 
perception, I believe that the possibility exists for the law to at least venture towards (if not 
attain) the justice which it seeks. 
(c) Obscenity 
The label 'obscenity' is the law's most direct and effective means with which to censor 
literature, from on high. Yet, despite the law's vigorous disapproval of lewd materials42 
courts in general have found it difficult to describe what exactly it is they regard as 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
A Misunderstood Relation at 320-328. 
Fictional characters are only subject to the whims and designs of their author(s), and 
need not feel any inherent sense of duty or obligation to any legal system outside the 
confines established by the literary work itself. 
Essentially, Posner analyses four arguments which object to the abolition of liability 
for defamation within fiction, they are: (a) that such abolition of liability would 
benefit fictional literature (above 'factual' literature) in an unfair manner; (b) the 
fiction/non-fiction dichotomy is in and of itself arbitrary; (c) such abolition would 
simply result in authors mala fide coating their work with a fictional veneer so as to 
avoid liability; (d) the Utopian ideal that in the event the legal system attained a state 
of perfection justice would prevail and all deserving persons would receive damages. 
Therefore, the argument for abolition would be undermined, since any deserving 
person is entitled to remuneration for defamation, irrespective of whether such 
communication originated from within fictional or non-fictional contexts. 
All Posner suggests is that it is the Jaw's duty to "internalise costs and benefits" so that 
society does not receive external costs (or benefits) to the detriment of the individual 
(and vice versa): See Posner A Misunderstood Relation at 320. 
Literature, in my opinion, is more capable than law of comprehending the human 
condition. 
Inevitably, obscenity and sexually lewd depictions or descriptions are regarded as 
synonymous. 
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"obscene". Such uncertainty is not, however, in itself surprising since the labelling of certain 
actions or statements as 'obscene' is a value judgement. Not only are such judgements 
peculiar to particular individuals or social contexts (rather than being universal and 
objectively understood), but they also inevitably undergo a transformation over time. This is 
due to the fact that social mores adapt to effectively respond to and represent changing 
conditions and developments in society. In tum, the law's use of the 'obscenity' label is 
aimed at legally entrenching societal mores existing at a particular time in that society's 
development.43 
As previously stated44, the terms 'obscenity' and 'pornography' are often imploded into each 
other and viewed as a single entity. However, Catherine MacKinnon45 incisively 
distinguishes between these two entities, creating a Janus-like vision of their respective 
concerns. According to MacKinnon, porriograpliy represents a socio-political actuality 
indicative of the realities of female subjugation and marginalisation within a patriarchal 
society; while obscenity embodies a moral abstraction created by the judicial system in order 
to regulate ethical human behaviour. Notwithstanding this difference in focus, MacKinnon 
maintains that both concepts retain a fundamental unity inasmuch as they are constructed 
from within a masculine frame of being without any reference. to female perception. 
Moreover, she accounts for the law's inability to provide an effective definition and 
understanding of obscenity as being based on the fact that to appreciate prurient interests 
"someone has to admit sexual arousal by the materials, but male sexual arousal signals the 
importance of protection" .46 Therefore, any attempts to define 'obscenity' (according to 
MacKinnon) will only be successful once they "address its fundamental issue - gender 
inequality" .47 
As justified as such feminist critique may be, however, I do not wish to analyse and discuss 
the properties of this discourse here.48 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
') 
The ensuing interaction between the law and society around the issue of obscenity 
most often revolves around literary material which is deemed in some way to 
undermine or tarnish the social fabric. 
See n42. 
C MacKinnon Philosophical Problems in the La.w (1996) DM Adams (ed) at 290-306. 
Idem at 294. 
Idem at 295. 
First, because the feminist cnttque of the pornography/obscenity debate contains 
sufficient material and merit (on its own) to constitute the subject of a substantial 
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South Africa 
Even given South Africa's morally calvinistic heritage, our courts have not been granted 
many occasions on which to adjudicate the question of 'obscenity' in relation to the language 
of literary texts. Instead, the question of 'obscenity' has often revolved around pictorial 
material and graphic depictions contained in literary works. However, an example drawn 
from within this latter context is still able to provide one with an insight into our courts' 
obtuse understanding of 'obscenity'. 
The case of Anchor Publishing Co. ( Pty) Ltd. and Another v Publications Appeal Boarcf9 
provides just such an insight. The applicants were publishers of a glamorous photographic 
magazine which was declared to be 'undesirable' (and subsequently censored) by the 
_Publicati_on Appeal Board, due ~to its Jewd pictorial content. However, the applicants 
maintained that the decision was unreasonable since the Board "had failed to apply its mind 
to the issues it had to determine, and had misdirected itself by condemning outright 
photographs of breast nudity in conflict with judicial and other authority to the effect that 
nudity per se was not indecent or undesirable" .50 Notwithstanding this argument, however, 
the court held that the Board had been correct in its decision,51 although (ironically) even the 
court admitted that "it was not easy to discover from the Board's reasons the factor which 
made the photographs obscene, and it was not enlightening for the Board to say that nudity 
per se was not undesirable and some aggravating factor was required".52 Such reasoning 
clearly begs the very question it set out to answer, and our courts have (to date) proven 
unable to rectify this situation. A possible solution would be to tackle the 'obscenity' 
definition from a different angle by analysing what it is not, although even such an option, in 
order to be effective and accurate, requires the definition reached to acknowledge the 
vagaries of the social context from whence it emerges.53 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
work; and secondly, because I shall look at the feminist perspective on the 
law-literature debate in greater detail. 
1987 (4) SA 708 (N). 
Idem at 708 G. 
Although the court did set aside the Board's decision to ban all subsequent editions of 
the magazine. 
1987(4) SA 708(N), 708 H-1. 
In other words, such definition must not presume 'obscenity' to be a constant and 
objectively defined class, and should rather concede that it varies from society to 
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Whatever the preferred definition of 'obscenity' ,54 the fact remains that an appreciation of 
literary texts as well as an understanding of social contexts can only illuminate one's 
conception of the term 'obscenity'. This is due to the fact that 'obscenity' is a legal label 
imposing a moral judgement on society, and in order to better appreciate its content one must, 
of necessity, understand its context. In this regard, literature can be of great benefit in 
framing one's understanding of 'obscenity' for two reasons - first, it forms a major 
component of the body of work against which obscenity laws react; and secondly, literature 
is able to reflect the vagaries of society and humanity in a manner which eludes the law. 55 
Conclusion 
The effects of the 'Law of Literature' are clearly of vital concern to legal analysts by virtue of 
their legal immediacy. However, (as I hope I have begun to convey) taken on its own this 
area of law-literature interaction fails, through its technicality, to convey the rich 
complexities of the greater law-literature endeavour. For this reason, one would be 
committing a grave injustice were one to regard the 'Law of Literature' as anything more 
than a component of (and suitable point of entry into) the law-literature debate. 
Notwithstanding this, the 'Law of Literature' remains a vital element within the broader 
framework of law-literature since it allows all the philosophical arguments and nebulous 
conceptions within the debate to find a point of connection in the day-to-day life of the law. 
1.2 Law in Literature 
The arena of 'Law in Literature' is generally understood as encompassing legal narratives 
within literary contexts, and literary reflections on legal institutions and concepts. Into the 
former category fall literary works which might be termed 'populist' for their broad 
readership and their stereotypical depiction of the legal process.56 While the latter category 
54 
55 
56 
society and even person to person, while noting that the law's allegiance is owed to 
the society at large. 
I do not go into further detail in this regard owing to the broad nature of the task; 
however, two books which do focus exclusively on this enquiry are: T Klein (ed) 
Obscenity and Pornography: An Interdepartmental seminar, University of Munster 
(1984); and N St. John-Stevas Obscenity and the Law (1956). 
In tum, it is these societal vagaries which 'obscenity' seeks to reflect. 
In this regard, I am specifically thinking of detective novels and novels revolving 
around 'trial scenes' as depicted in works by authors such as Agatha Christie, John 
Mortimer, and John Grisham. 
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consists of works which, while often containing 'populist' devices (such as criminal trials), 
are primarily concerned with sublime issues involving ethics, morality and justice. 57 
This area (i.e. 'Law in Literature') of the law-literature institution represents the decisive 
transition from the pedestrian (i.e. 'Law of Literature') into the philosophical (i.e. 'Law 
and/as Literature'), for it is here that legal and literary discourses become interlinked within 
the body of the literary text.58 'Law in Literature' may therefore be regarded as the 
foundational progenitor of interdisciplinary research into the fields of law and literature. As 
such its genesis is generally regarded, by American theorists, as being situated "in the first 
three decades [of America's] national history, [when] many cultural critics and men of letters 
were lawyers or received legal training as part of their education".59 This period of classical 
unity has, however, faded in the light of an evolutionary estrangement between law and 
liteiafiire, as a result of the development of Roinantfcisrii.60 In turn, the Romantic urge has 
dwindled and been superseded by a more complex appreciation of the fundamental 
similarities between law and literature as evidenced by "the power of language and the 
practice of interpretation".61 This transition should not, however, be seen as an exclusively 
American occurrence, since it has taken place at different times in various societies.62 
What is noteworthy, however, is the manner in which this law-literature animosity and 
interaction is mirrored in the progression from 'Law in Literature' through 'Law and 
Literature'. In other words, each phase of the law-literature endeavour can be seen to 
represent (in general terms) a particular point in societal development - 'Law in Literature' 
representing the genesis of the philosophical interdisciplinary endeavour; 'Law and 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
Into this category, I place works such as Harper Lee's To Kill a Mockingbird (1987), 
EM Foster's A Passage to India (1989), Joseph Conrad's Heart of Darkness (1989), 
and Frank Kafka's The Metamorphosis, In the Penal Colony and Other Short Stories 
(1995). 
This is due to the fact that the law's concerns are given effect to through the medium 
of literature. 
Judith S Koffler 'Reflections on Detente: Law and Literature' (1984) 62 Texas Law 
Review 1152 at 1158. 
This is due to the fact that the Romantic movement "elevated the artist to the position 
of 'profit of humanities highest possibilities', while the lawyer and the legal system 
became the artist's enemy": See Koffler idem at 1163. 
Idem at 1167. 
One could, for example, go as far back as the ancient Greek philosophers and 
playwrights (such as Sophocles, Plato and Aristotle) to search for the seeds of 'Law in 
Literature' through their reflections on it in Antigone, Gorgias and Ethics 
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Literature' providing the Romantic progression, and hence necessitating the entrenchment of 
the law/literature dichotomy; and 'Law as Literature' culminating in the complet~ unification 
of 'Literature and Law'. As I have already alluded, the true value of such progression can 
only be appreciated if one envisages it as circular (rather than linear) in structure. Therefore, 
the philosophical core of the law-literature relationship should not be seen as emerging (at its 
most basic) in 'Law in Literature' and culminating (at its most supreme) in 'Law as 
Literature'. Rather all the elements should lead back into one another so that a circular flow 
is created amongst them through which a more illuminating vision may be constructed. The 
most correct manner in which to conceptualise this configuration, therefore, is bt_~eeing the 
three philosophical components (i.e. 'Law in/and/as Literature') as manifestations of each 
other.63 With this framework in mind, it is therefore appropriate (at this point) to introduce 
• > 
~th~ <ifg!:lgl~J1_t~_ o_f certain law-literattire_ sc~olars with regard to 'Law in Literature' .64 
J Neville Tumer65 maintains that literature undeniably impacts upon the law through the 
countless legal references within literary texts,66 which, in tum, often lead to an awareness of 
the ethical dimensions of "the moral issues involved in legal theory".67 Similarly, William 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
respectively. Likewise, while America was going through its cultural 'renaissance' of 
'lawyer-poets', western Europe was already steeped in an era of Romanticism. 
Which is, after all, what they are since I conceded to regarding them as separate 
entities only for the purposes of more effective explanation initially. Moreover, my 
exclusion of the 'Law of Literature' in the above passage is neither an oversight nor a 
denial of its importance in relation to the other three elements of law-literature. The 
reason I have failed to mention the 'Law of Literature' is simply because I regard it as 
the factual component of the law-literature relationship (i.e. indicating what the law 
actually does) in contrast to the other three elements which represent the philosophical 
dimension of the relationship (and which I am at present analysing). 
Since these scholars, strictly speaking, fall into the 'Law and Literature' and 'Law as 
Literature' categories, their views will be discussed in greater detail in these later 
sections. 
JN Turner 'Teaching Law through Literature' (1985-86) 14 University of Queensland 
Law Journal 61 at 84. 
He highlights works such as CP Snow's Strangers and Brothers (which concerns 
various ethical dilemmas within the law) and In their Wisdpm (revolving around 
testamentary issues, including the doctrine of undue influence}, as well as Edward 
Albee's Who's Afraid of Virginia Woolf? (concerning family law, and the 
disintegration of a marriage). 
In this regard, Turner is referring to the 'moral issues' illuminated in Greek dramas 
and Shakespearean tragedies, as well as in more modern contexts such as Harper Lee's 
To Kill a Mockingbird: See Turner loc cit at 65. 
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Domnarski68 asserts that reading legal fiction is important for the education of the legal 
scholar inasmuch as it allows him "to experience the human drama and to see the law from a 
participatory perspective" .69 Therefore, in order to qualify for analysis, Domnarski requires 
of such legal fiction that it provide the reader with "something [which] political, sociological, 
or historical studies cannot", namely, an appreciation of "the particular response of the 
individual to the law".70 
Other theorists, such as Brook Thomas,71 have gone into immense detail of 'Law in 
Literature'. Thomas analyses various literary texts in the light of their historical context72 in 
an attempt to entrench the value of literary criticism for an understanding of legal history. As 
William H Page notes, Thomas creates this historical context by drawing on three primary 
sources: first, the 'personal relationships' between the four authors he discusses and certain 
prominent judges of the time; secondly, by describing various 'celebrated legal cases' which 
are likely to have impacted on the authors' 'conceptions of social conflicts'; and thirdly, by 
relying on a Critical Legal Studies movement interpretation of legal history, i.e. an 
interpretation based upon the belief in "a dynamic relationship between the legal system and 
the economic and political order". In this sense through his analysis of 'Law in Literature' he 
advocates a policy of 'Law as Literature' in which legal decisions are viewed as literary 
works, containing narrative subtexts. It is these subtexts which Thomas analyses, and in so 
doing tacitly undermines the rational and impenetrable discourse of the law in an attempt to 
arrive at a clearer conception of justice. As burdensome as such a task may be, Thomas finds 
it necessary due to the fact that he believes 'Law in Literature' illustrates "the limitations of 
posing questions of justice the way we do". 73 
In a similar vein (but with a different rationale), Carolyn Heilbrun, Judith Resnik and Robyn 
West74 all maintain that legal discourse per se, as well as much of literacy discourse75 is 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
W Domnarski 'Law-Literature Criticism: Charting a Desirable Course with Billy 
Budd' (1984) 34 Journal of Legal Education 102. 
Idem 703. 
Ibid. 
B Thomas Cross Examination of Law and Literature (1987). 
B Thomas 'The Ideology of Law and Literature' (1988) 68 Boston University Law 
Review 805 at 808. 
B Thomas unpublished manuscript, as quoted by Gary Leeds 'Cross-examining the 
Narratives of law and literature' (1990) 40 Journal of Legal Education 195 at 200. 
C Heilbrun and J Resnik 'Convergences: Law, Literature and Feminism' (1990) 40 
Yale Law Journal 1913; R. West 'Communities, Texts and Law: Reflections on the 
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unable to effectively convey a morally just message owing to the fact that both discourses are 
focused on a male centre of consciousness which ignores the female experience. Therefore, 
although Resnik conceives of 'Law in Literature' as either a means of analysing "how 
lawyers are perceived by the larger culture" or as a means for "the educated lawyer to become 
a certain kind of well-read humanist",76 the underlying irony for her (as well as for other 
feminist scholars) is that since this very discourse is perceived in male terms, its stated task is 
rendered impotent.77 Moreover, at the core of feminist literary theory is the realisation of the 
need for women to develop their own language and narrative discourse so as to more 
effectively express themselves free from the constraints of a patriarchal society.78 
In tum, Ian Ward79 reflects generally on the great potential of literature to enlighten the study 
of law, while cautioning that such possibilities should not be sacrificed by converting the 
endeavour into an academic and inhibitive exercise accessible only to theoreticians. For this 
reason, Ward maintains that 'Law in Literature' presents an ideal vehicle for conveying and 
reflecting upon legal issues in an engaging manner. However, Ward reflects on the spectrum 
of opinion which exists amongst contemporary critics regarding narrative and metaphoric 
usage within legal discourse,80 while also pointing to the distinction between the use of 
metaphor and narrative drawn by many theoreticians in respect of 'Law in Literature'. 
Richard Posner, for example, acknowledges that the use of metaphor provides a means of 
enhancing judicial style, while he marginalises the importance of legal narrative. In contrast, 
75 
76 
77 
78 
.~ 
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Law and Literature Movement' (1988-89) 1 Yale Journal of Law and the Humanities 
129. 
This includes literary discourse in which legal matters are expounded i.e. 'Law in 
Literature'. 
Heilbrun and Resnik loc cit at 1936. 
Feminist scholars maintain that the 'female voice' (unlike the 'male voice') is 
inclusive, and hence more adept at being able to perceive the larger culture and create 
well-read humanists. 
It is difficult for a woman to define her feelings in language which is chiefly made by 
men to express theirs": See Thomas Hardy Far from the Madding Crowd (1974). As 
an aside it is worth noting how ironical this quotation actually is in the present 
context, since it is after all a man (Thomas Hardy) who provides a female character 
with her 'voice', and he does so by means of a male discourse..__ 
I Ward Law and Literature - Possibilities and Perspectives (19~5), hereafter referred 
to as Possibilities and Perspectives. 
Ranging from Richard Posner who maintains a cautious demeanour towards the 
application of literary devices in legal analysis through to James Boyd White who 
advocates the creation of 'community' by means of literary interpretative techniques 
of legal subjects. 
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Paul Ricoeur81 alleges that metaphor and narrative are essentially different aspects of the 
same process - 'storytelling' .82 It is this latter opinion (i.e. Ricoeur's) with which Ward aligns ' 
himself since he acknowledges that parables (or narrative fiction) together with metaphors 
have been used since Aristotelian times to interpret legal matters because they provide an 
effective and concise analytical tool.83 
In contrast to Ward, however, Richard Posner84 cautions against presuming that law and 
literature contain a shared core of understanding to which the legally trained reader is 
exclusively privileged simply because issues of a legal nature are frequently the topic of 
literary texts.85 Posner asserts (in accordance with the view espoused by George Orwell) that 
"survival [over a period of time] is the operational test of greatness in literature".86 For this 
reason literature must concern itself with issues of fundamental importance to the human 
experience in order to survive - one such issue being law. Therefore, he agrees with John 
Ellis87 that the term 'literature' is ·the "label we give to texts, of whatever character or 
provenance, that are taken to have a meaning that is independent of the specific context in 
which they were created".88 Consequently, references to law in literary texts tend to be 
general (rather than technical) and metaphorical, making their impact minimal in regard to 
legal studies per se. However, Posner makes an important distinction by conceding that 'Law 
in Literature', while being of little value to the mechanics of the law, does provide a basis for 
exploring the question of justice. Even texts which appear to be "pervasively and accurately 
about law"89 such as Mark Twain's Pudd'nhead Wilson or William Shakespeare's The 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
P Ricoeur Oneself as Another (1994). 
However, according to Ricoeur, the infusion of 'scientific' discourse into 
contemporary jurisprudential thinking has resulted in the general confinement of 
metaphoric usage and narrative discourse to minor areas of jurisprudential endeavour: 
Idem at 96. 
Ward Possibilities and Perspectives at 6. 
Posner A Misunderstood Relationship at 13. 
Posner maintains that the effects of this frequency should not be overstated because 
the occurrence of legal topics within literary texts "is partly a statistical artifact", and 
moreover the "law figures in literature more often as a metaphor than as an object of 
interest in itself': Idem at 71. 
Idem at 74. 
JM Ellis The Theory of Literary Criticism: A Logical Analysis (1974). 
R Posner A Misunderstood Relationship at 75. By applying this definition of 
'literature', Posner specifically excludes a great many 'populist' literary works from 
his analysis (even though they may contain insights into law) on the basis of their 
apparent transcience: Ibid. 
Idem at 79. 
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Merchant of Venice become (in Posner's estimation) works lacking sufficient accuracy and 
realism to depict the mechanisms of law, and are merely metaphorical interpretations of 
man's struggle with the concept of justice.90 
Further along the law-literature continuum are Richard Weisberg and James Boyd White who 
represent the quintessence of the 'Law as Literature' formulation. Both theorists propagate 
the deconstruction of the law-literature dichotomy so as to create a unified sphere of 
law-literature co-existence.91 The complexity of their individual positions, however, lies in 
their joint refusal to polarise the ideals of law and literature into reason and passion 
respectively.92 Therefore, in respect of 'Law in Literature' Weisberg notes the potential for 
the distortion of natural forces (such as love, community and power) through the medium of 
language.93 In essence, therefore, he acknowledges the similarity between legal and literary 
discourses,94 while appreciating that their necessary unity is potentially destructive.95 
In turn, James Boyd White applies an equally nimble approach to the law-literature axis by 
assigning to it the ambition of attaining "a more complex and integrated organisation of 
language and experience"96 by reconstituting them in our minds so that we arrive at a clearer 
understanding of the ethical system in which they operate. White contends that legal analysts 
are sensitive to the benefits of interdisciplinary studies, however he believes that their 
90 
91 
92 
93 
94 
95 
\ ... 
96 
In this regard, Posner is particularly critical of Robin West's reading of works by 
Franz Kafka which he slates as being too literal, and consequential resulting in the 
untenable juxtapositioning of law and literature. 
Although sharing this ideal,.Weisberg and White are by no means in agreement as to 
its implementation (as will be seen in the section, 'Law as Literature'). 
In other words, they refuse to regard the law-literature axis as embodying the marriage 
of sense and sensibility respectively. 
Thus, Richard Weisberg does not regard the law as the cause of the suppression of 
passionate arts. Rather he conceives of legal thinking as an example of the 
intellectual stagnation which language can impose on life. Literary texts embodying 
legal themes are, therefore, merely an illustration of this tension: See The Failure of 
the Word (1984). 
In this regard, Weisberg primarily focuses on the linguistic and formalistic narcissism 
(he uses the term 'ressentiment') of modernist literature and law. 
This fearsome potential of law-literature unity arises owing to the repressive 
capabilities of ethical power (i.e. law) when combined with aesthetic authority (i.e. 
literature), and the tendency this has to substitute "wit for judgement, elegance for 
substance, words for values": See Richard Weisberg The Failure of the Word (1984) 
at 178. As Robert Weisberg (1988) 1 Yale Journal of Law and the Humanities 1 at 34 
notes of his namesake "Richard Weisberg's work has demonstrated how a legal theme 
can exert specific gravity in fiction". 
JB White Words Beyond Theory (1985) at 881. 
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endeavours are confined to either ascertaining the 'findings' (or assertions) which such 
disciplines maintain in respect of the world, or to establishing the 'methods' (or analytical 
means) of such disciplines, and in both cases transposing these conclusions onto the field of 
law.97 Moreover, White maintains that these analytical methods are of "little value in forming 
the hopes and expectations that we should bring to imaginative literature"98 by virtue of the 
fact that legal analysts do not tum to literature to provide the legal process with assertions or 
analytical techniques. This is not, however, to say that literary studies do not inform one 
about the world, or that literary analysis is a meaningless operation, but simply that (in 
White's estimation) literature approaches one's self-awareness from a more acute angle than 
that of the law.99 Therefore, White asserts that an inherent necessity of literature is to 
"question the nature of the language in which [it] is written", 100 and by so doing bring to light 
the inadequacies of our basic tenets of communication. The result is the inevitable 
transformation of the Self through the reconstitution of language101 and the act of engaging 
with the literary text. 
In contrast to this 'literary metamorphosis' of self, legal texts merely provide us with 
information that, while it may aid in changing our mental perceptions of external concepts, 
will never require of us a fundamental re-assessment of self. For this· reason, 'Law in 
Literature' provides an important avenue by which to erode the law's doctrinal dependence 
and encourage it towards a re-appraisal of its own means and ends through the creation of a 
textual community. 
Conclusion 
The 'Law in Literature' arena, at its most basic level, depicts legal characters and themes 
within literary texts. However, on its own, such a banal interpretation does not enrich 
law-literature co-existence. Therefore, one must look beyond the pedestrian facade of 'Law 
in Literature' to appreciate its valuable contribution to thegreater law-literature endeavour. 
97 
98 
99 
100 
101 
JB White 'Law and Literature - No Manifesto' (1988) 39 Mercer Law Review 739 at 
740. 
Ibid. 
In White's words "[literature] complicates one's sense of oneself and the world, it 
humiliates the instrumentally calculating forms of reason so dominant in our culture": 
Words Beyond Theory at 741. 
Ibid. 
This is of great significance since we use language to define everything we know of 
the universe, including ourselves. 
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Moreover, based on one's analysis of 'Law in Literature' one tacitly establishes one's own 
frame of reference for larger law-literature issues. By this I mean that depending on the 
extent to which one conflates law and literature into a single community of understanding or 
entity (within the context of 'Law in Literature') determines, in my estimation, one's position 
against either 'Law and Literature' scholars or 'Law as Literature' theorists. This is because, 
as I later hope to show, the former category focus on distinguishing law from literature by 
creating (simplistically put) a rational law vs. passionate literature dichotomy. Therefore, for 
such scholars 'Law in Literature' provides a forum in which the extremes of both disciplines 
can be mitigated with reference to each other, while ensuring that their fundamental 
differences of identity are entrenched. In contrast, 'Law as Literature' theorists approach 
'Law in Literature' as a framework in which the essential 'sameness' of both disciplines is 
reflected in spite of their different perspectives and purposes. Having thus taken the first step 
into the philosophical dimension of law-literature study, it is now appropriate to expand on 
this initial understanding by investigating the area that is 'Law and Literature'. 
1.3 Law and Literature 
What follows is an analysis of a broad range of theoretical perspectives relating to 
law-literature which, not surprisingly, far from being complementary often challenge and 
contradict one another's perceptions of the endeavour. Although I make no apologies for 
what at first glance may strike one as a morass of theoretical and philosophical claims and 
counter-claims, I hasten to add that such seeming complexity is supported by sound (if 
somewhat unorthodox) method. 102 The source of cohesion with which I have chosen to unite 
---------" ,_. ... .,.. - -----·~ ·-· . - - . -· .. - - . 
conflicting theorists under the banner of 'Law and Literature' rests in my belief that they all 
share a fundamentally united vision of the law-literature relationship. This form of 
classification is unusual in th.a! it is ~!heorist-sp~ecific rattier than theory-specific. By this I 
mean that I am more concerned about placing theorists into 'Law and Literature' and 'Law as 
Literature' categories on the basis of their own ideological perspective rather than on the 
basis of their allegiance to feminist, modernist or post-modern theories. For this reason it 
will be noted that theorists traditionally aligned to particular theoretical genres will not be 
grouped together on the basis of such allegiance alone. For example, I divide feminist 
'> 
scholars into 'Law and Literature' proponents, such as, Teree E Foster, Carolyn Heilbrun, 
Judith Resnik and Jane Baron; and 'Law as Literature' adherents, such as, Robin West. I 
102 
'Unorthodox' not in the sense of frivolous, but rather (as I modestly submit) in the 
hope that it may provide a novel and worthwhile dimension to law-literature studies. 
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believe that by constituting the theoretical framework in this manner the philosophical 
undertaking which follows 103 will prove to be more focused. 
In respect of my immediate task, I have chosen to divide 'Law and Literature' into five areas 
of enquiry which, I believe, effectively account for the different theoretical standpoints 
present within this particular category of law-literature endeavour. 
(a) The Educative Desire of 'Law and Literature' 
Ian Ward104 notes that in contrast to most theoretical approaches to the law, the primary 
motivation of law-literature is educative. In this regard he finds support amongst other 
theoreticians, such as CRB Dunlop105, Nancy Cook106 and Jules Getman107• The foundation 
for this common belief is constructed from their individual encounters with the unique 
potential of the law-literature endeavour. Such potential arises from what has been described 
as the 'user-friendly' 108 nature of law-literature studies which enables its proponents to 
grapple with legal problems in an engaging environment. 109 Most importantly, the educative 
scope of such legal-literary union extends well beyond traditional assumptions of legal 
domain, and encompasses a desire to inform human beings and not simply legal automatons. 
Therefore, the importance of this inter-disciplinary unity is not merely based on the scope of 
its domain, but also on the manner in which it effectively conveys its concerns. 
Moreover, scholars adhering to such an 'educational doctrine' maintain that socio-political 
and economic ambitions associated with law-literature are all subject to its primary educative 
concern. Thus, it is a matter of first conveying understanding to (i.e. educating) legal 
scholars (through the medium of law-literature), and then enabling them to make use of such 
knowledge to formulate socio-political or economic assertions. The reason advanced for the 
need for such an educative understanding in the first place is the common manipulative 
103 
104 
105 
106 
107 
108 
i.e. The search for justice and justification. 
I Ward 'The Educative Ambition of Law and Literature' (1993) 13(1) Oxford Journal 
of Legal Studies 323; and 'From Literature to Ethics' (1994) 14(3) Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 390. 
C Dunlop 'Literature Studies in Law Schools' (1991) 3.1 Cardozo Studies in Law and 
Literature 63. 
N Cook 'Shakespeare Comes to the Classroom' (1998) 68.3 Denver University Law 
Review 387. 
J Getman 'Voices' (1988) 66 Texas Law Review 577. 
I Ward 'The Educative Ambition of Law and Literature'(l993) 13(1) Oxford Journal 
of Legal Studies 323 at 324. 
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tendency of lawyers and writers m respect of language, coupled with their pre-existing 
interaction in the field of 'Law in Literature'. Thus, the 'educative proponents' maintain that 
the knowledge lawyers glean from law-literature "will enable them to respond maturely to the 
genuine, and thus enhance the perception of law and justice in the community they serve; if 
they fail to do so, society may accept literature's perception of law and justice rather than the 
lawyers". 110 In effect, therefore, contrary to their alleged desire to see legal analysts become 
well-rounded individuals through the study of literary texts, a number of 'educative 
proponents' retain a hidden agenda. They simply wish lawyers to learn to manipulate 
language with a similar subtlety to the author's art, and in so doing retain their discoursory 
monopoly over the governance of society and the concept of justice. 
Although there are certain 'educative proponents' who genuinely desire the development of 
well-read legal humanists by means of law-literature studies, it is unfortunate that their good 
intentions have been partly scuttled from within their ranks. Not that their worthy ambitions 
are completely lost, however, for there remain those amongst them who, like Ian Ward, are 
loyal to the notion that "literature is ethical, because language is ethical". 111 Unfortunately, in 
the light of both modernist and post-modernist literary evaluation, this particular ethical 
perspective of language is difficult to defend, and is easily swept aside as a remnant of /\J? 
Romanticism. Therefore, in order to revitalise the worthy ideals of 'educative proponents', I 
propose a fundamental reappraisal of their method of analysis. 112 This can be achieved by 
acknowledging that language does not in itself present a higher and constant truth, but that it 
is rather a flawed means of presenting man's ideals and aspirations. With this as a backdrop, 
it becomes apparent that law-literature must acknowledge its existence within an imperfect 
world as well as its own blemished facility of expression (i.e. language). Working with these 
realisations its educative potential is not lost or fruitless, but, in fact, enhanced, for while the 
discourses of law and literature may individually prove incapable of providing a sufficiently 
incisive vision of reality, combined they can create an illuminating spectacle which is able to 
account for the vagaries of human existence in a more just manner. This is due to the fact 
109 
110 
111 
Rather than having to deal with legal issues within the impersonal confines of a purely 
legal discourse. ..~ 
JG Mowatt 'Teaching Law through Literature' (1992) 1 De Jure 416 at 417. 
I Ward 'From Literature to Ethics: Strategies and Ambitions of Law and Literature 
(1994) 14(3) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 389 at 395. 
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that both disciplines approach the human condition from different angles and thereby 
interpret it with a . differing emphasis, which when combined, creates a depth of 
understanding not present in either individual discipline. I submit that the disciplines of law f 
f 
and literature share a 'core of meaning' represented by the concept of justice. Both I 
disciplines are vessels into which an amorphous mass of reality is poured, and out of which 
man tries to come to a clearer understanding or better control of some particular element of 
human existence. In this regard, law leans more towards a better control, and literature 
towards a better understanding. However, when combined, I maintain that these two 
disciplines allow one to glimpse a grander reality in which justice resides. 
Therefore, while instituting a re-assessment of law-literature's educative focus, I in no way 
wish to detract from its foundation (i.e. the education of legal analysts), but simply wish to 
-· 
magnify its potential. For I believe that the law-literature endeavour must go beyond 
educating lawyers simply for the sake of creating well-versed cultural connoisseurs, and that 
it should, in fact, take them on a far more fruitful journey - in search of justice and 
justification. 
(b) The Economic Dimension of 'Law and Literature' 
Richard Posner, 113 (who in recent years has been a regular contributor to issues of a 
law-literature nature as well as other interdisciplinary legal studies) is the most vocal 
supporter of the need for viewing both law and literature in the light of market-based 
economic principles. 
The essence of Posner's particular perspective regarding the law-literature relationship (or 
more aptly, given his views, the law-literature dichotomy) is partly found in his statement that 
unlike law, "literature is not concerned with establishing the truth of propositions".114 On this 
basis it could, therefore, be argued that literature is relegated ·to a low rung on the tacitly 
)4 constructed 'Posnerian ladder' of noble and worthy disciplines, at the apex of which resides 
economics and economic interpretation of all other disciplines (including law). However, it 
could also be presumed that Posner's statement refers to a belief that literature is content 
112 
I 13 
114 
In this sense, I do not wish to re-assert the Romantic ideals of linguistic transparency, 
but simply to illuminate the manner in which the educative potential of law-literature 
can be pragmatically re-awakened. 
Posner A Misunderstood Relationship. 
Idem at 270. 
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merely to pose questions in its search for 'truth', while law is obliged to provide one with { 
definitive answers. Even if one accepts this latter interpretation, however, there is a r, 
L 
fundamental flaw in the entire assertion since there is no logical basis for presuming that law 
should come any closer to attaining 'truth' (let alone representing it) than literature does, 
given that they are both human creations which are imperfectly communicated through the 
medium of language. Ironically, Posner later asserts that "the reason why rhetoric or style is 
important in law is that many legal questions cannot be resolved by logical or empirical 
demonstration". 115 This statement surely undermines any attempts by Posner to infuse the law 
with moral authority over and above that possessed by literature. Furthermore, I maintain 
that this acknowledgement (by Posner) of law's reliance on an element of human intuition 
beyond mere reason indicates the essential 'sameness' of law and literature. This is because { ~ 
both disciplines are borne of man's uncertain and intuitive steps to define and control his ( 
I 
existence; they both suffer from the same shortcomings of language in attempting to find 1 
expression to their desires; and they both merely represent two avenues of human endeavour { 
I 
whose ultimate focus is the search for truth and justice. 116 
Posner is critical of White's assertion that the languages of law and literature share I 
I 
fundamental similarities which enable a scholar of the one ~iscipline to provide unique I 
conceptual insights into the study of the other discipline. According to Posner, the narrow 1 
I 
focus of legal training precludes legal scholars from formulating any profound insights into 
non-technical issues of law within literary contexts; however, he is prepared to concede that 
the concept of 'revenge' does create a point of connection between the two disciplines. He 
asserts that 'revenge' may be viewed as both a legal prototype and a literary genre. With 
regard to law, Posner indicates that the origins of modern legal systems can be traced back to 
a system of revenge whose purpose was to achieve justice in earlier societies; while in the 
field of literature, 'revenge' provides a recurrent and universal theme. 117 Furthermore, Posner 
115 
116 
117 
Idem at 284. 
All three of these fundamental similarities lack any logical raison d'etre, and are 
created and maintained on a level which transcends logic and reason, and embraces 
instinct, intuition and spirituality. 
Vengeance, however, has proved to be an ineffective means of maintaining order 
(according to Posner) since it produces an underspecialised workforce because it 
requires all members of the community to dabble in the culture of revenge, rather than 
concentrating on specialised occupations and leaving law-enforcement to others; it 
also hampers large-scale co-operation, since people tend to look after their own 
interests or the interests of small, intensely loyal groups; moreover, because of the 
savagery and frequency of revenge, the subsequent feuds tend to be more destructive 
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is willing to acknowledge the existence of similarities in the structural frameworks of law and 
<"/ literature which result in parallel tensions, the most notable being "the theme of rule versus 
discretion". 118 In the legal context this is evidenced by the rules of precedent relating to 
,,..----·-·· 
judicial decisions which are balanced against judicial discretion; while within a literary 
framework, a writer is subject to grammatical rules and scholastic conventions (such as 
meter, pronunciation and genre), while retaining some measure of independence as to the 
construction of his work. Given such superficial similarities between the two disciplines, 
coupled with Posner's insistence that legal analysts cannot benefit in a fundamental manner 
from law-literature studies, it is surprising that his assertion leading on from this should be 
that law-literature studies are an avenue for bringing broader issues of legality and justice 
within the range and understanding of legal scholars. Surely if this is so then legal scholars 
benefit in a most crucial manner from law-literature studies, for what can be more vital to the 
study of law than an appreciation of the concept of justice. 
In essence, while seeking to distinguish law from literature on the basis of their mutually 
exclusive desires, Posner simultaneously analyses both disciplines in the light of an economic 
cost/benefit paradigm based on market forces (i.e. the law must internalise its costs so as to 
ensure that neither the individual plaintiff or the larger society/market unduly benefit from 
the law's actions; while, the true test of literary greatness is survival over time in the sea of 
changing market forces). While I agree that "the ability to make distinctions is as important _ 
to knowledge as the ability to make connections, 119 and while I am prepared to accept 
Posner's assertion that the effect of an economic vocabulary "is not to conceal unpleasant 
realities but to achieve analytical precision",120 what is apparent is that (aims aside) the effect 
of such analytical precision inevitably results in the vagaries and uncertainties of reality being 
suppressed by the veil of 'theoretical economic certainty' (i.e. for every human action there is 
a rational explanation which can be accounted for in terms of economic discourse). It is this 
element of Posner's argument which I find disturbing since, in my view, it denies the primacy 
of the very 'human condition' upon which it is based - the element of uncertainty. 
118 
119 
120 
than the initial "offence"; furthermore, seeking justice through revenge can result in 
lax punishment since revenge is dependant upon anger which rapidly fades away; and 
finally, justice based on revenge is morally crude. 
Posner A Misunderstood Relationship at 113. 
Posner A Misunderstood Relation at 353. 
Idem at 310. 
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Considering his 'economics' perspective, it is not surprising that Posner is sceptical of the 
claims made by deconstructionists and the Critical Legal Studies movement with regard to 
the inherent ambiguity of literary works and legal texts. However, it is Posner's assertion that 
there are far too many differences between literary and legal texts (i.e. that no tangible 
benefits can be gained from a cross-application of interpretative techniques) that leads him to 
assume an unusual interpretative stance. Due to this latter assertion, Posner does not regard 
himself as being inconsistent when he approaches legal interpretation from an 'intentionalist' 
perspective, while seeking to understand literary texts from within the context of a 'New 
Critic' approach. In essence, therefore, Posner the 'legal intentionalist', maintains that one 
must analyse the words, structure and background of a statute (or other legal text) so as to 
establish how the framers would have approached a particular problem had it occurred to 
them. In contrast, Posner the 'literary New Critic', regards a literary work as a coherent 
~ 
whole in and of itself, thus precluding any need for establishing the authorial intent so as to 
better comprehend the work. 
In the 'intentionalist' framework, the author assumes a pivotal role towards which all the 
readers' concerns are centred. Not only is it acknowledged that the author has a reason for 
including all the details he does, but it is also assumed that to understand the work a reader is 
required to appreciate the author's reasons. The corollary to intentionalism lies in what 
Posner describes as "an extreme form of 'reader response' criticism"121 through which the 
meaning of the literary text is regarded as the creation of the individual reader. The 'via 
media' of these two approaches is evidenced in 'New Criticism' which rejects the notion of 
both authorial-centred (i.e. intentionalism) or reader-centred (i.e. reader-response) literary 
interpretation, and assigns primacy to the work itself. 
Moreover, Posner criticises 'intentionalist' theories applied to literature because he believes 
they drain a work of its potential to relate to people and situations across time and space by 
confining the work to the author's perspective. In stating this, Posner concedes that "a work 
of literature is a deliberate human creation, and in that sense intentional"; 122 however, he 
maintains that issues of literary interpretation are by no means most effectively approached 
~)( analysing authorial intentions, since "the creation of works of J.i~erature is not a fully 
• 
self-conscious activity", 123 coupled with the fact that "an author may lack an adequate 
121 
122 
123 
Idem at 219. 
Idem at 228. 
Idem at 229. 
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perspective for understanding his work". 124 Ultimately, Posner believes that the 'aesthetic 
enjoyment' embodied in a literary work is diminished (rather than enhanced) if the work is 
engulfed by issues of intention which are "remote from the textual surface, and usually, 
banal" .125 Furthermore, since the rationale for excluding authorial intent from literary texts is 
premised on aesthetic criteria, Posner concludes that issues of intention within literary and 
legal contexts are far removed from each other, since he maintains aesthetics are of no 
concern in legal texts. 126 
With regard to legal texts, therefore, Posner maintains that an 'intentionalist' approach to 
interpretation is appropriate. This is due to the fact that, unlike literary texts which are often 
multi-faceted and contain various layers of meaning, legal texts are one dimensional and 
solely focused on conveying to the reader the legislature's or judiciary's commands and 
condusions~ ·· Furthermote,-the importance of-constraining legal interpretations to authorial 
intent rests on the need to create certainty within the law and thereby instil confidence in the 
authority of the legal system. 127 
The only junctures at which Posner foresees legal and literary interpretation connecting are in 
situations in which it is the legislature's intention to delegate its lawmaking function to the 
courts, and cases in which the intention of the legislature is not capable of being clarified. 
The former situation refers to "legitimately judge-made law", 128 and thus coincides with an 
analysis of authorial intent within literature; while the latter case coincides with situations in 
which one simply cannot arrive at the original intentions of the legislative framers. In this 
latter situation, however, Posner cautions against applying Dworkinian reasoning which 
views the court's interpretative task as the creation of the best rule. of law possible. The 
reason for Posner's concern stems from the fact that he contends such an approach belies a 
naive understanding of the legislative process, as well as the fact that the comparison between 
124 
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127 
128 
Idem at 230. 
Ibid. 
Moreover, Posner asserts that much of the literary appeal in respect of intention rests 
on the "romantic fascination with the personality of the artist": See Posner idem at 
238. In tum, (so the argument goes) this results in an academic exercise which 
subjugates all meaning to authorial intent rather than creating a liberating experience 
through which the text is able to transcend the time and space of its own creation. 
While Posner concedes that in certain situations there is a need to interpret the 
wording of legal texts in the light of the framers' intentions, he asserts that this is not 
to denounce his fundamental premise that one of the prerequisites for legal legitimacy 
is that the interpreter of the text must subordinate himself to the author in all respects. 
Posner idem at 246. 
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a judge interpreting the legislative provision so as "to make it the best possible statement of 
political principle or social policy", 129 and a literary critic doing the same to a literary text is 
deceptive. Moreover, Posner seeks to elaborate on this erroneous similarity by distinguishing 
the roles of the legal interpreter (judge) and the literary interpreter (critic) on a number of 
grounds all of which rest on the same fundamental assertion, namely that acts of judges are 
politically and socially "far-reaching" and on this basis in need of conformity; whereas the 
interpretation of literature, no matter how absurd it may be, is ultimately a 'harmless' act. 130 
In so doing, Posner denounces any theories attempting to show the fundamental 'sameness' 
of legal and literary interpretation based on the fact that (according to Posner) both 
disciplines have essentially divergent focuses. 131 
Posner acknowledges the fact that certain scholars believe literature has the potential to I 
infuse the law with moral meaning and universal values due to its focus as a "surer source of I 
knowledge about human nature, social interactions and other background information f 
important to judges" .132 However, he rejects the notion that literature is in any way a moral ( 
prism reflecting reality in a morally righteous and timeless manner. On the contrary, Posner I ~ 
maintains that just as notions of morality change over time, so the notions of morality 
depicted in literature merely reflect a particular age's beliefs. Thus, "a fair amount of 
literature is immoral by current standards" .133 On this basis, he asserts that far from being a 
moral force, great literature (which in Posner's definition is literature which has withstood 
market pressures over time) has the ability to induce the reader "to suspend moral 
judgements",134 and in so doing it becomes universal. Moreover, Posner believes that the 
didactic school of thought whose literary critiques assign moral and political values to 
literature is in danger of creating such a strong politico-literary link that literature may 
potentially find itself subject to some form of public regulation. 
Furthermore, Posner is dubious of the assertion that a literary background provides people 
with a broader sense of the human condition, thereby making judges, for example, more 
knowledgeable and able to more effectively arrive at just decisions. The reason for his 
132 
133 
Idem at 247. 
Ibid. 
Likewise, as previously indicated, Posner also rejects claims made by 
deconstructionists and the CLS movement regarding the inherently problematic nature 
of legal and literary interpretation given the essential ambiguity of language. 
Posner idem at 301. 
Idem at 298. 
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scepticism lies in Posner's belief that too great an immersion in literature may result in people 
reformulating their expectations and perceptions within the fictional environment of a literary f 
framework, and hence distancing themselves from reality and the human condition. This line \ 
of argument appears cogent, yet it once again emerges as a result of one of Posner's I 
fundamentally inaccurate premises, namely, that literature lacks the capacity to reflect the 1 
human condition with the same efficiency and insight as economics due to the former's ( 
reticence to provide finality on issues. In literature's defence, however, I assert that its 
reluctance to commit itself with any finality on issues regarding the human condition is 
merely an indication of its incisive appreciation of human existence which itself defies 
comprehension in terms of unwavering definitional characteristics. Moreover, given this 
'literary appreciation' of existence, one must surely acknowledge that Posner's 
economics-based reading of la~~ith its emphasis SJn certainty and finality is more removed 
from reality than is literature, and in this sense may be said to be not unlike the Romantic 
ideal of which it accuses literature. 
Due to Posner's conservative conceptual framework135 he envisages a narrow connection 
between law and literature based upon the 'aesthetic integrity' of literature as evidenced from 
134 
135 
Idem at 298. 
The use of 'conservative' and 'conceptual' (in the sense of being visionary) to 
describe Posner's views may appear contrary and contradictory, yet I believe the 
words are truthfully ironical. Posner is clearly an erudite and well-read individual, 
moreover he is acutely aware of the benefits of inter-disciplinary approaches to legal 
understanding (to which his numerous books and articles bear testimony), and in this 
light I would label him 'conceptual'. Yet, Posner's approach to all inter-disciplinary 
endeavours is fraught by a conservative spectre (in the form of economics) which he 
carries everywhere with him. It is this insistence on erasing the uncertainties and 
vagaries of human existence and replacing them with structured economic principles 
that justifies, in my opinion, Posner's being labelled 'conservative'. This is not to say 
that 'liberal' scholars are more able to account for the 'uncertainties and vagaries' 
thereby making their approach to law correct. Rather, such 'liberal' scholars concede 
the vagaries of human existence and structure their arguments around this factor -
unlike Posner's economic approach which first erases all traces of uncertainty by 
denying their existence, and then claims to have arrived at a true and incisive 
reflection of existence. Therefore, I disagree with Posner's approach not because of 
any lack of structured and clearly reasoned arguments on his part, but rather in spite of 
such arguments. I cannot accept his approach because of the foundations upon which 
it is based and the economics-biased vision which he seeks to propogate. 
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its 'impartiality', 136 'scrupulousness' and 'concreteness' .137 Moreover, it is in this light that he 
confesses "a preference for literature that expresses a realistic awareness of the tensions and 
ironies of the human condition", 138 while acknowledging that one should not completely 
disregard "the Romantic impulse - the sense of infinite human potential" .139 These two 
statements can be seen as the joint keystones around which Posner's arch of perception is 
constructed, and they provide the basis for much of his reasoning. For in my opinion, the fact ('() 
that he regards a 'realistic awareness' and a 'Romantic impulse' as separate and largely 
self-sufficient entities goes a long way to explaining his sole reliance on an 
'economics-based' approach (as his vision of reality) towards both law and literature, to the I 
almost total exclusion of any other influences. This indicates that Posner fails to sense the ! 
fundamental tension and irony inherent in human existence, namely, that realism and 
Romanticism are simply two sides of the same concept - i.e. man's vision of reality; 140 and I 
\ 
assert that it is the interaction between the sense of reality and the desire for Romanticism "I 
within man that make his vision of the world so complex. 141 One cannot, therefore, accept 
Posner's economics-vision of reality if one wishes to remain true to the belief that an 
unaccountable tension underlies all human endeavour. 142 Consequently, the 
realism-Romanticism friction indicates the need for a more empathic (and consequently 
anti-economics) vision of law. 
Furthermore, in contrast to Posner, I maintain that not only is the study of law and literature i 
an illustration of 'realism-Romanticism' interdependence (and hence vital to an appreciation 11 
of the vagaries of human existence); but also that in terms of this relationship, law sides/ 
more with the 'Romantic' ideal, and literature more with the 'realistic' perspective. This may\ 
i 
seem a startling assertion to make given the fact that law prides itself on its ability to control 1 
I 
the actions of people in the 'real world', while literature appears to be little more than an 
intellectual indulgence in 'Never-Never land'. Yet, in spite of such beliefs, I assert the 
136 
137 
138 
139 
140 
141 
142 
Posner defines it as its "detachment, empathy, balance, perspective, a complex 
awareness of the possibility of other perspectives than the writer's own: See Posner 
idem at 301. 
Ibid. 
Idem at 304. 
Idem at 305. 
As opposed to being two separate and unrelated concepts. 
As TS Eliot stated in Four Quartets "humankind cannot bear too much reality": See 
TS Eliot: A Collection (1987). 
This tension results from the attempt to formulate untarnished ideals from the 
imperfect materials of human existence. 
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'realistic' supremacy of literature above that of law given the fact that literature embodies the~ /) 
intellectual, emotive and intuitive capabilities of man to strive for some understanding of his 
reality, while the law represents little more than the framework of man's desires and romantic/ 
ideals. In making these assertions, however, I am in no way implying that literature is 
pragmatic and law is idealistic. For in adhering to such a dichotomy, I would merely be 
creating a fallacy similar to that of which I accuse Posner. Rather, all I· intend by this 
reasoning is that while acknowledging that law and literature are both wrought with 
realist-Romantic tensions, I believe the law to be more influenced by the 'Romantic', and 
literature by the 'realistic' strands of human existence. I concede that this is not likely to be a 
popular sentiment, but I feel it needs to be made since it is my view that it is only as a result 
of the dominance of legal discourse (and without any logical foundation) that literature and 
literary discourse have come to be seen, at best, as pleasant diversions from the 'real world'. 
Finally, it is only in undermining the Posnerian dichotomies of law/literature and economic 
realism/literary romanticism that will, I believe, enable the search for justice to be effectively 
undertaken. 
(c) The Social Realities of 'Law and Literature' 
Carolyn Heilbrun and Judith Resnik143 approach law-literature interaction from a feminist ! 
focus, and in so doing criticise many of its analysts (such as Ian Ward and Richard Posner) 1( 
who, they claim have failed to give due regard to the 'female voice'. They maintain that this \ 
disregard of the female perspective is not in itself surprising given the social realities of 
patriarchal society, which in tum impact upon legal and literary disciplines to form a 
male-biased canon of perception. However, in analysing the sexist assumptions underlying 
both law and literature, Heilbrun and Resnik hope not only to enlighten an audience burdened· 
by this sense of false consciousness, but also to provide a viable (feminist) vision to replace 
the present social order. 144 
This feminist perspective (in terms of description, analysis and theory) is based upon the real 
experiences of women, which in tum aid the process of acknowledging the importance of the 
143 
144 
Loe cit. 
What adds to the interest of Heilbrun and Resnik's analysis of law-literature is that 
they postulate a feminist standpoint from different disciplines - Heilbrun from a 
literary perspective and Resnik from a legal point of view. 
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'female voice', as well as re-evaluating the legitimacy of a purely male-centred discourse. 
Moreover, at the core of this feminist perception of self lies the belief that the proximity 
between the theoretical plane and real experience which it advocates provides feminism with 
a unique and invaluable insight into both law and literature. In this regard, Heilbrun laments 
the fact that no male analysis on law and literature145 has to date acknowledged the virtues of 
feminist interpretive critique. 146 These feminist benefits are further expounded by Teree 
Foster147 who asserts that "one must question the relationship between the status of women in tt 
American Society and the role of the legal system in perpetuating this status". 148 Only by so 1 
doing can one achieve a "sensitive understanding of the human experience"149 - more ( 
I 
specifically, the female experience. 
The primary concern of these three feminist analysts is, therefore, to use the field of 'Law and } 
Literature' to explore "the conditions of women and [create an] understanding of the ways in I I 
which patriarchy assaults women's rights and choices". 150 They thus view literature in a very 
focused light - i.e. as a means of concretising the marginalised voice of female experience 
into the life of the law; and consequently as a way in which to legitimize and humanise legal 
discourse. This is clearly a worthy task based upon justifiable concerns. However, in my 
view, none of the critics mentioned analyses the law-literature relationship in terms beyond 
its 'social realities'. In other words, they confine themselves to the task of reconstituting the 
female-self in law and literature, and do not venture to explore the underlying congruence 
between law-literature per se (i.e. they do not embark upon an analysis of 'Law as 
Literature'). This is not unexpected since the scope of their task is, in itself, monumental, 
however it is unfortunate that they do not extend law-literature along its natural hermeneutic 
145 
146 
147 
148 
149 
150 
With one exception, namely, Stanley Fish Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, 
Rhetoric and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies (1989) (hereafter 
referred to as Doing What Comes Naturally). 
Heilbrun refers to Ibsen's play A Doll's House to illustrate the legal bias in favour of 
men which continues through to the present - "There are two kinds of moral laws, two 
kinds of conscience, one for men and one, quite different, for women. They don't 
understand each other; but in practical life, woman is judged by masculine laws, as 
though she weren't a woman but a man": See Ibsen: A Biography (1971) at 466. 
TE Foster 'But is it Law? Using Literature to Penetrate Societal Representations of 
Women' (1993) 43(1) Journal of Legal Education 133. 
Idem at 135. Of course, the enquiry ought not to be confined to American society 
alone, and is applicable to all patriarchal communities. 
Idem at 136. 
Heilbrun and Resnik: Loe cit at 1927. 
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I 
progression - i.e. the formulation of 'Law as Literature' - which in turn creates the possibility 
for a more sublime conclusion in which justice is of paramount importance. 151 
(d) The Political Context of 'Law and Literature' 
The 'social realities' of law-literature as brought to light by feminist scholars naturally extend ', 
into an analysis of its political context. This is due to the fact that issues of socio-political 
concern of necessity enjoy a symbiotic relationship with each other since both arenas (i.e. 
social and political) provide structural manifestations of a community's anatomy. Thus, for 
example, the social reality which dictates that female experience is to be marginalised is 
situated within the political context of patriarchal domination. Therefore, as Jane Baron 152 
-indicates, ·law not only recognises an exclusive type of story (i.e. based upon a male 
perspective) but it also places constraints on the ways in which the story is to be told. In so 
doing, "the extent [to which] stories and storytelling technique govern what and how things 
are said in legal fora, they are vital to understanding the way in which power is exercised". 153 
Moreover, Baron perceptively notes that the manner in which stories exercise power can be 
used to subvert present power-relations (including the political context in which power 
operates) and replace them with a different strategical framework in which to operate. 
Similarly, Judith Koffler154 regards the 'law-literature movement' 155 as "an alliance that aims 
at generating political friction, intentionally going against the grain ... and an effective 
agitation of the organs of power" .156 In this regard, she brings to light an interesting 
151 
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155 
156 
I do not develop upon the 'social dimension' which is presented by these feminist 
scholars, at this juncture. However, I do continue my exploration into it when I come 
to discuss Robin West in the section 'Law as Literature'. 
JB Baron 'Resistance to Stories' (1994) 67 Southern California Law Review 255 at 
260. 
Idem at 265. Thus, over time and through repetition the dominant stories attain a truth 
of their own and become accepted as the way things are. 
JS Koffler 'Forged Alliance: Law and Literature' (Book Review) (1989) 89 Columbia 
Law Review 1374. 
Koffler refers to the 'American chapter' of law-literature interaction in disparaging 
terms. She deems it to have been constituted by a series of theorists with differing 
perspectives, whose only point of connection was their desperate desire to infuse the 
law with a humanistic perspective. In so doing, these theorists have (according to 
Koffler) unwittingly stumbled onto a common focus in the form of a law-literature 
association, and consequently had the term 'movement' imposed on their individual 
endeavours. 
Koffler idem at 1375. 
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dichotomy by distinguishing between the law-literature 'movement' and the law-literature 
'industry' - the former consisting of subversive (and chiefly political) scholastic attacks on 
the staid legal establishment; while the latter embodies the legal establishment's (primarily 
political) attempt to mould law and literature into an industry of authority and respectability 
under its conservative auspices. Consequently, Koffler finds herself in total disagreement 
with Richard Posner's perspective of law-literature due to his tacit belief that literary 
interpretation cannot be regarded as interpretation "if it draws support from an ethical or 
political position from a text". 157 Koffler, therefore, concludes that, in essence, Posner finds I' 
no room in his objective and 'reasonable' universe of male-centred law for female voices or I 
literature about women. In contrast, Koffler regards Benajmin Cardozo's 158 interpretation 
(with which she does not agree) of the law-literature relationship as forwarding the notion 1 
that inescapable truths and justice can be reached by means of these dual disciplines, due to I 
the fact that (she contends) Cardozo regards law as being a form of literature. Moreover, it is i 
interesting to note that Koffler's vision of the law-literature symbiosis is in certain respects ( 
similar to that of Thurman Amold,159 who regards law as merely being a gigantic folktale \ 
without any particular focus on truth and justice, whose sole purpose is the protection of l 
private property interests. 
Once again, it is unfortunate that while these proponents of law:.literature's political bias 
provide astute arguments in support of their cause, they fail to extend their reasoning beyond 
the immediate political context of patriarchal domination. By so doing, they tacitly denounce 
the possibility of a greater political reality in the context of which a sense of justice might 
prevail. 160 
157 
158 
159 
160 
Idem at 1382. 
B Cardozo Law and Literature and Other Essays (1931) at 116. 
T Arnold The Folklore of Capitalism (1937) at 77. 
Admittedly, feminist theory per se alleges that justice can only exist once female 
discourse is entrenched within the legal and literary canon. }Jowever, I believe that 
this argument, as it stands, does not go far enough towards its•desired ambition. In 
my estimation, in order to attain a state of justice (at least in a theoretical,· if not a 
pragmatic sense) one must go beyond the mere inclusion of minority discourses into 
the accepted canon, and one should delve into the underlying tensions and similarities 
of law and literature. It is this further enquiry which is required, and which can only 
be attained through a conception of law-literature in terms of 'Law as Literature'. 
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(e) The Spectre of Duelling Discourses 
Ronald Dworkin161 maintains that law per se is an interpretative undertaking which is 
unavoidably political. Moreover, he asserts that legal propositions are interpretative of legal 
history without requiring an appreciation or analysis of authorial intent since in many cases 
"the author has no intention either way and . .. on others his intention cannot be 
discovered" .162 In this regard he, therefore, proposes a policy of 'law as integrity' which aims 
to ensure that all legal interpretation conforms with doctrinal history while simultaneously 
striving towards social goals and principles of justice. 163 To illustrate his vision, Dworkin 
makes use of the 'chain-novel' which would appear to suggest his allegiance to 'Law as 
Literature' theorists. However as I intend to show, Dworkin's conceptual framework lacks 
certain fundamental characteristics of 'Law as Literature' discourse. 
In essence, the 'chain novel' represents the continuum of subsequent judicial decisions along 
which legal reasoning on a particular point of law has developed. 164 Rather than b~ing 
arbitrary or inconsistent, however, this progression of judicial analysis is bound together by a 
common desire to jointly "create, so far as they can, a single unified novel that is the best it 
can be". 165 This, in turn, ensures that all 'novelists' give due regard to the judicial precedent 
preceding their contribution, and strive to maintain conformity by means of the dimensions of 
'fit' and 'interpretation' .166 
However, despite apparent allusions to an interpretative connectedness between legal and 
I 
literary texts, I believe that Dworkin's focus lies elsewhere. He makes use of the 'chain 1 
\ 
novel' not because of a belief in the intrinsic worth of literary interpretation when applied to I 
161 
162 
163 
164 
165 
166 
R Dworkin 'Law as Interpretation' (1982) 60 Texas Law Review 527. 
Idem at 529. 
Idem at 545. 
Dworkin regards the judges as novelists in the enterprise, whose individual decisions 
contribute to the creation of a single 'chapter' in the greater endeavour. 
R Dworkin Law's Empire (1986) at 229. 
Dworkin asserts that all legal interpretations must be tested in terms of these two 
dimensions so as to maintain conformity and achieve just results. First, the 
'dimension of fit' must be satisfied, by which he means that in adopting a particular 
interpretation an individual author must ensure that it conforms to the general pattern 
laid down by judicial precedents. (This is not however, to say that the judicial 
interpretation in question must 'fit' all aspects of the precedent). Secondly, in 
situations in which several possible interpretations 'fit' the text in question, then the 
'dimension of interpretation' or value (i.e. that which is most morally appealing) must 
be relied upon to ensure that the interpretation chosen is that which best advances the 
text towards its just ends. 
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legal analysis, but simply because he maintains that legal and literary interpretation happen to 
share a common desire, namely, the ambition of creating the best legal or literary 'novel' 
possible. While I regard all attempts to understand legal reasoning in terms of literary 
. 
discourse as valuable avenues of exploration, I find that Dworkin has, in many respects, l 
forged a false and superficial alliance between the two disciplines. This stems from the fact 
that Dworkin applies a Posnerian analysis of literary texts by tacitly assuming that the text 
represents a coherent whole from within whose sphere no details are accidental as they all 
contribute to the work's meaning. 167 However, when such an analytical technique is 
transposed onto legal interpretation (i.e. when every included detail is deemed to be 
significant) then the very structure of the text disintegrates and frivolous assumptions arise as 
to its meaning. This is because (to continue Dworkin's analogy) while a small percentage of 
literary texts may have successive authors thereby creating a "chain novel", all legal texts are, 
by their very nature, constituted by both multiple and successive authors. This is due to the 
fact that legislative bodies comprising tens, if not hundreds, of individuals impact upon the 
form of certain legal texts (i.e. Acts of Parliament) which are, in tum, often referred to and 
interpreted by single or full judicial benches in their own legal texts (i.e. judgements). The 
result being the creation Of a modernist or even post-modernist novelistic structure in the case 
of legal texts, rather than the Romantic and highly stylised form suggested by the 'chain 
novel'. This should not, however, detract from the fact that Dworkin appreciates an essential 
concern of law and literature, namely, the question of interpretation of texts. Nonetheless, 
while critics remain divided as to the benefits of his 'chain novel' vision what remains 
self-evident (at least as far as I am concerned) is that Dworkin's thesis at no point delves 
beneath his self-imposed novelistic framework to question the underlying hermeneutic 
tensions common to both law and literature. By this I mean that he fails to fully explore the 
concept of law through the lens of literary perception, while also not engaging with the 
mutual desire of both disciplines to strive for something beyond themselves. It is this failure 
which entrenches a law-literature dichotomy and prevents Dworkin from entering the 
philosophical plane of 'Law as Literature'. 
,\ 
167 In contrast, Hershel Parker argues in Flawed Texts and Verbal Icons: Literary 
Authority in American Literature ( 1984 ), that this presumption ought to be rebuttable 
owing to the many 'radically imperfect works of literature': See Posner A 
Misunderstood Relationship at 245 n61. 
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Stanley Fish168 also concerns himself with issues regarding the nature of interpretation similar 
to those espoused by Dworkin. Notwithstanding this, however, while Dworkin asserts the 
existence of a distinction between the first 'author' in the chain who merely creates, and 
subsequent 'authors' who both create and interpret;169 Fish, in contrast, argues that no 
distinction exists between the initial 'author' and subsequent 'authors' along the chain. The 
reason for this (according to Fish) lies in the fact that the initial 'author' can begin any type of 
'novel' he wishes, but his choice must conform to the requirements of 'novel writing' per 
se. 170 Therefore, for Fish, the central point of authority remains authorial interpretation of the 
text no matter how far along the authorial 'chain' one travels. 171 Moreover, in this regard, 
while Dworkin's notion of the chain enterprise provides him with a foundation upon which to 
explain the consistency inherent in the judicial and literary process, Fish maintains that any 
extreme judicial decision does not constitute a judge "striking out in a new direction", 172 but 
is merely a continuation (albeit a bizarre one) of the initial enterprise along non-judicial lines. 
Furthermore, Fish asserts that if a judge can provide a reasoned explanation for arriving at a 
different decision to that of his predecessors, then such a decision is not new since "it will 
have been implicit in the enterprise as a direction one could conceive of and argue for" .173 
In essence, therefore, while Dworkin believes in the judicial integrity of prior decisions (in 
accordance with which present judgements must conform or risk illegitimacy), Fish maintains 
that to conceive of present judgements in the context of past decisions is, in effect, to 
"reconceive that chain by finding it in an applicability that has not always been apparent" .174 
In so doing, Fish asserts that in order for judicial decisions to retain the integrity of the 
168 
169 
170 
171 
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173 
174 
Fish op cit. 
Thus as the 'chain novel' progresses so the constraints on each subsequent author 
become greater. 
As Fish puts it, the initial author is "neither free nor constrained (if these words are 
understood as referring to absolute states), but free and constrained": Op cit at 89. 
However, this is not to be interpreted as a carte blanche for whimsical or obscure 
readings of earlier texts by 'authors', since they are all merely free agents within the 
constraints of the textual enterprise itself. 
Op cit at 93. 
Ibid. Furthermore, although this does not preclude such a decision from being 
criticised, any criticism will be based upon the judicial direction of the decision rather 
than its inherent 'newness'. 
Op cit at 94. 
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reasoning from whence they sprung they must continually revise and reinterpret that past so 
that the lessons it has to teach may be of value to the present. 175 
Most importantly, Fish agrees with Posner's fundamental assertion that literary and legal 
interpretation are distinct enterprises. However, he disagrees with Posner's justification for 
the dichotomy based upon the notion of 'intention'. Posner conceives of the interpretative 
process as either a means by which to discern the authorial intention (in the case of legal 
texts) or a means by which to assign some satisfactory and coherent meaning to a text 
independent of authorial intent (in the case of literary texts). Each interpretative method is 
distinct and text-specific in the context of its Posnerian application and is used as a · 
mechanism for constraint and consistency. In other words, Posner insists on the importance 
of relying on the authorial intent in the context of legal texts so as to constrain analysts from 
imputing terms into such texts which result in inconsistent results, while he maintains a 
laissez-faire approach to literary texts by encouraging interpreters to seek an interpretation 
with which they simply feel comfortable. 176 However, Fish maintains that this Posnerian 
dichotomy regarding intention is fundamentally flawed since he (Fish) asserts that intention is 
the sole avenue for interpretation in the first place. Thus, Fish alleges that interpreting all 
texts in terms of 'intention' is a necessary requirement for understanding, and not simply an 
optional endeavour to be embarked upon when one requires a measure of constraint in respect 
of certain texts. This is based on Fish's assertion that "words are intelligible only within the 
assumption of some context of intentional production, some already-in-place predecision as 
175 
176 
In this sense, Fish asserts that all histories are not merely discovered, but to some 
limited extent, actually 'invented'. And it is this crucial understanding of history and 
judicial precedent which Fish alleges that Dworkin fails to appreciate, since he 
(Dworkin) is guilty of raising earlier decisions in the judicial chain to the level of 
universal truths, while regarding arbitrary decisions in the light of such truths as being 
institutionally impossible. Therefore, in Fish's mind, Dworkin ironically adheres to 
the extremes of legal realism and positivism which he seeks to avoid. Moreover, with 
regard to 'intention', while Dworkin conceives of it as alien to the notion of 
. 'understanding' (in as much as he refutes the suggestion that one must accede to 
authorial intent so as to interpret a text effectively); Fish maintains that within the 
'chain novel' context (which Dworkin himself has created) to read a text, of necessity, 
requires one to engage in "the act of specifying the same intention": Op cit at 99. 
This is not so much because Posner believes in the need for freedom of literary 
interpretation in order for artistic integrity to be maintained, but is rather based on the 
assumption that the artistic process is itself inconsequential in the greater scheme of 
things. Therefore, according to Posner, what people choose to infer from such literary 
texts may as well be based on personal preferences without being hindered by having 
to refer back to some foundational authorial intention. 
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to what kind of person, with what kind of purposes, in relation to what specific goals in a 
particular situation, is speaking or writing". 177 Consequently, one cannot assign, as Posner 
suggests, a coherent meaning (independent of intention) to a text, because all possible 
meanings are, in fact, in Fish's opinion subject to "an intentional structure already 
assumed". 178 Moreover, Fish accounts for situations in which meaning appears to emanate 
from the words themselves without any reference to authorial intent by means of the fact that 
"the intentional structure -the conditions of intelligibility that limit the meanings words can 
have before they are produced - is so deeply in place that we are not aware of it and seem to 
experience its effects directly, without mediation". 179 However, as Fish concedes, the 
necessary entwining of interpretation with intention creates a symbiotic relationship which 
works both ways. In other words, not only must one take cognisance of intention in the act of 
interpretation, but one must also be aware of the fact that the act of defining the intention 
from which a text proceeds is itself subject to the possibilities of interpretation. 180 Therefore, 
Fish's universe of understanding revolves within the sphere of intention and interpretation 
which share a cause-and-effect relationship to each other, unlike the understanding of Posner 
which regards intention and interpretation as distinct spheres of endeavour which only 
intersect each other when the requirement of constraint prevails. 
So it is that Fish criticises Posner's fundamental assertion that unlike persuasive language 
which relies on rhetoric for its effectiveness, scientific language is founded upon some purer 
and more precise formulation, namely, logic which creates such ~ertainty in and of itself that 
it does not require rhetorical persuasive techniques. Fish's criticism stems from his assertion 
that, in fact, all modes of discourse are rhetorical inasmuch as they are steeped in 
assumptions, distinctions, and perspectives which are always vulnerable to criticism. 181 
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Op cit at 295. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
This is to say that one still uses one's faculty of interpretation in respect of the 
authorial intention behind a work. Therefore, Fish acknowledges the fact that a group 
of people may hold distinctly individual appreciations of the authorial intention 
behind a work based on the fact that they each interpret such intention in the light of 
their unique concerns. 
Furthermore, Fish indicates that both scientific and legal discourses are themselves · 
formulated on the basis of distinctions such as "rest and motion" or civil and criminal, 
which have come about as a result of protracted rhetorical arguments. Thus, their 
apparent serenity ought not to deceive one since it is merely the result of a particular 
rhetorical argument finally gaining acceptance over other similar arguments, and 
winning for itself the right to act as an accepted premiss and go largely unchallenged 
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similarities between law and literature rather than· an intrinsically philosophical relatedness. 
Thus, the result is that Dworkin's conceptual framework is insufficiently particular (in terms 
of the creation of some symbiotic understanding between law and literature) in order for him 
to be comfortably numbered amongst the ranks of 'Law as Literature' scholars. 
However, while Dworkin makes an attempt to include literary theory in his analysis of textual 
interpretation and understanding, other theorists such as Jessica Lane186 exhibit a blatantly 
hard-line approach by maintaining that law and literature "speak to vastly different human 
impulses and needs", 187 therefore resulting in the requirement of a conceptually individual 
method of interpretation so as to best serve their particular ends. Moreover, Lane elaborates 
on the inherent distinction between law and literature by framing their practices and 
communities in terms of the different interests which they serve. Thus, for example, she 
-- conceives of law and--the-fogal community as -based upon a clearly defined hierarchy 
(comprising courts and individuals) whose duties are to ensure the survival of principles of 
certainty and continuity by "regularising social structures" and focusing on "social 
integration" .188 In contrast, literary criticism is viewed by Lane in terms of a "critical 
fascination with upheaval and novelty" intent on elaborating on the "intricate possibilities 
hidden in the dialectic of writing and reading". Furthermore, in highlighting the 
distinctiveness of law and literature, Lane points to the two characters whom she believes 
epitomise the traits towards which the respective disciplines strive - Hamlet (depicting the 
intense complexity and emotional enormity possible through literature) and Hercules J (the 
supremely just and omnipresent figure who seeks to guide the legal process). Ironically, 
however, at no point does Lane concede the fact that both figures referred to are (in terms of 
her own dichotomy) ultimately founded upon intensely literary characteristics in as much as 
they are both creations of man's "critical fascination with upheaval and novelty". 189 
Nonetheless, this analysis of Lane is not in itself contentious or particularly novel (no pun 
intended) since it forms the main (albeit tacit) thrust of most critical evaluations of the 
relationship between law and literature. It is, therefore, generally taken as a 'given' amongst 
185 
\ 
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189 
i.e. Legal vs literary discourse. 
D Lane 'The Poetics of Legal Interpretation' (Book Review) (1987) 87 Columbia Law 
Review 197. Although not previously mentioned, I do regard Lane as a 'Law and 
Literature' exponent. 
Idem at 215. 
Idem at 216. 
Ibid. 
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law-literature scholars (even those espousmg a 'Law as Literature' viewpoint) that 
differences do exist between the two disciplines. The only area of division, accordingly, is 
between those who focus on the disciplinary dichotomy (i.e. 'Law and Literature') to the 
exclusion of a valuable interdisciplinary symbiosis, and those who acknowledge the 
autonomy of the respective disciplines but choose to analyse them in a joint community of 
understanding (i.e. 'Law as Literature'). 
I now move on to examine 'Law as Literature' theorists and the way in which they seek to 
interpret the law-literature enterprise. 
1.4 Law as Literature 
In its application to date, the term 'Law as Literature' has been used to describe the inherent 
tensions arising from an exploration of legal discourse which seeks to acknowledge the 
'ordinariness' of language on the one hand, while emphasising the philosophical potential of 
such discourse on the other. While sharing this common interpretative paradox, however, 
'Law as Literature' theorists (as I choose to define them) have by no means formulated a 
standardised approach to the dilemma. For this reason I have divided the present section into 
what I regard to be the four primary methods by which such scholars seek to resolve their 
concerns. 
(a) An Act of Hope along the Journey of Experience 
James Boyd White190 asserts that learning from literature is both an intensely personal, as well I 
as complex experience. Not only must the individual interpreter "accept responsibility" 191 for 
what he gleans from the literary text and for the manner in which it impacts upon him, but \ 
this relation between interpreter and text is not something judged in terms of 'findings' or 
'methods' but rather experience and exposure. This of necessity results in a broad 
interpretative network making the law-literature endeavour an abundance of claims and 
counter-claims. 192 Therefore, White maintains that what "literature has most to teach, then, is 
a way of reading ... not only 'literature', but all kinds of texts and expressions : a way of 
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JB White 'Law and Literature : No Manifesto' (1988) 39 Mercer Law Review 739. 
Idem at 742. 
For this reason, White asserts that the phrase 'Law and Literature' is inaccurate on 
three grounds. First, it presupposes the existence of a coherent body of work 
'operating on common premises'. Secondly, the use of the word 'and' fails to convey 
the deep-rooted connection between law 'and' literature. And thirdly, 'literature' is 
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focusing our attention on the languages we use, on the relations we establish with them, and 
on the definition of self and other that is enacted in every expression" .193 
Moreover, White is concerned that discussions of 'Law and Literature' are often pedestrian in 
nature, revolving around questions of 'aesthetic(s)' rather than 'political and ethical 
meanings' which "we must be prepared to understand and to judge". Thus, White encourages 
the reader to immerse himself in the literary experience and engage with the "multiplicity of 1 
voices" therein so as to arrive at some appreciation of the "unstated or opposing truths" they 1 
contain.194 It is precisely for this reason that he scoffs at suggestions that a "literary view of 
law fails to see that the law is about power", since White maintains that reading texts in the I 
manner he advocates is to "expose the root of power, which is linguistic or ideological in ( 
I 
nature. [After all] whoever controls our languages has the greatest power of all". 195 This 1 
I 
point is of particular significance when one notes (as White argues) that while people may 
perceive reality by means of languages of common understanding such as "social science or 
common sense - or even literature", the fact remains that this reality is both language -
created and language-bound, and we as individuals must,· therefore, be aware of our 
accountability for what we perceive and how we express our perceptions. Therefore, White 
asserts that it is only through such individual and collective efforts than an effective "ground 
of judgement" can be created whereby we learn to pose the correct questions, and to perceive 
the just answers. Thus, for this reason, White asserts that the 'heart of justice' does not reside I 
I 
on a theoretical 'nonlinguistic' plane, but that it is 'ethical and relational' embedded in our / '·· 
\ 
approach to the interpretation of texts and their reflection of experience. 196 In this regard, \ 
White prefers to formulate his arguments in the context of 'law and the humanities' rather 
than 'Law and Literature' (which he believes to be too narrow a category containing certain 
erroneous implications). According to White the 'literature' categorisation is narrow because! 
it does not fully account for the wide range of works and discourses which can aid the \ 
i 
understanding of law, and which are outside of the canon of high literature. Moreover, White I 
maintains that the thrust of the law-literature endeavour is not towards literature per se, but 
! \ 
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itself too narrow a category confining itself by implication to 'high literature': Ibid at 
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Idem at 745. 
Idem at 746. 
Idem at 747. 
Idem at 751. 
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consists of a wider movement away from social science discourse and towards the language 
of the humanities. In this regard, he insists on the diversity and individuality present in law-
literature studies, which, in tum, makes it unwise to assume that all of its proponents operate 
from within the same contextual premises. Therefore, White does not regard law-literature 
interaction as the foundation of a 'movement', but rather "a return to a sense of law as a 
humanistic discipline that has its modem roots at least as early as the Renaissance". 197 
Based upon his perspective, White, therefore, asserts that rather than contribute to the study 
of law and literature in a broad humanistic sense, the work and ideas of Richard Posner 
marginalise literature in an attempt to "reaffirm the primacy of another kind of speech and 
thought over law and literature alike" .198 Whereas Posner's conception of language stems 
from a particular understanding of natural science (based upon 'economic' foundations) 
through which he reflects his understanding of the world (including literature); White, in 
contrast maintains that literature exists within a different conceptual and discursive 
framework to that in which Posner seeks to place it. As White states - "a literary text is not a 
string of propositions, but a structural experience of the imagination, and it should be talked 1 
about in a way that reflects its character".199 It is Posner's denial of the special qualities of 
literary discourse, therefore, which form the main thrust of White's critique of his view, since 
White cannot accept his (i.e. Posner's) tacit premise that science establishes universal criteria ( 
of meaning and validity, and hence a universal model of thought and expression.200 In spite \ 
of this, such a 'scientific' means of analysis remains deeply embedded in the human psyche, 
and White readily admits to its advantages in circumstances other than literary analysis. 
White accounts for the natural tendency towards a 'scientific' analysis of literature in terms 
of the inherent tendency in man to support the view that the core meanings of any text is 
propositional in character, and that rational thought must contain some linear coherence 
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JB White 'What Can A Lawyer Learn from Literature?' (1989) 102 Harvard Review 
2014 at 2015 footnote 3. 
Idem at 2016. Posner's conception of language and his particular discourse is 
widespread (according to White) which, in turn, accounts for its potential appeal and 
its inherent dangers. 
Ibid. 
Moreover, White is not alone in his belief, for the image of science as the supreme 
medium of understanding has been tarnished in recent years by numerous other 
academics such as William Booth Critical Understanding - The Powers and Limits of 
Pluralism (1979)and Stanley Fish Doing What Comes Naturally (1989) (in literary 
studies); Roger Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1981) (in philosophy); 
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linking its propositions. There is great comfort to be gained from supporting such a vision of 
language as fundamentally certain. At least within such a framework one has a solid 
foundation from which to make assumptions, without having to question the very premises on 
which one's argument is based. Yet to do so within the context of literary texts is to commit a 
grave injustice by failing to appreciate that such texts operate on the basis of a different 
conceptual discourse. Rather than being 'propositional', literary texts are, in fact,/ 
experiential and performative, inextricably tied to language and not reducible to any logical\ 
outline. Most importantly, such texts are cultural entities seeking to integrate the author's 1 
experience with the reader's interpretation and perspective.201 
Moreover, White maintains that to effectively appreciate· a literary text one must engage with 1 
it so that a dialogue of sorts forms between the reader and the writer on the one hand, and the , 
writer and the original experience (i.e. that experience which he is relating) on the other. 
Such a system of understanding naturally presupposes the existence of interstices between the 
chaos of reality and its textual (or oral) depiction, and between the experience of 'the Self' 
and the perceptions of 'the other'; however, it is in bridging these fissures of perception by 
means of the connective tissue of understanding that 'the Self' is transformed and the text 
reveals its meaning. Such a manner of interpretation is a naturally complex and intensely 
emotional encounter fraught by the possibility of failure. Yet, White contends that its 
complexity provides no valid justification for its dismissal in favour of a more 'scientific' and 
straightforward approach. In actual fact, were one to adopt such 'Posnerian' lines of 
reasoning, White contends that one denounces the humanistic dimensions present in literature 
and literary analysis. 
White then institutes a separate enquiry to analyse whether one should regard the law in 
purely 'scientific' terms or whether it contains a moral dimension (similar to that of 
literature) which can consequently be aided by a literary approach. He concedes the fact that~\ 
(once again) the prevailing norm in past decades has been to regard the law as a science, and I 
that various schools of legal thought (such as the Legal Realists) have developed with the aim ( 
201 
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Carol Gilligan In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development 
(1993) (in psychology); and by postmodernist scholars in general. 
While it is invaluable to share such 'experiences' through the medium of language 
(whether in a textual or oral form) one must always be aware that all of one's efforts 
invariably constitute a reduction in the intensity of the original experience (something 
which Posner appears unwilling to acknowledge). 
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of piercing the ambiguities of legal language so as to "reach the real world' upon which the l 
I 
law acted".202 Moreover, White does not underestimate the potentially invaluable insights I 
which 'science' 203 can provide as a gateway into law. However, he maintains that the image 
of law as a science is a misconception because it overlooks the central concern of all legal 
activity, which is to analyse issues in the light of "authoritative texts and other documents 
which define the terms of thought" of the analyst.204 Within this context all that any science 
can do is to provide the legal analyst with data which he must then analyse, interpret and 
translate into a text of his own. The reason for such a reconstitution of ideas and 
re-alignment of data is due to the fact that social science "speaks to an audience that is, in 
principle, omnipotent, able to implement the policy it recommends without constraint from 
the will of others".205 In contrast, the legal analyst is never in an omnipotent position but 
"always speaks to circumstances defined and regulated by a set of authoritative texts which it 
is his task to identify and interpret".206 Thus, the texts constrain the freedom of choice of both 
the legal analyst and her audience (something which social science cannot achieve, because if 
it were to interpret legal constraints it would, in effect, be 'doing' law). 
Furthermore, White contends that the manner in which legal analysts translate such 
'scientific' principles and arguments into a legal discourse is itself not a science but a literary 
art. It is thus around this 'art' that all legal scholarship is centred (according to White), 
whether they care to acknowledge it or not. In this respect, in interpreting the authoritative 
texts which provide the legal analyst with his conceptual framework his duty is to 'translate' 
such texts in a manner which precludes them from being read and reduced to a "simple 
re-statement of their original meaning".207 This is because in translating words across 
different contexts one necessarily changes their significance. However, this is not to say that 
legal analysts have a 'carte blanche' to interpret authoritative texts according to their own 
whims. In actual fact, legal analysts are constrained in all they do "by an obligation of 
fidelity to the original text".208 Thus, the legal analyst is "a kind of translator, a writer who 
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necessarily remakes an original text, but always under the obligation to do justice".209 In fact, 
if one were to encapsulate the work of a legal analyst in one sentence, it is best summarised 
by White as the art of "invention and imagination, constrained, as art always is, by her [the 
legal analyst's] responsibilities to her material and her world".210 
It is this spirit of artistic creation at the foundation of the legal process which is enhanced by 
an understanding of law coupled with an appreciation of literature, which allows us to better 
comprehend our universe through a greater awareness of the capacities of language and the 
potential of our minds to formulate our existence. Moreover, the act of reading texts 
composed by other minds (with different perspectives) allows us to engage in avenues of 
thought we would not otherwise have encountered. Thus, in reading literary texts we are 
vulnerable inasmuch as we allow our perceptions and beliefs to be developed, adapted and 
even undermined by those of the writer, through the process of understanding. And 
ultimately, understanding engenders an intellectual humility borne of the knowledge that our 
individual perceptions are imperfect, and allowing us to perceive 'truths' that rest beneath the 
veneer of certainty created by the social and political frameworks in which we exist. It is to 
this spirit of questioning and adapting which literature re-awakens our minds, and in turn, 
allows us to reformulate our perceptions of the law as not something certain and omnipotent, 
but rather as a process of discovery (just like any other human institution) in search of the key 
to the most noble human ambition - the attainment of justice. 
Unlike White, however, Posner confines the extent to which literature aids law to situations 
in which the reading of literature can teach the legal analyst certain 'craft values' (such as 
meticulousness, impartiality and concreteness) and certain 'rhetorical tricks' (which can 
make an argument more persuasive than its merits warrant). This absence of any greater and ' 
more fundamental connection between the two disciplines may be accounted for by 
considering Posner's conservative-economics perspective which prevents him from entering a 
discussion or forwarding an opinion lacking any formal economic foundations. And since 
any comparison of law and literature in terms of the fundamentals of language and our 
understanding of the world is based on a 'humanistic' rather than an 'economics' 
appreciation of existence, Posner must of necessity excuse himself from the discussion. By 
"'" implication, Posner's view of reality appears to be one in which a clear causal sequence runs 
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through all human actions, allowing analysts in all disciplines to account for such actions in 
concrete (economics-based) terminology, while any actions not reducible to such terms are 
best left unaccounted for. In this sense, Posner (and other 'Law and Literature' theorists) 
could be criticised for distancing themselves from the mire of uncertainty through which 
'Law as Literature' scholars are prepared to trudge in search of answers. Rather than join the 
fray, Posner maintains a conviction in the untarnished 'sense' present in his line of argument. 
However, what he overlooks is that the human condition (by its very nature) tarnishes the 
appeal of 'sense' through its inherent 'sensibility'. It is this latter element which is missing 
as a vital thread throughout Posner's argument. Nonetheless, Posner's perspective of the 
law-literature relationship provides a suitable point of entry into the discussion of the topic, if 
only for his logical reasoning, his conversational tone and his interesting insights (even if one 
does not agree with them). Moreover, his views provide the perfect foundation for an 
analysis of more complex and controversial approaches to law-literature interaction. 
Furthermore, White asserts that rather than seeking to integrate law and literature, Posner's 
primary premise is to 'show up' their differences and incompatibility. By so· doing, however, 
Posner is obliged to analyse them as if they are self-contained fields of thought offering us 
different findings based upon their different objectives. Yet, White maintains that this is not 
the correct way in which to approach the debate, since literature does not offer us findings 
("as though it were a kind of social or natural science"), 211 rather it engages and transforms 
the mind in certain ways. Thus, White criticises Posner's framing of his fundamental enquiry, 
namely - what the field of literature has to teach the law - as being a trivialisation of the 
complexities of the symbiotic relationship in existence. The enquiry to be embarked upon 
should, according to White, rather be - what meaning and value can a literary education have 
on a legal scholar? The answers to such an enquiry being neither logical nor 'scientific', but 
based upon the individual's willingness to engage with texts and increase his understanding 
by re-evaluating his perspective. Not only is this a far more interesting concern for the 
purposes of academic debate, but it also adds a deeper dimension to the intellectual kudos 
around law-literature philosophy212 positioning it as a discipline of great impact and potential 
211 
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Idem at 2028. 
The use of 'philosophy' is explicit in this context· and is used to connote a way of 
thinking embodied in my understanding of law and literature as mirrors of human 
thought. Whereas, the terms law-literature 'movement' or 'debate' are umbrella terms 
relating to the divergent philosophies and understandings of scholars relating to the 
union of the two disciplines. 
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in relation to the study of law, while simultaneously refocusing our understanding of law by 
encouraging us to reconsider our preconceived notions of the purpose and aims of law. 
Peter Teachout213 is highly complementary of White's approach to law and literature, and both 
men are equally critical of what they regard as "the disintegrative tendencies underlying the 
effort by some economic theorists to transform the language of legal discourse into the terms 
of utilitarian cost-benefit calculus".214 In this regard Teachout asserts that Posner's 
jurisprudential approach towards legal reasoning and interpretation corrodes the complexities 
and integrity of the whole legal process, not least because it "leaves out entirely the central 
fact of individual human suffering".215 Consequently, Posner's vision "is one in which the 
rhetoric of expediency and self-interest would become the exclusive rhetoric for explanation 
and justification of the decisions we make". 216 
In contrast to Posner's market-based legal v1s1on lies the opposite extreme of 
communitarianism whose central theme represents an attack on what it perceives to be the 
reductionist tendencies of such market-orientated approach together with a naive vision of a 
reconstituted existence in which 'the Self' and community are joined in a coherent oneness. 
This approach, therefore, focuses on the establishment of an existence "in which the bond of 
shared values would be so great that the need for law itself would simply fall away". 217 
Moreover, Teachout points out that the central concerns of communitarianism218 are 
effectively the very same ones which concern White; however, in Teachout's opinion while 
the communitarian vision fails, White's succeeds, and he thus endeavours to establish the 
reason for this ironical discrepancy by analysing the arguments of a great communitarian 
theoretician, Roberto Unger. 
According to Teachout, Unger appreciates the fact that a liberally-biased society will not per 
se result in a coherent vision of reality. Thus, Unger seeks to attain a theoretical fusion of 
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Ibid. However, it is important to note that Teachout does not.disapprove of Posner's 
reliance upon economic theory per se (since Teachout approves of White's stance 
which maintains that a certain level of efficiency and narcissism have a role to play in 
life), but rather that he merely disagrees with the extremes to which Posner employs 
it. 
Idem at 884. 
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acknowledging these elements and working through them, it is White's assertion that some 
'unity' will be found and justice achieved. 
However, in attempting to connect the fictional with the factual in some 'unity' of existence, 
it could be argued that White is embarking upon exactly the same impossibility of task of 
which he accuses Unger. This is because the two concepts (i.e. literature and law) are 
perceivably distinct in their perspectives of reality and hence require different vocabularies 
for their expression. However, in response to this, while the distinctiveness of the two 
discourses is undeniable, this should not, however, preclude the persuasive potency of their 
unity owing to the fact that both disciplines are structured around a common goal (the 
attainment of justice) and communicated through a mutual medium (language). In fact, I 
would submit that the unity of their divergent perspectives through interdisciplinary study 
provides one with a more richly textured appreciation of the construction of language and the 
potential for justice. In essence, what such 'unity of existence' symbolises is an act of hope 
along our journey of human experience. 
(b) A Poethical Perspective 
Richard Weisberg224 maintains that the merger of "form and substance, sound and sense"225 
within the legal system inevitably results in the attainment of a just system of law. This is 
because there is (according to Weisberg) a unity of meaning between the use of words in a 
particular context and the substance imparted by those words. In this regard, therefore, 
"words do not translate the thought of justice, words are justice, and words can be the 
absence of justice".226 Within this context, therefore, Weisberg contemplates a dimension of 
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Richard Weisberg Poethics and other Strategies of Law and Literature (1992), 
hereafter referred to as Poethics. 
Idem at 5. 
Idem at 6. In a similar vein, Paul Henle Language, Thought and Culture (1958), as 
reprinted in Law, Language and Ethics (1996) WR Bishin, CD Stone (eds) at 159 
argues that language is generally regarded as a "transparent medium for the 
transmission of thought" because people tend to regard it as a facilitator for the 
efficient expression of our desires, thoughts and beliefs. However, Henle agrees with 
Edward Sapir's analysis of the relationship between language .aqd experience, namely, 
that language actually defines such experience "by reason of its• formal completeness 
and because of our unconscious projection of its implicit expectations into the field of 
experience". Thus, Henle maintains that language (more specifically one's use of a 
particular discursive vocabulary) influences one's perceptions, and therefore helps to 
define one's understanding of the world and of oneself. In Henle's opinion these 
perceptions are created from the fusion of environmental factors together with one's 
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'fit' (unrelated to that espoused by Dworkin) between the use of words within a legal 
pronouncement and the desire for justice towards which they strive. 
This unification of form and substance to which Richard Weisberg adheres was initially 
posited by Justice Benjamin Cardozo,227 and appears to stand in stark contrast to the notion 
that the outcome of a particular case must take precedence over the linguistic components 
which produce it, since a decision may be 'well crafted' but might lead to unjust results. 
However, Weisberg alleges that this concern over the possible incompatible desires of form 
and substance is groundless. The reasons for this are threefold. First, that a judicial decision 
cannot be alienated from the language in which it is expressed, without some modification of 
meaning. Secondly, that no judicial opinion which harbours an erroneous outcome has ever 
been 'well crafted'. And thirdly, that even highly esteemed judicial statements will lose 
potency over time should they fail to correlate 'sound and sense' into their conclusions.228 In 
essence, "the years have not changed the reality of law : for better or worse, it is utterly 
dependant on language; better, it is, utterly, language".229 
These factors constitute the poetic message with which Weisberg deems legal texts and 
oratory to be infused, by virtue of their dependence on language. Moreover, the extent to 
which such method encourages the harmonious synergy of form and substance dictates the 
artistic mastery of the legal text (or judgement) and its subsequent intellectual value. Yet, in 
order to attain the ends of justice, a further enquiry into the poetic substance of the legal text 
is required. This journey into 'poethics' is initially embarked upon through the medium of 
literary works 'about' law,230 but extends to encompass "any well-crafted story - whatever its 
subject matter - [which] uncovers for the lawyer the inevitable primacy of the poetic method 
to law";231 and ultimately, it is within this broader arena of literary works that Weisberg 
believes the law (and more specifically, its legal agents) can arrive at a better sense of justice 
having peered through a literary "lens" to discover how legal agents communicate, how they 
relate to marginalised elements/discourses in society, how they reason, and how they 'feel' .232 
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57 
In this regard, Weisberg is adamant that the canon of "great [literary] books"233 be retained, 
despite the insistence of many feminists that such canon should be overturned and replaced 
with one which is more partial to minority discourses and perceptions. The reason for this 
rests in Weisberg's belief that all attacks levelled against the literary canonical structure 
emanate from those who feel unduly threatened by it when, in fact, such a canon of 'great 
books' also "renders comprehensible an often relativistic postmodern program. So, in 
addition to providing what might be called remedial training to people not responsible for 
having read so little, law and literature expands their sensitivity to more contemporary 
fads". 234 Weisberg goes on to emphasise his point by stating that "Shakespeare says more in 
one play than all the rest of English speakers combined ... [therefore] ... I do not think the 
case has been made for law and literature's abandoning the canon just because some feminists 
insist we do so".235 Yet, sweeping statements such as this cannot alone detract attention from 
Weisberg's inability to effectively counter feminist allegations. For the fact still remains that 
the 'great books' to which Weisberg refers are founded in a male centre of consciousness 
which denies all other marginalised experience value and voice. And the fact remains that 
without the inclusion of marginalised discourses into his canon of 'great books', Weisberg 
remains unable to pragmatically achieve the just ideals which his poethical theory seeks. 
This is due to the fact that in order to attain justice the poethical tradition requires 'unity' (in 
effect, some sort of community of law-literature understanding), yet Weisberg confines it (i.e. 
the 'unity') to an exclusively male discourse. Taken to its logical conclusion, therefore, the 
result can be seen as the attainment of an exclusively 'male justice', nothing more. 
While Weisberg lauds White's many efforts to ennoble the legal process through a steady 
erosion of its bureaucratic and 'scientific' foundations, he (Weisberg) is sceptical of the 
supremacy of rhetoric with which White seeks to replace them. This sense of dread which 
Weisberg feels relates back to White's foundational premiss of the ambiguity of rhetoric. 
Thus, while White claims that such rhetorical fluidity positively engages (rather than 
negatively illustrates) the 'radical uncertainties' of human existence;236 Weisberg adopts a 
more sceptical stance regarding the integrity of rhetoric. This is based upon Weisberg's 
assertion that human history (particularly that of the twentieth century) has witnessed the 
w)gar abuse and destructive manipulation of human aspirations tfil9ugh the medium of 
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rhetoric. In essence, a schism between ethics and rhetoric, which Weisberg believes only his 
system of 'poethics' can effectively re-establish. Therefore, for this reason Weisberg cannot 
abide by White's (arguably inconsistent) conception which "at one and the same time asserts 
the musicality of justice and also its ethics" through the medium of rhetoric.237 Furthermore, 
the chief area of concern for Weisberg lies in the fact that this evolutionary metamorphosis as 
envisaged by White, does not appear to be grounded in principles of justice or some innate 
sense of social order, and is rather based upon "the already establish~d discourse of the matter 
at hand".238 Weisberg thus perceives White's frame of reference to be one in which "the good 
judge manages to hear all of the sides of that talk and then to create a new text. The text 
differs from the earlier discourse, just as a translation differs. from its 'original', yet it is 
always responsive to it".239 Weisberg thus finds himself unable to project any ethical 
dililension onto White's rhetorical system. Moreover, he finds great discomfort in White's 
tacit condonation of the ability of some rhetoricians to incisively posit a particular view 
without necessarily retaining an allegiance to the text. Therefore, in Weisberg's view "always 
of more importance to White than an honest act of communication is any act, for it is the 
absence of words, and that alone, that his system cannot abide". 240 Related to this concern is 
Weisberg's assertation that "White also disregards the probability that the ensconced 
'translator' (the authoritative lawyer or judge) simply has no interest whatsoever in inviting 
disempowered outsiders into the discursive arena".241 However, as already mentioned, 
Weisberg's own male-dominated 'poethical' framework can also be seen to deny such 
marginalised groups access to the "discursive arena". 
The formation of 'poethics' thus represents Weisberg's attempt to structure law-literature 
co-existence along ethical lines which, in tum, creates a superstructure in which justice 
prevails. Moreover, in this context, 'poethics' can be seen to contain four main component 
parts.242 First, the primary desire to infuse the law and legal thinking with an ethical bias by 
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59 
means of a literary perspective, coupled with the revitalisation of political ethics.243 
Secondly, the observance of literary formalistic techniques (in spite of present 
deconstructionist trends) through an appreciation of the harmony between form and 
substance.244 Thirdly, an analysis of the sameness between "the power and politics of literary 
texts, and the corresponding power and politics of legal texts". 245 And finally, the educative 
ambition of law-literature which bolsters its ethical dimension. However, relating back to the 
important ethical dimension at the core of Weisberg's framework, Ian Ward makes certain 
interesting observations which are worth quoting at length:-
"Literature is ethical because language is ethical. I have no wish to doubt this 
assertion. If literature did not demand of a student the appreciation of ethical issues, 
and thus the creative understanding of them, there would be little point in suggesting 
that they should be read, at least not as a means of supplementing a legal education. 
The problem lies in trying to identify the point where ethics finishes and where 
politics begins, and of course, whether this point is ever totally distinguishable ... 
What Weisberg's book [Poethics] does, more than anything perhaps, is reveal an 
essential paradox common to all jurisprudential writings; the near impossibility of 
writing about law theoretically without introducing politics in the guise of ethics."246 
Therefore, while Weisberg maintains the autonomy of ethical endeavours from the influence 
of political opinions, Ward incisively pierces Weisberg's own argument to reveal his political 
biases by reference to three areas of discussion. The first area relates to the Holocaust which 
Weisberg discusses on the grounds of the ethical concerns which it raises. However, as Ward 
notes, while the lapse of time might lull one into the belief that the spectre of genocide over 
50 years ago has transcended political confines, one should bear in mind that such a process 
bears unfortunate similarities to the extermination of ethnic groups in the ex-Yugoslavia 
within the last five years. The second area of debate revolves around misogyny which 
Weisberg labels as ethically immoral and intolerable. However, Ward, once again, maintains 
that Weisberg's allegations are based upon the tacit premises that misogyny is also politically 
unacceptable from a liberal Western perspective, since in Kantian terms it undermines "the 
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In this regard, Richard Weisberg looks to the arena of 'Law in Literature'. 
As Ward notes in From Literature to Ethics at 393 "literary fopnalism [according to 
Richard Weisberg], demands a return to the text and not the realler as the centrepiece 
of the literary enterprise ... Only literary formalism can foster the return of a literary 
ethics, and then, in tum, a postmodern legal ethics". 
Ibid. In this regard, Ward notes that it is "[Richard Weisberg's] explicit assertion that 
interpretation is constrained by its own normative integrity". 
Idem at 395; 
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equality of human dignity". 247 And lastly, Weisberg's critique of "Christian theology, whose · 
philosophy and culture he [Weisberg] concludes could only rise to prominence at the expense 
of the Aristotelian concept of justice" ,248 which Ward regards as also providing a clear (albeit 
tacit) indication of Weisberg's own political perspective. 
While Weisberg's 'poethical' vision might best be accounted for in terms of a 'polethical' 
(i.e. political-ethical) discourse, there nonetheless remains an ambivalence between 
Weisberg's references to justice and the competence of any discourse to attain it. In this 
regard Weisberg himself notes that "[Richard] Poirier says it might make more sense to view 
literature as a model of postmodernist confusion [rather] than as a cure for it". 249 So, too, in 
the opinion of William Gaddis,250 as people turn to literature or law in a vain attempt to rid 
themselves of their corrupt societal influences, they are simply met by contorted grammatical 
structures which serve to confuse and confound rather than redeem. 251 In spite of the 
linguistic and conceptual chaos, however, Weisberg holds fast to his belief that sense can be 
made of it and justice achieved by means of his 'poethical' foundations, (which are 
themselves steeped in the Romantic notion that words themselves create knowledge). 
It is in relation to this 'poethical' concept of justice that John Fisher252 finds himself at odds 
with Weisberg. For while Weisberg asserts that the term 'justice' symbolises the connection 
of subjective perspectives into a mutual vocabulary; Fisher, in contrast, maintains that 
Weisberg's assertion that "beautiful language is intimately connected to ethics and 
empathy"253 is problematic since in associating beautify speech with justice, one must of 
necessity then question what makes speech beautiful in the first place? In this regard, Fisher 
notes that Weisberg's essence of 'beauty' is determined by reference to the 'great writers'; 
however (as I have already intimated) this proves unsatisfactory since one is of necessity 
confining one's understanding to 'male justice' within such a restrictive cannon. Fisher, 
therefore, posits a more culturally inclusive appreciating of the literary process which steers 
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Idem at 396. While in certain Eastern and African cultures misogyny proves to be an 
acceptable (if not foundational) practice of the society. 
Idem at 397. 
Robert Weisberg 'Taking Law Seriously' (Book Review) (1995) 7 Yale Journal of 
Law and the Humanities 445 at 453. 
W Gaddis A Frolic of His Own (1994). 
These issues (amongst others) will be analysed in greater depth in the chapters of 
'Justice' and 'Justification'. 
J Fisher 'Reading Literature/Reading Law : Is there a Literary Jurisprudence' (1993) 
72(1) Texas Law Review 135. 
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clear of problematic notions.such as 'beauty', and strives rather to engage a broader spectrum 
of culturally diverse perspectives in a community of understanding, which he maintains will 
enable a "true vision of justice to emerge". 254 This stems from Fisher's assertion that the 
claims of 'poethics' are "more appropriate for the complex, self-referential nature of poetic 
language than for the more functional language called for in judicial opinions".255 
Nonetheless, despite Weisberg's Nietzschean bias (by virtue of his insistence that "textual 
meanings are indeterminate"),256 he asserts that this in no way denies the possibility of justice. 
According to Weisberg, therefore, it is only as a result of the "resentful inversion of the 
notions of punishment and, more generally, justice"257 that a spirit of 'ressentiment' has been 
allowed to prevail during the nineteenth century, which, in turn, has perverted the notion of 
justice,258 and created a conceptual mire which only 'poethics' can pierce and reformulate into 
a just ideal. 
( c) Interactive Communities ·of Understandings 
Robin West259 approves of JB White's literary bias in the formulation and transformation of 
communities of understanding by means .of the centrality of texts.260 Therefore, West readily 
acknowledges that this essential textual focus impacts upon the "form and substance of a 
community's moral and social life" which, of necessity, then demands a fundamental 
reassessment of the purpose of legal texts, inasmuch as "we ought to think and read legal 
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Idem at 146. 
Fisher Joe cit at 139. 
Fisher Joe cit at 160. 
Richard Weisberg 'On the Use and Abuse of Nietzche for Modern Constitutional 
Theory' (1988) Interpreting La.wand Literature at 181. 
Idem at 183. 
Nietzsche situates the concept of justice in the active emotions of aggression, strength, 
boldness and nobility (as opposed to the reactive emotions), since "to be just is a 
positive attitude": Idem at 183. 
R West 'Communities, Texts and Law : Reflections on the Law and Literature 
Movement' (1988) 1 Yale Journal of Law and ~he Humanities 129, hereafter referred 
to as Reflections on the Law. ......._ 
As White himself states "Every text is written in a language, and the language always 
entails commitments to views of the world - of one's reader, and of others - with 
which the writer must somehow come to terms . .. Every text thus creates a 
community, and it is responsible for the community it creates. This means that every 
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texts, not as political or positive commands, but as texts which both constitute and constrain 
the community's moral commitments".261 In so doing, White and West maintain that one 
arrives at an ethical understanding of justice which is rooted in the interpretative capacities of 
the reader to draw together the textual community, thereby ensuring that the interpreter bears 
a measure of responsibility for the manner in which the ideals of justice are reflected. 
However, it is also in regard to this factor, that West criticizes White's interpretative 
competency, based upon two elements. First, that in West's estimation, White's 'textual 
analyst' is excessively bound by the very texts he wishes to analyse, therefore, resulting in a 
"social criticism which is constrained and stunted by the texts it criticizes". 262 And secondly, 
that White's textual canon which seeks to define and constitute a community does so only in 
the interests of the existing discursive participants. 263 Therefore, in defining one's community 
in this restricted 'Whitean' sense, one of necessity arrives at an incomplete and inconsequent 
interpretation of justice, marked more by its exclusion, objectification and violation of 
societal discourses than for its creation of an inclusive vision of justice. It is, thus, on this 
point that West seeks to distance herself from White and develop a more effective method of 
approaching interpretative communities. 
Rather than expose the manner in which communities are formed or the means of creating 
better ones in terms of a 'Whitean' textual framework, therefore, West seeks to approach the 
issue from within her understanding of the interactive catalyst around which one's sense of 
community is centred and develops. In other words, West appreciates that our individual 
sense of community is forged from our interaction with those around us, and the extent to 
which we impose, subordinate or compromise our views in respect of theirs. It is, thus, the 
extremes to which we choose to go in respect of our own discursive desires which determine 
the extent of our community's interactive nature and hence integrity. As West notes, "the 
moral worth of these communities depends entirely on the quality of this affective 
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text is at once an ethical and a cultural performance": See JB White 'Law and 
literature: No Manifesto'(l988) 39 Mercer Law Review 739 at 745. 
West Reflections on the Law at 131. 
Idem at 138. 
On this point West is particularly harsh (and justifiably so) of White's treatment of the 
'outsiders', asserting that "because they do not participate as subjects in the processes 
of critique and self transformation, they become literally objectified ... because they 
do not speak, they are objects; because they are objects they do not speak, and as 
non-speakers they are outside the community": Idem at 140. 
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interaction".264 This conception ofcommunity is, therefore, far greater in its extent than mere 
textual communities for primarily two reasons. First, based upon the fact that interactive 
communities "include those we violate as well as those with whom we textually 
communicate".265 Secondly, such communities (in addition to acknowledging our textual 
interconnectedness) also embody our non-textual and non-verbal attachment to others.266 
Therefore, the manner in which such interactive communities evolve and improve is not 
necessarily confined to the channels which seek to create a deeper awareness of our cultural 
texts. While, West concedes that such a method is of prime importance for the understanding 
of textual communities, we must go beyond the transformation of the text and seek to 
transform ourselves if we wish to better comprehend the interactive community. As West 
remarks - "we need to transforin our communities of violence, terrorism, and oppression into 
communities of compassion and respect. The way to do so is by improving the quality of our 
affective interaction with others".267 
Therefore, West develops White's notion of community beyond a sense of moral textualism 
and onto a broader interactive sphere in which even the textually marginalised are included. 
In this regard, law and literature are seen as embodying more than textual communities which 
"reflect and constitute as well as convey our moral and cultural traditions",268 and are also 
regarded as interactive communities conveying a sense of "violence, violation, compassion, 
nurturance and respect"269 amongst individuals. Moreover, West alleges that our 
understanding of a specific law or legal decision may vary according to whether we perceive 
it from the perspective of a textual community or an interactive one. This is because while a 
statute or judicial decision may textually represent a noble cultural ideal for its constituents 
(i.e. the textual community) it may simultaneously operate as an oppressive force in respect 
of members of the interactive community who are textually excluded. For this reason, West 
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Idem at 146. 
Idem at 147. 
This results in a far greater potential in respect of the interpretative process since (as 
West indicates) often factors beyond textual cohesion bind particular communities. In 
the case of oppressive communities, for example, violence predominates as a cohesive 
influence while "words themselves - not the texts they form - actively deprive or 
speciously grant the slaves [or any oppressed groups] their humanity - whether or not 
they express their deprivation textually": Idem at 149. Likewise, moral communities 
of respect are chiefly bound by non-textual methods of understanding, such as, 
intimacy, passion, trust and even sadness. 
Idem at 147. 
Idem at 154. 
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maintains that law-literature study contains the invaluable potential for improving our 
appreciation of the textual community (through the act of reading) which, in tum, acts as the 
foundation upon which the interactive community is constructed (though the act of 
understanding the narratives of the textually excluded). The ultimate ambition of such a 
vision therefore appears to be the hope that through a willingness to engage with the 
narratives of the interactive community, the textual community will expand and the 
importance of literature will become entrenched in the life of the law. 270 
Melissa Harrison271 notes, however, that the general notion of 'community' is not something 
which is readily associated with either literary or legal studies. She bases this on Robin 
West's thesis that the defining experience in both disciplines is that of the male perception 
which is by its very nature rooted in alienation and separation.272 The effect of this is that the 
joint goal of literature and law (specifically jurisprudence) is seen as the promotion of 
individual autonomy at practically all costs. Yet, as Harrison indicates, such a perspective 
fails to account for "the subjective reality and the contradictions of women's lives".273 This 
female perspective consists of a sense of connection274 which goes unacknowledged in terms 
of the male norm; and it is for this reason that Harrison has sought to take practical steps in 
the law school environment to reverse what she regards as an unnatural state of affairs.275 
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Ibid. 
As things stand at present, however, West points out that the fields. of 'Law and 
Economics' and 'Law and Literature' (in the general sense) achieve the same result 
from different perspectives. The economics perspective focuses on "preference and 
choice", while the literary concern revolves around "promulgation of texts and 
interpretations" as well as "a commitment to canonical culture". The result of both 
disciplines nonetheless being the production of "an intensely conservative 
commitment to the values and mainstays of the status quo": Extract from the Fate of 
Law (1990) at 34-45, as quoted by West (1990) 99 Yale Law Journal 1936. 
M Harrison 'A Time of Passionate Leaming: Using Feminism, Law, and Literature to 
Create a learning Community' (1993) 60 Tennessee Law Review 393. 
West refers to this phenomenon as the 'separation thesis': See R West 'Jurisprudence 
and Gender' (1988) 55 University of Chicago Law Review 1 at 2. 
Harrison loc cit at 397. 
Connection both "materially (through pregnancy, intercourse, and breast-feeding) and 
existentially (through moral and practical life)": Ibid. 
Harrison who is attached to the faculty of l<;tw at the University of Montana 
established a course on feminist theory and the law in 1992. The focus of the course 
was structured on a study of feminism, law, and literature, and sought to reduce the 
alienation experienced by many female law students by creating a "connection 
between the law and the rest of their lives": Idem at 400. 
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To this end Hamson has chosen to incorporate a literary focus together with a feminist vision 
of law so as to redefine reality in terms of an integration of experience. In this regard, she 
maintains that the use of literature is justified on two grounds. First, in line with West, 
Hamson asserts that literature and literary narratives, when used in legal studies, have the 
ability to instil a sense of empathic understanding in one, through an acknowledgement of 
'the other'. In turn, this bolsters feminist legal theory (which posits an inclusive vision of 
existence in which theory and practice merge) by including marginalised discourses in the 
reader's scope of experience. Secondly, with particular reference to female marginalisation in 
the legal canon, feminist literature ensures that women have the opportunity of satisfying 
their inherent need to be a part of a 'connected' community of other women. In so doing, it is 
argued that they can foster a 'bilingualism' 276 or exchange between the language of their 
experience and the dominant language which defines all norms and standards,277 and amve at 
a sense of completeness. Most importantly, this symbiosis allows marginalised stories to 
acquire a fundamental legitimacy tantamount to that which is wielded by entrenched 
canonical theories, thereby enabling such stories to, at times, take precedence over the 
theoretical canon if justice will be best served in this manner. 
While I would rather critique law-literature scholars in terms of their individual contribution 
towards a greater understanding in the field, the concept of communities of understanding 
inevitably leads into an analysis of feminist legal theory in general. This is because the 
majority of scholars who promote the concept of communities of understanding (whether 
they be textual or interactive) happen to be feminist proponents.· For this reason I am obliged 
to collapse my own 'Law and Literature' and 'Law as Literature' dichotomy to illustrate 
certain underlying notions inherent in feminist jurisprudence generally. 
Regarding the notion of justice, Anne Scales278 maintains that the sense of 'objective reality' 
as posited by formalism is simply untrue since abstract universality is unsuited to the law 
whose goals are, after all, social and not merely theoretical. However,.Scales is adamant that 
feminist theory must not respond to formalism by constructing a solipsistic system of its own 
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This term was first coined by Shauna Van Praagh 'Stories in Law School : An Essay 
on Language, Participation, and the Power of Legal Educatimi' (1992) 2 Columbia 
Journal of Gender and Law 111at141. 
i.e. The language of authority in the legal and literary canon, which in modern 
Western society is invariably defined in terms of the perceptions of the middle to 
upper-class white male. 
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to replace it. Rather the solution lies outside the bounds of an objective-subjective divide, 
and within the realm of principled adjudication and orderly co-existence. Thus, feminist 
legal theory should refocus the law on its principle task, namely to reinterpret differences and 
provide morally just decisions in the light of real human conflicts.279 Consequently, the 
feminist goal of discerning domination requires the law to recognise the psychological 
substructures of gender which, in turn, requires us to disregard the formalistic notion that the 
success of a legal system must be ascribed to a principle of detachment. 
However, having rejected the notion that for a legal system to be effective it requires a 
completely objective perspective, Scales concedes that there are certain qualities inherent in 
the notion of a just legal system. For such a legal system to exist there must of necessity be 
discernible elements of reason and fairness present. Notwithstanding this, neither element 
depends on objectivity per se, and instead relies on the redefinition of terms and the 
.. 
inevitability of gender differentiation to arrive at the moral crux of human conflict. In 
essence, therefore, the formalist tendency of equating humankind's most noble aspirations 
with objectivity280 and neutrality must be discarded in favour of a principled standard of 
equality.281 
It is plain that feminist jurisprudence entails a radical shift away from law reform, inasmuch 
as it provides a different perspective of equality based outside the male-dominated legal 
culture, while law reform seeks to work within the existing legal framework. Furthermore, 
feminism provides one with a very incisive critique of formalism's weaknesses by uncovering 
what is at best its stubborn male-centredness, and, at worst, its misogynystic hypocrisy. 
However, having critiqued formalism, feminist jurisprudence appears to be divided as to its 
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A Scales 'The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay' (1986) 95 Yale Law 
Journal 1373. 
Scales refers to this feminist perspective as 'concrete universality' in contrast to the 
'abstract universality' (which disguises differences beneath a veil of apparent 
objectivity) put forward by formalism: Idem at 1388. 
This is inherent in the male sense of individual alienation, in contrast to the female 
capacity of individual connectedness. However, this in no way suggests that male 
experience is fundamentally a vision of benign objectivity. 
To this end, Carol Smart suggests that only women should be entitled to use the 
argument of equality in an attempt to reach such a principled standard, while men 
should be estopped from raising such arguments in the light of the male bias inherent 
in the legal system: See Smart Feminism and the Power of Law (1990) Chapter 4. 
However, I find such a solution unsatisfactory since it brings us no nearer to an 
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goals,282 and often vague as to the means of attaining its objectives. I would venture to 
suggest that the reason for this has a lot to do with the very label - 'feminism', which creates 
an immediate polarisation between the genders and thereby results in an even wider schism 
between male and female perceptions, causing unnecessary antagonism by forcing people to 
adopt either extreme of the debate (i.e. formalism or feminism) purely on the basis of gender. 
In effect, one, therefore, arrives at a situation in which people with different desires and 
ambitions (in law-literature study, or any other jurisprudential endeavour) are grouped 
together on the basis of gender, as if this were the soie criterion for perception. 
While a name change alone is unlikely to change much, some satisfactory solution may, 
however, be reached if one looks to the essence of feminist jurisprudence, rather than its 
outward manifestations and varied interpretations. Essentially, feminism seeks to accord 
legitimacy to a more subjective and less formalistic approach towards legal interpretation by 
the judiciary, as well as creating an awareness of the inherent male-bias within present legal 
systems, and the need to acknowledge and reform gendered perspectives. On this basis, il 
appears to me that feminist jurisprudence should make itself the rallying point for a large 
range of minority and marginalised groups whose voices go unheard in the presence of the 
dominant legal discourse.283 In tum, two alterations would be required of feminist 
jurisprudence, in my mind, first that it go beyond a mere reforming of gendered perspectives, 
and include racial, religious,. cultural, and sexual perspectives, as well; and secondly, that it 
achieve such results through a more socially neutral title, such as ,'minoritarianism', which 
will have the effect of making the feminist ideology more accessible to a wider range of 
interest groups. 284 
282 
283 
284 
understanding of what constitutes a principled standard of equality, and, in fact, 
proves to be contradictory since it argues for equality in certain lights but not others. 
Hence my division of particular feminist scholars between 'Law and Literature' and 
'Law as Literature' proponents based upon their individual contributions to 
law-literature study, rather than the common theory which they all espouse. 
Such minority groups might include people of colour, people of different religious and 
cultural persuasions, and people of different sexual orientations.. All these groups will 
benefit from a more subjective approach to legal interpretation as argued for by 
feminism, since their individuality will be accorded status and due respect. 
It should be noted that two feminist scholars support such a redefined notion of 
feminist ideology : namely, Anne Dailey 'Feminism's Return to Liberalism' (1993) 
102 Yale Law Review 1265, and Joan Williams 'Feminism and Post-Structuralism' 
( 1990) 88 Michigan Law Review 1776. 
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Therefore, while Robin West may have coined the phrase 'interactive communities', I believe 
that in order for it to have the universal appeal which it deserves, it must of necessity be 
distanced from 'feminism' (technically understood), and hence applied in a less 
theory-specific manner. Only in this way will one be able to attain the levels of 
understanding alluded to by West and consequently arrive at a truly 'interactive community' 
in whose presence the possibility of justice is a reality. 
(d) Redefining our Reality 
Gretchen Craft285 asserts that law and literature are bound together by a fundamental fear of 
the unknown and the desire to control future events in some way. Moreover, Craft astutely 
notes that this sense of 'dread' is shared by all human endeavours (be they medical, religious, 
scientific, et cetera) based upon the unpredictability of the human condition (all that we know 
for certain is the sequence of three events, namely our birth, our life, and our death - what 
occurs before, during, and after them, however, remains a profound mystery). Therefore, all 
disciplines are, in Craft's opinion, focused on providing "a system for making sense of what 
might happen and for establishing rules to shape or predict possible outcomes".286 It is, 
accordingly, this anxiety for what the future holds that law and literature each seek to allay 
through their own perceptions of reality (and the human condition therein), and their 
individual channels of communication. In this regard, Craft maintains that literature 
"captures and suspends fear, allowing readers to contemplate the perils of arbitrary fate", 
while the law features as "an antidote to fate" by interposing its judgement and explanation 
on events ex post facto. 287 Moreover, since the law cannot make any overt allusions to its 
own insecurity,288 the arena of law-literature interaction provides an effective means of 
revealing the true state of affairs beneath the guise of benign certainty which legal discourse 
projects. Nonetheless, Craft's understanding cannot be reduced to a dichotomy between 
'deceitful' law and 'sublime' literature, for, in effect, both disciplines necessarily provide 
some intellectual solace to humanity by eliminating the inessential and filtering the chaos of 
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GA Craft 'The Persistence of Dread in Law and Literature' (1992) 102 Yale Law 
Journal 521. 
Idem at 522. 
Ibid. 
This is based upon the fact that the law of necessity advocates certainty and 
predictability so as to instil in its subjects (i.e. humankind) an unquestioning reverence 
for its capacity to govern human affairs. 
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existence into a 'coherent reality' .289 In essence, therefore, they do so by placing geometrical 
constraints onto the organic curves of existence. As Craft states - "Literature and law 
winnow out unimportant, distracting details through a process of elimination that reduces 
human experience, and shapes it, to achieve an account endowed with certainty and 
meaning".290 However, whether such 'meaning' is ever of value depends on whether one 
believes that the uncertainty of existence is ever knowable, in part or whole. For without the 
certainty of such knowledge, meaning itself becomes an illusion. It is because of the risk of 
sliding into such a mire of indeterminate 'nothingness' that people are generally prepared to 
concede the existence of certain 'givens' as baselines on which to construct their 
understanding of reality. And it is on this need for meaning which law (particularly), and 
literature, thrive by individually asserting that they should be perceived as just such a 
'baseline' of understanding. 
This process of reductive filtration is, according to Craft, "driven by a demand for order and 
connections, for composition'',291 and for this reason there is no denying the fact that it 
impacts upon the emotional poignancy of any given text. In this regard Craft maintains that, 
in literature, every detail which is included is significant based purely upon its incorporation 
in the text, thereby allowing one to explore the tacit emotional variables which underlie the 
text with great accuracy. In contrast, Craft views the law's exclusion of certain facts from 
legal texts as the basis for a fundamental distortion of the truth, since she regards the law as 
only having an interest in truths which provide a 'coherent' and 'controlled' outcome.292 
Nonetheless, while the law might muffle an event's original poignancy it still retains a certain 
impact.293 Craft asserts that the reason for this rests on the fact that legal discourse's use of 
restraint actually bestows upon an event a sense of immediacy and dignity. Consequently, in 
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Loe cit at 522. 
Idem at 525. 
Idem at 526. 
Idem at 527. 
This creation of distance between legal discourse and emotional immediacy has been 
the subject of much debate in itself. Karl Llewellyn The Bramble Bush (1991), for 
example, maintains that the law has a duty to prevent people (in a legal arena) being 
consumed by what they witness, and the most effective man~r in which to achieve 
this is through the use of dispassionate language. So, too, Adam Smith The Theory of 
Moral Sentiments (1978) promotes the desire of legal discourse to distance itself from 
the horror of the events with which it deals. In contrast, Martha Minnow 'Words and 
the Door to the Land of Change' (1990) 43 Vanderbilt Law Review 1665 and Julius 
Getman 'Voices' (1988) 66 Texas Law Review 577 express concern at the law's highly 
structured discursive framework and its lack of regard for empathic understanding. 
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this manner the law is able to effectively (according to Craft) preserve people's stories and act 
as a record of their suffering. 
Most importantly, however, in Craft's view, is the shared focus of literature and law, 
embodied in the desire to order the chaos of existence. In this regard, she views them as "two 
parts of a continuum"294 approaching the dilemma from two separate points of reference -
law, by analysing the ordinary and revealing the inherent dangers which lurk beneath it; and 
literature, by focusing on the arbitrary and suspenseful, and examining the sense of dread "as 
it unfolds" .295 By so doing, the two disciplines, combined, afford us the opportunity of 
controlling the arbitrary and unknown,296 while also examining and possibly rationalising our 
fears. By imposing artificial constraints on reality, Craft believes that law and literature seek 
to order it in some way. Literature achieves its ambition by creating stories in a linear format 
(i.e. a beginning, middle, and end), while law goes about its task by means of an allegiance to 
principles of certainty (i.e. by promising finality on issues). However, I find that Craft's 
explanation regarding the linearity of literary structures is unsatisfactory, especially when one 
takes note of modernist and post-modernist genres which adopt techniques such as a stream 
of consciousness writing. Thus, in spite of such promises and motivating forces, it is 
difficult, in my mind, to argue with any conviction that a sense of calm can prevail through 
legal or literary discourses, and overcome humankind's inherent sense of uncertainty and 
dread.297 
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Craft loc cit at 538. 
Idem at 539. 
At least so the law would like us to think. However, since Craft maintains that the 
law should not lead to arbitrary dangers being created, it consequently has no duty to 
punish the unavoidable or inevitable. 
As Craft herself concludes "We are exposed to fortune. Don't go into the woods at 
night. Don't set out from home on an icy winter's morning. Stay away from the 
water's edge. Don't let the children stand near the stove. Something is going to 
happen": See Craft loc cit at 546. Prakash Mehta, however, views the existence of 
doubt as having a worthy role to play in the legal process, since "texts that 
acknowledge the human experience of doubt in decision making can be 'beautiful"' by 
virtue of their honest appraisal of our very humanness: See Mehta 'An Essay on 
Hamlet : Emblems of Truth in Law and Literature' (1994) 83 The Georgetown La.w 
Journal 165 at 167. 
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While Craft is absorbed by a sense of dread, John Cole298 is intent on redefining the law's role 
in our lives by examining its function in relation to art and science, and in so doing he hopes 
to arrive at some understanding of law-literature interaction. 
Cole begins by seeking to 'frame' (i.e. view from an external perspective) legal facts and 
. literary fictions only to conclude, however, that while the latter is capable of being 
deconstructed into receding frames of reference, 299 the former cannot be reframed in a larger 
perspective since it is exceedingly difficult to project ourselves beyond its bounds.300 
Therefore, we are required to perceive truth (as opposed to fiction) from within a frame of 
reference "in which there is a Given, and language either relates to that Given in a 
straightforward way (and is true) or it does not (and is false)". 301 Prior to this notion of 
'framing' (which, in essence, acknowledges the primacy of the subjective experience), Cole 
notes that western ideology was bolstered by three fundamental beliefs. First, that for every 
honest question there is only one true answer; second, that the methodology behind a 'correct 
solution' is 'rational in character'; and third, that such solutions are 'true universally, 
eternally and immutably' .302 Cole refers to all forms of understanding which operate with 
these premises as perceiving existence through the 'Door of Or' in which meaningful 
statements are either true OR false, and in which the participants have no choices or 
responsibilities beyond declaring an assertion to be true or false. Moreover, there are no 
costs attached in ascertaining the truth, and consequently "no responsibility for the choices 
we make",303 since we are reassured in the knowledge of the existence of answers to all our 
dilemmas. However, as Cole notes, once we acknowledge the possibility of receding frames 
of reference, then the search for universal truths depends on the possibility of arriving at the 
founding frame from whence such eternal truths emanate. Yet, the human condition has, to 
date, been unable to present any experiential proof of such final frame. On this basis, 
therefore, Cole asserts that it becomes troublesome to perceive reality through the 'Door of 
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JO Cole 'Thoughts from the Land of And' (1988) 39 Mercer La.w Review 907. 
i.e. Literature is always capable of being reframed in a 'larger perspective' or a 
"different perspective" thereby making it a controllable rather than controlling entity: 
See Cole idem at 910. 
Cole asserts that the only way in which we could achieve a framing of reality would 
be by means of "radical metaphysical assumptions, on which we lack agreement": 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Idem at 911. 
Idem at 912. 
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Or' owing to the fact that an assertion may be true from one referential focus, but false from 
another. It is in this state of suspended potential that all assertions are thus true AND false 
simultaneously. 
In the 'Land of And' (as Cole chooses to refer to this state of contradictory potential) we are 
at once capable of 'negative capability' ,304 as well as the obligation of making 'tragic 
choices' 305 affecting our vision of reality. In essence, the world we choose to create at times 
varies between an existence of "or" and the potential for "and" depending upon our particular 
circumstances, while "prior to that contextual creation we exist in a space where both are 
possible".306 While frames of reference are capable of infinitely receding in the 'Land of 
And', Cole, however, is adamant that this should not be regarded as an indication of 
'systematic uncertainty' 307 in which a sense of nothingness prevails. Rather, if we conceive 
of the process by which we restructure (i.e. frame) our world as being a circular progression 
in which we simultaneously define and interpret our reality, then we create "a world that 
makes sense to us (and only us) and makes sense in terms of the specific purposes we have in 
mind".308 Moreover, the spectacle of receding frames in no way prohibits the formulation of 
distinct concepts of truth and falsehood, owing to the fact that they are merely redefined (and 
hence retain their dichotomous relationship) in the context of a particular frame and in 
relation to specific circumstances. This also invariably impacts upon language per se which 
is seen by Cole as "neither unproblematic nor neutral'',309 but as an active participant in our 
formulation of that which we take to be 'Given'. Therefore, language achieves the status of 
determinate meaning exclusively within the bounds of a particular frame of reference, and as 
the creation of a particular individual. In this sense, Cole propagates a deconstructionist 
ideology of language. For while all disciplines rely on their appearance of certainty and 
self-sufficiency for their legitimacy, deconstructionism erodes such claims, most notably by 
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i.e. the phrase coined by John Keats to refer to "the state of being, in which we are 
capable of being in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching 
after fact and reason": Idem at 914. 
Idem at 915. 'Tragic' inasmuch as we have to choose between various possible 
assertions with which we wish to frame our understanding of the world, even though 
no single assertion has power on its own to attract our allegiance. In effect, therefore, 
we are obliged to conform with an inherent characteristic of the human condition, 
namely, the duty to make choic.es. However, in this situation, unlike the 'Door of Or', 
our choices have intensely personal consequences. 
Idem at 917. 
Ibid. 
Idem at 919. 
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showing that the apparent autonomy of individual disciplines is illusory, since they all retain 
a common reliance on language. This is perhaps the most valuable contribution of 
deconstructionist theory in as much as it encourages one to ask questions which reformulate 
the way in which we view individual disciplines and the ways in which they interact with one 
another. One such area of interdisciplinary endeavour has been the analysis of law-literature 
interaction. Consequently, deconstructionism should not be viewed as a theory which 
subjectivises all meaning into a morass of indeterminacy. Rather, it acknowledges the 
existence of an interpretative context from within whose sphere a work ought to be 
interpreted. What remains at issue, however, is the manner in which one should approach 
such contextual reading, which is, in tum, determined by the questions one poses. 
Since answers are not simply available for the taking, the obligation to create them is a 
precondition of our existence. Regarding legal decisions, moreover, Cole believes that they 
epitomise the strictures of the decision-making process whose focus is governed by this 
"need for creating answers, and the conditions of uncertainty relatively unobscured by myths 
of the Given".310 In this regard, Cole defines the decision-making process within the 'Land of 
And' as a two stage development, beginning with the appointment of a particular 
decision-maker, who is simultaneously declared to be the ultimate arbiter and retainer of 
solutions, and followed by the assignment of 'burdens' which assist him in his duties. To this 
end, Cole believes that the requirement of a declaration is the. principal indication of 
existence in the 'Land of And', for it signifies the acceptance of responsibility for our 
actions.311 Moreover, the declaration of a particular decision-maker is itself contextually 
orientated and not permanently entrenched,312 since the human condition is marked by a 
continual fluidity of understanding which is best served by situation-specific declarations. 
Cole concedes the fact that human experience is motivated by a desire to arrive at some 
omnipresent and ethereal declaration which governs existence. However, he notes that the 
search for such guiding principle through the 'Door of Or' creates harmful consequences by 
leading one on a Utopian crusade removed from the essence of existence by demanding right 
OR wrong, yes OR no answers. Therefore, perceptions in the 'Land of And' seek to echo the 
gentle curves of our human understanding by incorporating visions of reality so as to create 
·' 
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Idem at 921. 
Idem at 933. 
A factor which is lacking in actions embarked upon through the 'Door of Or'. 
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"the composition of a small masterpiece",313 unrelated to any 'Given', and chosen simply 
because of its ability to restore "harmony to our vision of the world".314 For this reason, 
Cole's appreciation of law-literature interaction is not one which conceives of 'Law and 
Literature' (since this is tantamount to pursuing understanding through the 'Door of Or'), but 
is rather founded upon a sense of 'Law as Literature' (i.e. providing a glimpse into the 'Land 
of And'), since he asserts that "There is no Science! There is no Art! There is no Law! 
There is only Science, Art and Law, simultaneously defining themselves and each other".315 
Led by a similar motivation to redefine our reality, James Murray316 seeks to unravel the 
metaphoric potential of legal discourse and its impact upon the human experience. The 
importance of such an exploration being that the medium of metaphor is rooted in the human 
imagination through which it facilitates the point of connection between language per se and 
understanding so as to project the participant beyond the everyday and into "the poetic, the 
imaginative, the analogical, the emotive, the whimsical, the affective". 317 In this regard, just 
as humanbeings reflect ideals which extend above mere rationality and logicality, so, too, the 
legal process (which is, after all, a human institution) embodies humanity's noble aspirations 
through metaphoric constructs. Murray notes that even "the 'facts' of a case are metaphorical 
constructs and more goes into their creation than meets the eye. The facts are not set in 
concrete ... The facts are created, fabricated in the classical sense".318 In a similar vein, 
Lawrence Douglas319 asserts that literature (both fictional and factual) can act as a responsible 
vessel of communication, and do justice to the memory of the Holocaust. For this reason, 
Murray not only perceives the fluid interchange of what might crudely be termed 'fact' and 
'fantasy', but he also, in effect, condenses reality to a series of metaphoric catalysts which 
(when engaged) allow us to glimpse essential truths which go by unseen through rational 
perceptions. Therefore, Murray maintains that metaphorical thought is inextricably linked to 
all human endeavours (and, in fact, represents their foundation), thereby making its continued · 
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Unlike the situation relating to the 'Door of Or', in which declarations and 
decision-makers take on a universal and constant dimension. 
Cole loc cit at 934. 
Idem at 935. 
Ibid. 
JE Murray 'Understanding Law as Metaphor' (1984) 34 Journal of Legal Education 
714. 
Idem at 718. 
Ibid. 
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union with the law and legal thought an absolute necessity if we wish to do justice to our 
human potential. 
Conclusion 
The arena of 'Law as Literature' is simultaneously challenging and discomforting. It 
encourages us to re-evaluate our hermeneutical understanding of the legal process and the 
role of law in society, while also unsettling any comfortable notions we have regarding law's 
inviolability and legal discourse's supremacy in relation to other discourses. Most 
significantly, it demands of one the recognition that the concept of 'Law and Literature' 
contains an inherent problem in its formulation; 320 and it is in this regard that it (i.e. 'Law as 
Literature') strives to entrench a vision in which literature and literary criticism "structure 
dis~_ussions on fundamental legal issues".321 Moreover, 'Law as Literature' theorists tacitly 
support a conception of the individual as a morally autonomous being who functions within 
the chaos of existence,322 inasmuch as mortals are seen to be 'free agents' within the divine 
framework. This emphasis on the individual, in tum, requires us to define people in terms of 
their community and context so as to make an effort towards some sense of 'connection' 
between 'the Self' and 'the other', which subsequently guides one's judgement in the search 
for greater aspirations.323 However, the disturbing realisation emerges that this subtlety of 
individual characterisation (which has also been referred to as the 'human condition') 
inevitably brings to light the law's inability to cope with (let alone control) human nature, due 
to the relative inflexibility of the legal process in relation to the vagaries of humanity. 
While 'Law as Literature' scholars try to infuse the law with literary dimensions, or (more 
correctly speaking) aim to rediscover the essential 'sameness' between law and literature, so 
that a sense of justice might be captured, and reflected in the human condition one has to 
question whether human experience has ever attained these levels of justice alluded to, and, 
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Lawrence Douglas 'Wartime Lies : Securing the Holocaust in. Law and Literature' 
(1995) 7 Yale Journal of Law and the Humanities 367. 
This is because the notion of 'Law and Literature' is misleading and imprecise in its 
assertion of the existence of two independent and largely unrelated disciplines. 
(part of a quote by Richard Weisberg) reproduced in the article by John Ayer 'The 
Very Idea of Law and Literature' (1987) 85 Michigan Law Review 895 at 896. 
In effect, no human actions are predetermined by a di vine, omniscient power. This is 
not, however, to argue within an atheistic framework necessarily; rather, it is the 
result of an appreciation of divine authority as non-intrusive rather than authoritarian. 
The most sought after and noble of which is the search for justice. 
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in fact, whether it ever can or will arrive at this ideal. In their own ways, those scholars 
mentioned all claim to have the answer to the creation of a just vision of human experience. 
However, in the next two chapters, I propose to show how this search for 'justice' is always 
counterbalanced by a corresponding search for 'justification' which, in effect, ensures that the 
human experience is spent in a state of 'suspended animation', as it were, thereby preventing 
either extreme from being fully embraced. 
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CHAPTER2 
JUSTICE 
Introduction 
The arenas of law-literature interaction (as I have chosen to formulate them) while 
concerning themselves with highly focused enquiries into the law-literature endeavour, 
nonetheless all maintain a unity of purpose centred around the search for justice, and the 
concomitant search for justification.• However, given the broad scope and multiple 
understandings of 'justice' which various situations impose upon different people,2 it should 
not be presumed that a single conception of justice is viable, or, in fact, desirable in all 
situations. In other words, while the desire for justice is a common one shared by all people, 
the exact means of its attainment is in no way commonly agreed or understood. 
However, despite such multiplicity of understandings relating to justice (which I have chosen 
to broadly categorise into legal understandings), and literary understandings, the element of 
prime and unifying importance is that the search for this illusive concept pervades all human 
endeavour by virtue of man's need to create some just order and certainty in the midst of the 
vagaries of existence. Moreover, the desire for such predictability is bound (one might say 
inextricably) to the loftier aspiration of the attainment of justice, since there is little point in 
desiring a system of knowable regulations and order which simply entrenches base desires 
without seeking to empower the human intellect and spirit in the search for justice. For it is 
only in entertaining the notion of justice as a possibility in all human equations, that one can 
appease the moral and ethical dilemmas which confront human existence. Without such a 
possibility we are no more than amoral mutations in a ghastly experiment. In this regard, the 
law-literature endeavour provides a particularly insightful angle on man's preoccupation with 
justice by exploring the concept from within the framework of two seemingly unrelated 
disciplines, and thereby exposing their essential commonality while also underlining the 
extreme complexity of their mutual ambition. Moreover, it is within the context of 'Law as 
Literature' that the search for justice can be seen to attain a measure of extreme poignancy 
in~smuch as the disciplines of law and literature are conflated into eaQ_h other. On this basis, 
I hope that the reader is able to infer that my intention in analysing 'j~stice' goes beyond a 
2 
This latter element will be expanded upon in the following chapter on 'Justification'. 
And, in tum, which different people choose to imply in particular contexts. 
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superficial examination of its properties in the context of legal, and literary understandings, 
respectively. Rather, it is my desire to show that law-literature study, as a whole, provides a 
manifestation of humankind's timeless search for justice. 
Once again, however, in order to embark upon the complex task of defining the broad 
expanse of law-literature study in terms of a single, focused search, it has proved both 
convenient and necessary to divide my exploration into legal, and literary compartments first, 
prior to fusing them into a single understanding. 
While I wish the reader to become engrossed in my search for justice within the field of 
law-literature interaction, I feel that it is only fair at this stage to provide you with a tentative 
guideline of where this will all lead : 
It is my contention that language (and hence the disciplines of law, and literature which are 
merely different vessels of perception constructed by language) is one of the primary 
constructs through which man is able to convey his conceptualisation of 'justice' to others.3 
However, while I believe that this search for justice is an inevitable condition in a 
postlapsarian existence, I do not foresee the possibility of its attainment precisely because of 
the vagaries of such existence. More fully analysed, I believe that there are three principle 
factors which preclude a state of 'justice' from being attained. First, due to the fact that we 
cannot fully express such worthwhile notions as 'justice' through the imperfections of 
language. Thus, at best we can only hope·to achieve 'relative justice' rather than attaining a 
state of 'absolute justice' .4 Secondly, law, and literature, are tainted endeavours inasmuch as 
they aim to find some certainty to existence and attain 'justice', yet they are unable to divest 
themselves of the uncertainty of existence from whence they have their being. The reason for 
this is twofold. Pragmatically, such a divestiture is impossible, because human existence, by 
its very nature, is unpredictable in a philosophical sense;5 and theoretically, as soon as one 
removes the human element from the equation, all actions become predetermined or 'known', 
3 
4 
5 
Another manner in which to tacitly convey such understanding would be through 
actions, unaccompanied by words. 
In this sense, the law is (by definition) itself steeped in injustice since the language 
upon which it relies is flawed and imprecise, and can never fully convey the true 
extent of legal aspirations. 
i.e. Although certain actions may be predicted or inferred from those actions which 
have gone before, human nature and actions per se remain spontaneous, and hence 
'unknown'. 
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since no element of spontaneity remains. In other words, law and literature gain power and 
authority from their self-declared crusade in search of 'justice' from within the midst of 
human chaos, yet it is this same chaos of existence off which they both feed to bolster their 
legitimacy. Thirdly, law and literature can never attain a state of 'justice', since human 
beings have a limited perception (i.e. we only know so much at any one time), thereby 
precluding us from arriving at a state of just harmony and equilibrium given our present 
circumstances. To argue otherwise is to denounce our fundamental humanity and distance 
ourselves even more from those around us - something we cannot do because of our 
fundamental need for 'connection' (within ourselves and with others). 
In essence, while people strive for 'connection' between one another so as to create some 
harmony of belief in which justice might prevail, the problem of the enquiry has to do with 
relativity, and the fact that you and I are, by definition, separate entities who do not perceive 
reality in exactly the same manner. Therefore, until such time as you is I, only then will our 
perceptions coincide and language effectively reflect our internal state, thereby allowing 
justice to prevail. To a limited extent, communities of people with shared values and 
perceptions manage to form a cohesive internal identity and reflect this in a common 
externalisation and understanding of justice through a common language usage. However, 
this only occurs on a limited scale and is never completely effective because of the flaws of 
language itself, together with the fact that while a common identity may be formed by the 
community, I am still not You (and never will be until such time as all our identities are 
subsumed into the force of a single entity). 
Having thus outlined, in general terms, my understanding of what the search for justice 
entails, I shall begin by analysing in greater detail different conceptions of justice. 
2.1 Legal Understanding of Justice 
There is no denying the fact that, on a superficial level at least, the law claims to be 
preoccupied with the notion of justice, its attainment, and its maintenance. Yet, it is also 
necessary to be aware of the magnitude of this concept; the different conceptions of 'justice' 
which abound; and the complex task of arriving at some understanding of justice. 
,'\. 
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Edgar Bodenheimer6 asserts that "a reaction or judgement in a matter concerning justice or 
injustice is something which takes place in the realm of values, that is, in a mental empire 
distinct from the domain of physical occurrences",7 which is similar to Hans Kelsen's8 belief 
that the concept of justice has no rational foundation, and is merely rooted in the emotional 
reactions of individuals or groups to the demands of positive law - consequently making it a 
subject unfit for philosophical analysis. Within the legal context, the concept of legality is 
often closely associated with the notion of justice. 'Legality' requires administrative acts to 
conform with general laws, and thereby be legitimised - without which a sense of justice will 
not permeate the society. However, this in no way presupposes the absolute conformity of 
the two concepts (i.e. legality, and justice). Plato, for example, argued that a just social order 
is not reliant upon government by law, but is rather based upon the belief that government by 
libera!e~-~~~ividuals which is focused upon the desire to resolve real issues within specific 
contexts is both necessary and possible (provided, of course, that one selects individuals who 
prove worthy of the challenge). Moreover, notions of equity and morality also filter into the 
generally perceived understanding of justice, thereby framing it as the representation of all 
legal ambitions, and the state in which the law ought to be.9 
In this regard William Galston 10 notes that justice has been associated with the 'common 
good' since the earliest times of Greek philosophy. However, he acknowledges that this 
notion is in itself ambiguous since, while justice may lead to the greater common good, the 
journey towards such a state invariably requires certain individuals to make greater sacrifices 
than others; while at times when a sense of cohesion and co-operation guides a society 
towards justice (by means of the route of 'the common good'), there is no indication as to 
how the benefits gained are to be subsequently divided amongst the society. 11 Therefore, 
6 
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II 
E Bodenheimer Treatise on Justice (1967). 
Idem at 2. 
H Kelsen General Theory of Law and State (1961) at 56. 
In itself such an understanding need not constitute a purely utopian ideal, since many 
areas of legal endeavour often coincide with a particular society's understanding of 
justice. 
WA Galston Justice and the Human Good (1980) at 34. 
The answer to this issue has generally depended upon allegiance to one of two 
extreme points of view Hyperorganicism (which posits the cohesion of the 
community above individual subjectivity), and Hyperindividualism (which maintains 
the primacy of individual desires over any communal considerations). Support of the 
former position requires a standard division of benefits amongst all individuals; while 
support of the latter notion requires division of benefits according to merit and 
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Galston chooses to conceive of justice in terms of a bundle of possessive relations to which 
an individual is rightfully entitled. In this respect, therefore, he envisages a system of 
'proportional justice' based upon allocable goods, 12 and distributive principles within specific 
social contexts. The benefit of such a notion is that it is not subject to the extremes of 
ideology associated with 'absolute justice' which seeks to provide a uniform framework for 
all human experience. 13 However, as Galston concedes, the effect then of such 'proportional 
justice', which demands more than mere voluntary agreement as to the distribution of 
benefits, is "less than perfect community". 14 Thus, there is no 'science of justice' in his 
opinion, merely "an ability to surmise what is possible or probable within a given situation"15 
based upon a thorough knowledge of the facts of a particular scenario, and a sense for human 
ethics and morality. 
In tum, Terry Threadgold16 roots this sense of relativity of experience in the communicative 
constraints of human discourse (and I would consequently extend this reasoning to the 
proportionality of justice). He asserts that discourse constitutes a means for creating the 
world from within a particular point of reference thereby making it a specific rather than a 
12 
13 
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16 
demand alone. 
Galston divides such goods into three principle categories, namely, 'economic goods' 
(such as property, income and developmental opportunities); 'political goods' (which 
include authority and citizenship); and 'recognition goods' (comprising status and 
prestige). · · 
In this regard, Aristotle is noted to have said "All law is universal, but about some 
things it is not possible to make a universal statement which shall be correct. In those 
cases then in which it is necessary to speak universally but not possible to do so 
correctly, the law takes the usual case, though it is not ignorant of the possibility of 
error. And it is nonetheless correct; for the error is not in the law, nor in the 
legislator, but in the nature of the thing, since the matter of practical affairs is of this 
kind from the start. When the law speaks universally, then, and a case arises on it 
which is not covered by the universal statement, then it is right, where the legislator 
fails us and has erred by oversimplicity, to correct the omission - to say what the 
legislator himself would have put into his law; if he had known. Hence the equitable 
is just, and better than one kind of justice - not better than absolute justice, but better 
than the error that arises from the absoluteness of the statement. And this is the nature 
of the equitable, a correction of the law where it is defective owing to its universality" 
(extract from Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, Bk 5, Ch 10 as reprinted in JB White 
The Legal Imagination (1985) at 647. 
Galston op cit at 282. 
Idem at 283. 
T Threadgold 'Legal Practice in the Courts : Discourse, Gender and Ethics' (1991) 7 
Australian Journal of Law and Society 39. 
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universal truth. In effect, therefore, it becomes possible to reconstitute experience by 
reconstructing the narratives which are told; however, the arrival at a single unified 
community of understanding (and hence the attainment of 'absolute justice') is no longer an 
option, given the relativity of experience as embodied in language. The best one can hope 
for, then, (in Threadgold's opinion) is to work within the present linguistic framework so as to 
provide 'radical alternatives' 17 to the entrenched canon of discourse. However, achieving this 
is itself not an easy task since it requires the unmasking of existing discourses, and their 
expression in a manner which provides the reader with effective alternatives to the dominant 
discourse. This requires a delicate and precise procedure, for it leaves the theorist in a 
vulnerable state, uncertain that his new discourse will be able to effectively communicate his 
ideas to the reader. 
A good foundation, therefore, from which to explore the modern relativistic understanding of 
justice within the legal context is by examining recent assaults upon legal-formalistic 
pretensions. 18 
Jack Balkin 19 advocates a theory which calls for a shift in the jurisprudential focus away from 
the legal system per se, and onto the nature of the legal subject who analyses and interprets 
the law. Thus, legal understanding should be seen as something which the legal subject 
brings to the legal object itself, rather than an amorphous concept which pre-dates the legal 
subject and represents a universal truth embodied in the legal object. The effect of such an 
assertion consequently leads to the dismissal of notions of rigid certainty and the 
undermining of the objective foundations upon which formalist jurisprudence is based. This 
is not, however, to say that Balkin rejects ideals of certainty in favour of some sort of 
'anarchic bliss'. 20 Even within the new subjective framework certainty is maintained by 
means of 'shared subjectivity'. Thus, the subjectivity of the legal subject operates within a 
17 
18 
19 
20 
Idem at 41. 
Essentially, formalism maintains that the law is interpretively self-sufficient, and 
hence indifferent to the social context in which it operates. 
J Balkin 'Understanding Legal Understanding : The Legal Subject and the Problem of 
Legal Coherence' (1993) 103 Yale La.w Journal 105 at 107. 
Such a sense of subjectivity would itself of necessity lead to a complete immersion of 
Self in an existence of 'nothingness' and a world of 'meaninglessness'. Moreover, 
this state of being is inconceivable for humankind, since we need some foundation 
(however tenuous) for our beliefs. In this regard even deconstructionists give primacy 
to a particular object (namely, the text) and by so doing establish a foundation upon 
which to make assertions. 
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specific framework of cultural norms and values which form the core of the individual's 
understanding. It is, therefore, merely within this framework that subjectivity is able to 
contribute to, rather than create, the individual's understanding of the legal object. Moreover, 
the importance of such a 'cultural perspective', according to Balkin, lies in the fact that legal 
understanding is very much an active process centred on 'the knower' rather than 'the 
known'. Therefore, judgements of legal coherence of necessity rest upon the nature of the 
Self which, in tum, ensures that legal understanding comes to be seen as a means of 
self-evaluation and reflection. 
Balkin's theory provides an interesting alternative to formalist-based jurisprudential 
interpretation. In tum, however, Christof Heyns21 confronts the one factor which Balkin 
overlooked in the formulation of his theory, namely, the role which irrational factors, such as 
values, play in the construction of our cultural framework, and consequently our vision of 
reality. Therefore, Heyns (in a sense) develops Balkin's argument by centring his enquiry on 
which legal subject's value system to apply when deciding the issue of reasonableness in a 
divided society. Thus, in a similar vein to Balkin, Heyns asserts that the 'reasonableness 
enquiry' cannot be made on a purely objective and clinical basis since there is a need for the 
infusion of humanness into legal decision-making. However, in contrast to Balkin, Heyns 
argues that the incorporation of the legal subject's perception into the 'reasonableness 
enquiry' cannot be regarded as a rational factor per se, since it (in tum) is based upon 
irrational elements, such as beliefs and values. For Heyns, the basis for adjudicating 
competing values is effectively resolved in terms of a 'scale of relative acceptability' 22 whose 
primary enquiry revolves around which particular value and its associated conduct will best 
serve, or at least minimally disrupt, the focus of a particular society. 
What is most apparent from a study of Balkin and Heyns is that the formalistic notion of 
objectivity (which extends into an appreciation of justice as objective, as well) is merely an 
illusion, since law is created by people for the governance of human interaction. Thus, at 
both ends of the legal equation - the creators, and the subjects - subjective factors have a 
paramount influence on the course of the legal process. However, formalist proponents have 
themselves now instigated a backlash against what they perceive to be the tide of anarchy 
21 
22 
C Heyns 'Reasonableness in a Divided Society' (1990)2 South African Law Journal 
279 at 281. 
Idem at 301. 
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inherent in subjective interpretations of the law. So it is that Herbert Wechsler23 maintains 
that the main prerequisite of the judicial process is that it must be 'genuinely principled' 24 
inasmuch as the grounds for the decision must be adequately neutral, and thereby transcend 
the immediate result. Consequently, it is alleged by Wechsler that only an approach rooted in 
formalist theory can provide the required level of neutrality, and hence arrive at a principled 
decision. So, too, John Rawls25 avers that the less one knows about a particular situation, and 
even the less one knows about oneself, the more likely one is to reach a just decision. Thus, 
the more one immerses one's 'flawed' subjectivity in the omniscient waters of formalist 
thought, the more likely one is to reach a just conclusion. However, as communitarian 
theorists effectively reason - Rawls' theory proves impractical since individual persons are 
not autonomous entities capable of ideological isolation from those around them, let alone 
from themselves. Thus, the communitarian paradigm of justice requires (as one of the factors 
--··--- ----·---- -- -- ----
for its attainment) a knowledge and sensitive understanding of 'the Self', coupled with an 
appreciation of the connective relationship between 'the Self and its societal framework. 
Although one may agree with the approach adopted by Balkin and Heyns, and on this basis 
rationalise that formalistic objectivity is merely an illusion which appears theoretically 
'complete' but which is practically flawed. Nonetheless, such an approach overlooks the very 
allure of formalism inherent in its illusory perfection. Formalism appears to provide us with 
a glimpse of that towards which we all strive, namely, certainty, comfort and a conclusion -
all of which we somehow equate with justice. The fundamental basis of formalism is that it 
does not have to justify its existence or belief to anyone. It takes on a heroic stance in 
challenging individuals to look beyond their own interests to a system of legal interpretation 
which strives for perfection and justice by means of objectivity. The fact that the process 
must inevitably end in despair given the solipsistic nature of man renders the formalist 
journey meaningless for many, yet for some the challenge of setting aside the chaos of 
selfhood for the promise of objective certainty makes formalism an alluring concept to adhere 
to, and defend. 
·' 
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Gretchen Craft26 astutely notes that literature tries to account for the irrationality of reality 
within the confined and ordered world of the specific literary work, while law attempts to 
provide some coherence to human existence within the formalistic confines of statutes, 
custom, and judicial precedent27• Therefore, just as a literary work is self-referential 
(inasmuch as the "real world" is filtered, and condensed onto the pages of a particular literary 
work according to the whim or design of the author), and self-contained (since a work 
represents an entity of sorts with some cerebral progression - as opposed to being a 'vacuous 
nothing'), so, too, the law harbours similar principles, according to Craft. However, Craft 
would want us to believe that by applying the law in this formalistic manner, the most 
equitable and efficient legal results can be attained, and the chaos of human experience 
controlled. It is thus, at this point that Craft's comparison of law and literature begins to go 
awry and her conclusions askew. 
Admittedly, within a literary context the very act of confining emotions, motives, and desires 
onto paper constitutes an inevitable reduction in the complexity and intensity of such human 
characteristics. So, too, the act of legal explanation deconstructs the enormity of an event to 
a level at which it can be grasped more easily, and analysed with greater speed. However, 
Craft advocates that, within a legal context it is imperative not only to filter out emotion but 
also to confront and control human behaviour purely by means of rules. Such ideals are, 
however, distinctly problematic since they claim to provide just results while denouncing the 
existence of variable characteristics such as emotion, motivation, and desire which are 
inherent in the human condition. Since the rationale for law is the control of human 
behaviour, it appears strikingly incongruous to attempt to achieve such a lofty desire without 
acknowledging the components within the human psyche which may effect its outcome. It is 
thus, in my opinion, a fallacious argument to rationalise that by discarding all the variables 
and uncertainties within human existence - in essence 'fate' - from legal reasoning, that such 
legal system will provide an effective antidote to fate, while also assuring just results. 
In contrast to Craft's assertions, Kristin Bumiller28 maintains that formalism, which stresses 
its ability to provide some certainty in the wake of humankind's chaos of being, is unable to 
26 
27 
28 
G Craft 'The Persistence of Dread in Law and Literature' (1992) 102 Yale Law 
Journal 521. 
See Ch 1 for an introductory discussion on Craft. 
K Bumiller The Civil Rights Society (1990) Ch 2. 
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do so. Despite (or arguably because of) formalism's strict focus upon legal rules, Bumiller 
contends that discrimination simply works through such rules with the result that the law 
comes no nearer to providing clarity on humankind's tumult. For Burniller, rules merely 
provide an illusion of certainty, and do not effectively confront the fears and anxieties present 
in reality. In fact, rules serve to create dread and fear in the very victims who seek refuge in 
the law from the injustices of human existence. According to Bumiller, this dread stems from 
the fact that in seeking assistance through legal channels, 'victims' are required to assume 
their victimhood and accept their inability to assist themselves, thereby legitimising their own 
defeat. Rather than confronting their position, therefore, in the light of the clinically 
impartial law, victims tend to internalise and rationalise their pain and hurt. Thus, the 
objective system of rules to which Craft refers is the same body of law which Bumiller 
perceives to be born of division and manipulative inequality. In effect, Bumiller indicates 
that Craft's theory of law is merely an academic exercise which fails effectively to account 
for or encourage people's interaction with the legal process. This is due to the fact that the 
theory itself bears no relation to the reality of human tensions, conflict, and inequality in 
which it is situated. Furthermore, the concept of law itself is actually grounded in such 
human turmoil, and feeds off it, rather than simply regulating it. 
John Noonan29 also criticises Craft's defence of the effectiveness of law as a means for 
creating certainty. Noonan emphasises the legal system's reliance on the human element in 
its midst - ranging from those who create the law, through to those who apply it, and those 
against whom it has an effect. This very humanness which pervades the entire legal process 
means that at best the law is feigning objectivity, and at worst is tacitly consorting in the 
conflicts brought to it for adjudication, since it is upon the maintenance of such tensions that 
the legal system relies for its survival. Furthermore, the surfeit of human egos, desires, and 
machinations at all stages of the legal process make the thought of an objective body of law 
seem impractical. Thus, for Noonan, the law's assumption of an impersonal and objective 
persona is simply a donned mask of impartiality, used as a means for creating a secure (albeit 
fictitious) premiss on which people can rely based upon our tacit association of objectivity 
with justice. Nonetheless, it may be argued that far from achieving its goal of certainty, 
formalism, in fact, creates a greater sense of unease through its utter disregard for the 'human 
29 J Noonan Persons and Masks of the Law (1991) Ch 2. 
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element' both surrounding it, and within it. 30 Moreover, in this regard, Martha Minow31 
implicates the legal process in condoning the very social violence it claims to govern by 
means of a tacit violence inherent in the law itself. This 'legal violence' may, in turn, be 
analysed in terms of an 'active' and 'passive' violence. Regarding the former, Robert Cover32 
asserts that legal interpretation, and the violence it occasions can only be understood with 
reference to each other. On the one hand, legal interpretation signifies the imposition of 
rational constraints upon the irrational tumult which social violence occasions; while on the 
other hand, through interpretation the law responds to pain by imposing sanctioned violence 
of its own in the interests of 'justice'. As to the 'passive violence' in the legal system, 
Minow relates the tragic details of two child abuse cases33 in which judicial inaction resulted 
in the agonising deaths of two young children. She regards such inaction on the part of the 
law as tacit condonation of the very atrocities it was established to control, and consequently 
as reprehensible as any positive actions which participants acting on behalf of the legal 
system may take to hinder, delay, or prevent such access to justice. 
Cover and Minow appear, however, to conflict in their assessment of the measures required 
to deal with such 'legal violence'. In essence, Cover maintains that the violence perpetuated 
through legal interpretation is indicative of a vain attempt by the law to impose some 
30 
31 
32 
33 
In spite of this, formalism seems able . to comfort itself in the illusion that the 
theoretical attempt at certainty by means of objectivity, rather than the attainment of 
such certainty through experience, is important. As theoretically satisfying as such an 
argument may be, however, there is a need to find some practical solutions to law's 
aim to provide individuals with some respite from the uncertainties of life. The first 
means of tackling the problem would seem to be an acknowledgement of the various 
subjective voices vying for supremacy within the law. Once such conflicting 
perspectives have been identified, the law has to embark on the task of providing 
some certainty for its subjects by simply balancing these different rights and values 
against one another. The rights and values (and consequently the sense of 'justice') to 
be adopted will, therefore, be those which a particular society can best afford from a 
moral and practical point of view. Such a system cannot, however, be dependent 
upon the whims of those in effective control of the legal system (i.e. the legislature 
and judiciary). Therefore, if the legal system is to instil confidence in its subjects and 
provide them with a beacon of certainty in a sea of apprehension, it must be seen, by 
the 'victims' who seek its assistance, as being benignly omniscient. 
M Minow 'Words and the Door to the Land of Change: Law, Language and Family 
Violence' (1990) 43 Vanderbilt Law Review 1665 at 1666. 
R Cover 'Violence and the Word' (1986) 95 Yale Law Journal 1601at1604. 
The cases in question are De Shaney v Winnebago County Department of Social 
Services [109 S Ct 998 (1989)] (Minow op cit at 1667); and that of Lisa Steinberg 
(Minnow op cit at 1678). 
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effective domination and control over reality. While this may result in a superficial sense of 
security, in effect it nonetheless merely serves to accentuate the existing problems. Cover is 
understandably unable to provide any absolute remedy to the above dilemmas since he 
acknowledges that legal interpretation is not a utopian ideal imposed upon the suffering of the 
world, but that it is, in fact, a creature borne by this suffering, and one which merely attempts 
to maintain a tenuous equilibrium between conflicting interests by means of a violence of its 
own. Therefore, rather than provide conclusions, Cover attempts instead to create an 
awareness of the ironies and hypocrisies present in any legal system as evidenced through 
legal interpretation. Moreover, Cover appears resigned to the violence present in legal 
interpretation based on humankinds inherent desire to manipulate the "social organisations of 
violence"34 through the use of violence in another guise. Thus, owing to the law's unfortunate 
response to violence, Cover's ideal of common meaning is a pragmatic impossibility. In this 
regard, Cover maintains that the best that can be achieved, given the chaotic nature of 
humankind's perceptions of reality, is some form of 'shared subjectivity' (as opposed to 
'universality of understanding') coupled with recognition, rather than mere denial, of the 
violence which operates from within a legal context. In tum, Minow approaches the issue of 
legal violence from the perspective of the language used by courts, which result in judicial 
inaction based upon often spurious distinctions. As with Cover, Minow acknowledges that 
the law is a social construct born of the very societal turmoil it seeks to regulate. However, 
whereas Cover acknowledges the inevitability of violence within the law, Minow asserts that 
through its use of words the law is able to re-create itself, change its emphasis, and strive for 
justice. Minow maintains that while the law often acknowledges the human element present 
in all given situations35, somehow in implementing the law the judiciary seeks to avoid the 
emotions and passions embedded in the conflict in favour of a clinical and antiseptic 
resolution of the situation. There is, thus, an ill-conceived presumption that 'justice' is best 
served when references to the vagaries of human nature are kept to a minimum in matters of 
law. Moreover, Minow astutely criticises the irony of such a presumption, since law is by 
reason of its very purpose36 grounded in human conflict. Thus, to simply denounce the 
relevance of human attributes when deciding the law does not do away with their existence. 
~· 
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See Minow op cit n40 at 1625. 
This acknowledgement can be seen in the legal constructs of mens rea, the test of the 
'reasonable person', and the various legal obligations to act in particular 
circumstances amongst others. 
i.e. The constraining and controlling of human society. 
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According to Minow not only do such human attributes have a right to be considered in a 
court of law, but they are of vital necessity if justice is to be regarded as more than an idle 
and idealistic phrase. In this regard, Minow places great stress on the role of narratives in 
legal reasoning. In this regard, she states that law is, essentially, a morass of subjective 
realities vying with one another for power, inasmuch as parties come before the court with 
different interpretations of events from which the judge is expected to extract commonalities 
and contradictions, and come to a resolution based on his own perception of events. Such a 
task is exceptionally onerous (if not altogether impossible), and Minow, therefore, advocates 
legal narratives as a means for all parties to effectively express themselves and infuse the 
legal process with compassion and greater justice. The narrative process will thus serve a 
dual function in that it will provide the legal system with an opportunity to analyse accounts 
of reality which diverge from, and even undermine dominant understandings, as well as 
(hopefully) creating some 'connection' between these different perceptions, thereby eliciting 
empathic understanding. The appeal of Minow's argument lies in the fact that differing legal 
narratives alert judicial decision-makers to the vagaries of the human condition, and provide 
them with often overlooked perspectives of the law. Thus, the legal process is brought to the 
realisation that in all situations paraded before it, no matter how constant or certain the law 
appears to be, sight should never be lost of the one 'uncertainty' which is always present, 
namely, the spectre of violence present in humanity. With such a perspective at hand, it can 
only be hoped that the law will incorporate an element of flexibility (and consequently, 
pragmatism) into its dealings with its mortal and imperfect subjects, thereby emancipating the 
notion of 'justice' from the shackles of theoretical objectivity. 
In essence, therefore, both Cover and Minow criticise the legal process' regular formalistic 
adherence to rules, and its disregard for the realities of the participants. However, while 
Cover appears resigned to the need for violence within the law to supplement its regulation of 
society, Minow, in contrast, regards the law in a less severe light, as simply in need of greater 
exposure to different "realities" in the legal narrative process in order to arrive at just 
decisions37• Nonetheless, I contend that one thing remains undeniable, namely, that the power 
37 Whether, in fact, there is necessarily any fundamental distinction between Cover's and 
Minow's approaches, or whether they merely provide a different perspective on the 
same issue, is debatable. However, I would tend to support the latter assertion, since 
both authors provide valuable insights into the association between violence and law, 
and its consequent effect on the possibility of 'justice'. Thus, it seems wasteful, in my 
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of words should never be looked upon with disdain or disbelief. As Michael Barkun38 states 
"perceptions help us understand the law in important ways, since the primary 'vessel' for 
perception is language, and language has the ability to confine and define events".39 
Therefore, just as the language of law has the ability to condone violence, so, too, it has the 
power to control it, and in the process strive towards an understanding of 'justice'. 
Admittedly, such an appreciation of legal discourse in terms of its nebulous nature, poised as 
it is between violence and rationality, is not conducive to the attainment of a comfortable and 
straightforward understanding of 'justice'. Yet it is imperative to embark upon such a 
journey in order to penetrate the polished veneer of the law so as to ascertain whether 
'justice' has a point of connection in human existence and the rule of law. 
In this regard, Randy Barnett40 asserts that the concepts of 'justice' and the 'rule of law' 
"presuppose a social context"41 onto which they then proffer their services as a means of 
managing the "fundamental social problems that are unavoidable features of human social 
life".42 To this end, however, Barnett insists that justice is not simply a tacit and intangible 
desire, but one which must, in fact, be effectively communicated (ex ante) in order to have 
the desired results implicit in its formulation, successfully achieved. Moreover, he alleges 
that the channel of communication most suited to this task is the rule of law, since it is 
founded upon the principle of standardised ex ante communication. As Barnett himself 
notes: "Without the formal characteristics of the rule of law, justice will be unknowable in 
advance of personal decisions to act and, consequently, avoidable injustices will unavoidably 
occur".43 In essence, therefore, Barnett conceives of justice and the rule of law as operating 
in two dimensions - first, as a means of addressing "the problem of knowledge";44 and 
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mind, to attempt to weaken each argument's valuable contribution by pitting them 
against one another. 
M Barkun Law Without Sanction (1968). 
Idem at 39. 
RE Barnett 'Forward : Can Justice and the Rule of Law be Reconciled' (1988) 11 
Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 597. 
Idem at 599. Since he maintains that both concepts require some form of human 
interaction in order to justify their existence. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Idem at 616. i.e. Justice through the channels of the rule of law disseminates 
information to people, thereby providing them with ex ante knowledge of events and 
their consequences. 
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secondly, as a means of confronting "the problem of interest". 45 However, he readily 
concedes that the latter issue of 'interest' poses difficulties, since the law is required to 
impose force (in the form of legal sanctions and retributive measures) so as to facilitate the 
attainment of just results; yet the imposition of such force may reach a point at which it 
becomes self-defeating. Moreover, the fact that the authority to impose sanctions on others is 
confined to a small group of individuals leads to the potential for (rather than a respite from) 
injustice. Nonetheless, through the association of the rule of law to justice in the light of a 
moral dimension, Barnett believes that the potential of sliding towards an abyss of injustice 
can be averted, and the social ills of knowledge, interest, and power, effectively controlled.46 
Therefore, Barnett's universe is rooted in moral justification which permits it to effectively 
attain the ideals demanded of it by justice. Such an understanding, thus, requires an 
appreciation of the need for the concept of justice to be conjoined with its channel of 
communication - i.e. the rule of law - in order for there to be an effective transmission of 
such noble ambitions (with the consequent possibility of their attainment). Barnett, however, 
is not unaware of the reality that both the rule of law, and justice are imperfectly evolving 
concepts (inasmuch as they develop and mutate at differing rates, and at different times to 
each other); yet, he maintains that it is only by means of a unified vision in which justice and 
the rule of law are seen as co-dependent upon each other that one can achieve an informed 
appreciation of their social functions, and thereby "better understand and reform both ideas". 
Richard Posner,47 in contrast, approaches the notion of morality from a more radical 
standpoint in terms of which legal authority per se is celebrated in the light of a "morality of 
obedience".48 This essentially conservative perspective49 (rooted in unsentimental premises) 
seeks to articulate the moral virtue of legal authority as distinct from justice.50 In essence, 
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Ibid. i.e. The rule of law accords high status to certain relationships (eg ownership 
and marriage), and sets about first, defining, and secondly, defending them in a 
uniform manner (within a particular societal context) so that just results might prevail. 
Idem at 623. 
Posner A Misunderstood Relationship at 250. 
Idem at 252. 
I realise that in referring to Posner as both 'radical' and 'conservative', I open myself 
to the accusation of being inconsistent. However, the juxtapositioning of such 
adjectives is emblematic of the underlying tensions in Posnerian reasoning - ie he 
seeks to entrench an essentially conservative rationale by means of radical 
formulations. 
Posner contends that the object of law is the creation of order, rather than justice. 
Therefore, there is no correlation between law and justice (or any other virtue for that 
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therefore, legal authority (together with other forms of authority) which has been distilled in 
the filter of human history serves to clarify and structure the unknowable content of human 
motivations in an irrational universe, thereby providing some focus and, more importantly, 
order - without the need to elucidate upon and seek comfort within the ideal of 'justice'. In 
this regard, Posner's commitment to the importance of authority is somewhat 'Darwinian' in 
nature inasmuch as he maintains that the hierarchical and institutionally entrenched authority 
which prevails in the present is to be supported and valued by virtue of its temporal survival. 
It is, thus, not the prerogative of mankind to question the raison d'etre or suitability of such 
authority, but merely his obligation to adhere to it, (if he wishes to retain a semblance of 
sanity), since it objectively rationalises the chaotic universe and thereby orders it in 
accordance with humankind's craving for rationality and certainty. In contrast to this 
understanding, Posner intimates that existence within the chaotic flux of the 'natural world' 
(i.e. a framework devoid of hierarchical and institutional authority) requires of one the sole 
belief in the possibility of attaining 'justice' (which itself requires an ordering of sorts) 
without the assistance of any pre-existing foundational framework - something which (Posner 
alleges) is altogether futile, and fit only for philosophical consumption rather than practical 
implementation. 
Taking Posner's reasoning to its logical conclusion, one might assume that due to the 
advances in the law, and the long history of judicial precedent, the law today possesses a 
greater degree of certainty than ever before (inasmuch as new cases can be decided merely by 
reference to past decisions). However, such a presumption would be misguided since legal 
decisions are "just particular propositions which only report ... certain historical events"; 
therefore, "in order to obtain a general or functional rule or principle we must have a 
universal proposition".51 In essence, therefore, there can never be a presumption that a 
previous decision can be followed 'in toto' in later cases, since the variables in a given 
situation are never completely replicated in other contexts. This is not, however, to assume 
that judges are free-agents whose decisions merely represent their whimsical dictates in a 
particular situation. On the contrary, (and in contrast to Posner's principal allegation) the 
51 
matter); and the sole factor dictating the inherent good in law is its authoritative 
nature. In this same vein, great literature (for Posner) is generally concerned with the 
virtue of authority. 
Stoljar 'The Logical Status of a Legal Principle' (1953) 20 University of Chicago La.w 
Review 181 at 182. 
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thread linking past, present, and future decisions is the fundamental presumption in favour of 
justice. While I concede the fact that human history is littered with instances of injustices and 
excesses, nonetheless, I maintain that but for some basic tenet of justice around which the 
human psyche is moulded, and towards which successive societies have striven (in various 
manners), all existence is rendered amoral - and worse still, meaningless. As John Dickson 
notes regarding the modern manifestations of justice which have developed in the past two 
centuries: 
"In the eighteenth century the emphasis shifted, though less in England than 
elsewhere, from history to reason, from precedent to fundamental justice. That was 
the golden century of human "reason", when the miraculous was expected of it. In it 
was found what the Middle Ages had found in religious faith, and what the nineteenth 
century was to find in science - a key to unlock doors, a panacea for all the ills of the 
world, a mechanical toy that kept man agape for what wonders it was going to work 
next. And for the type of reason, mathematical reason was chosen - a reason working 
out with inexorable logic the single correct solution for every problem. Such an idea 
at work in politics produced the Abbe Sieyes, and in law the era of codes. It was 
believed that the one and only legal rule for every possible situation could be written 
off in advance by a proper combination of axiomatic first principles with the same 
accuracy as the answers to all the problems in Euclidean geometry. Law ceased to be 
an instrument working towards certainty - it became certainty itself ... [However] we 
have come to realise that logic is but the tool of premisses, and that the premisses of 
social intercourse fluctuate ... logic will not yield us certainty; in fact nothing will". 52 
An important point of distinction, however, remains - namely, that while modem existence 
may be characterised by acute uncertainty, it nonetheless retains meaning by virtue of the 
human preoccupation with justice. 
Modern liberal thought has sought to cope with such uncertainty by creating fundamental 
distinctions in all spheres of human understanding. Thus, for example, the liberal theory of 
Self distinguishes between objective reason and subjective desire; liberal epistemology 
entrenches the separation of theory and fact; and the liberal theory of legal reasoning divides 
52 Extract from Administrative Justice and the Supremacy of Law, as reprinted in Law, 
Language and Ethics (1996) Bishin WR, Stone CD (eds) at 468. 
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all legal endeavour between impersonal rules and individual values. Far from providing a 
suitable, or indeed practicable, solution to the quandary of uncertainty, however, Roberto 
Unger53 maintains that such liberal theory forces one to make a choice based upon extremes 
and lacking in any essential validity, as a consequence of which one's argument becomes 
steeped in contradiction and destined for failure. Unger acknowledges that the relationship 
between particulars and universals remains the central problematic in modem existence. 
However, whereas modern liberal thought looks to the establishment of dichotomies for 
comfort, Unger seeks to replace the very foundation of classical teaching from which liberal 
thought has evolved. Unger's underlying concern with modem liberal thought is that after 
having entrenched the notion of dichotomies as a natural phenomenon of human reasoning, it 
then seeks to marginalise the significance of theoretical universals in the equation and to 
establish the primacy of the particular and the individual as defined in terms of a 'universal' 
category. The problem with this, however, Unger notes, is that by denying the significance 
of essences, universals are reduced to the level of nominal quantities. In other words, 
terminology and defining characteristics are merely abstracted from a series of chosen 
instances. Moreover, such categorisation is flawed by its very randomness since the manner 
in which we seek to define such notions is principally governed by our particular purposes in 
a defined instant. Conversely, if one wishes to define a universal without reference to 
particulars, then one enters the sphere of formalistic pretentious lacking in any practical 
application. Either way, one will meet with disappointment. Unger is, therefore, at odds with 
both the classical foundations of liberal thought as well as the modem interpretation which 
such liberal thought seeks to extract from its classical origins. 
Unlike classical ideology which denies the existence of tension between the particular and the 
universal simply by subordinating the will of the individual to the destiny of the universal; 
and unlike modem liberal thought which attempts to redress this imbalance by asserting the 
perpetual separation of the individual from the universal and defining them independently of 
each other, Unger charts a different course which he labels 'concrete universality'. In terms 
of Unger's theory, the universal is only able to exist through the individual and the individual 
is given the ability to influence the universal. In essence, they are contingent upon each other 
for their identity and meaning. Only when the one is understood can the other be known. In 
terms of this paradigm, therefore, the separation of particular from universal and Self from 
53 R Unger Law in Modem Society: Towards a Criticism of Social Theory (1976) at 116. 
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Other is not a hinderance to understanding, but rather, a vital component in the formulation of 
meaning since they are all co-dependent identities. 
It is undeniable that in recent years there has been a shift (in the legal context) away from an 
objective and universal understanding of justice towards a more relativistic approach54 closely 
associated with a more pragmatic appreciation of the attainment of human ideals. There is, 
therefore, no fear of resorting (through relativism) to a nihilistic vision of existence based 
upon conflicting personal experiences; rather, the journey requires of one a more complex 
understanding of the dense interrelationship of such personal experiences through an 
acknowledgement of their 'sameness' and their 'difference', and ultimately their individual 
contribution to the larger canvas of human endeavour.55 However, it is apparent that one will 
encounter problems whether one abides by an absolute or relativistic notion of justice. The 
reason for this lies in the fact that allegiance to the former notion demands of one a belief 
(some would call it a naive faith) in the ability and desire of people to look beyond their own · 
circumstances, and comprehend a uniform totality of vision upon which all individuals can 
focus with equal conviction; while acceptance of the latter notion often exposes one to the 
accusation of being solipsistic and failing to 'do justice' to humankind's nobility of spirit and 
visionary potential.56 
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In the context of justice, relativism entails an understanding of moral values in less 
than absolute term, i.e. it connotes a willingness to accord status to socio-historical, 
political, economic, and cultural variables in the creation of a particular justice 
paradigm. In contrast, the naturalist school of legal philosophy is categorised by its 
adherence to a conception of justice as uniform and universal and, most importantly, 
not a human creation but a divine concept. \~ 
As Hans Kelsen stated "I cannot say what justice is, the absolute justice for which \ 
mankind is longing. I must acquiesce in a relative justice and I can only say what 
justice is to me ... justice, to me, is that social order under whose protection the 
search for truth can prosper. 'My' justice, then, is the justice of freedom, the justice of 
peace, the justice of democracy - the justice of tolerance": See H Kelsen What is 
Justice? (1957) at 23-24. 
In this context, Julius Stone asserts that while relativist theories are often structured so 
as to account for fluctuations (be they social, political, economic et cetera) in the 
human environment, this in no way presupposes the efficiency and influence of such 
theories upon general human endeavour. The reason for this, according to Stone, has 
to do with the fact that the very complexity of such relativist theories often stifles 
their effectiveness as tools of general applicability and influence: See J Stone Human 
Law and Human Justice (1965) at 299. In short, "the ideals which relativism usually 
offers have not the glamour which surrounds principles which present themselves as 
absolute": Ibid. 
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Essentially, the legal conception of justice appears to contain an inherent paradox in its 
formulation inasmuch as its formulaic construction (governed by the principles of 
reasonableness, equity, fairness, and due process) seeks to administer the variables of a 
particular situation, while retaining sufficient elasticity so as to be applicable to a wider range 
of differing social contexts. The result, according to Stone57 is, therefore, that the outcome of 
such an enquiry cannot direct judgement in the way of a single validated conclusion in a 
particular case since the opposing tensions of particularity and generality serve to diffuse the 
focus of the 'justice' enquiry.58 Ultimately, this is due to the fact that legal notions of justice 
expressed in terms such as 'doing justice between the parties' and 'basing one's decision on 
the merits of the case' are at once both general and particular in nature. Nonetheless, it is this 
very plurality of visions59 which enables one to resolve matters of extreme complexity 
"without undermining faith in justice by open confession of our inadequacy",60 while also 
encouraging a sense of constancy during times of vacillating values by focusing on an 
omnipresent ideal. 61 
This paradoxical position extends into the notion of 'morality' which is often embedded in 
legal understandings of justice. Within this context it is apparent that a distinction is 
generally made between 'natural law' and 'positive law' .62 The former notion relating to a 
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Ibid. 
Moreover, on the basis of a particularist view the search for justice in the context of a 
specific factual matrix would defy application in any other context since the material 
factors of any given situation are unique. 
One might refer to it as an indeterminacy of sorts. 
Op cit at 301. 
Stone alleges that an understanding of the notions of 'justice' and 'law' as 
synonymous indicators of a single concept is both unhelpful and incorrect given the 
broad nature of 'justice' and its association with almost every facet of human life. 
(For an in-depth analysis of the impact of 'justice' in human relations generally: See 
CK Allen Aspects of Justice (1958). However, this is not to assert that 'justice' and 
'law' are easily distinguishable in practice. What it does, nonetheless, indicate is that 
while legal discourse would have one believe that it is the most effective (if not the 
sole) means by which to attain justice, there are, in fact, other discourses which are 
equally capable of providing one with a unique, and possibly clearer, 
conceptualisation of justice. Such discourses include political, scientific, 
philosophical, and literary discourses. However, given the broad nature of such a 
multidisciplinary analysis in the context of the present thesis, I ftave felt it appropriate 
to confine myself to an enquiry into literary discourse alone. 
'Natural law' embodies an ideal of justice which guides a society, and is based upon a 
communal allegiance to a moral ('internal') facet of legal justification; while 'positive 
law' seeks to account for legal justification in terms of 'external' socio-political 
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legal ideal, and the latter notion representing a legal reality. Joseph C Cascarelli63 argues that 
the distinction between the two notions is to be found in their different interpretations of how 
they perceive justice to be connected to human origins. Cascarelli notes that while natural 
law must maintain a presumption of innocence as to the origin of mankind, since it is only 
from such innocence that 'Justice' (in the sense of an immutable concept) can be born, the 
understanding of positive law is embedded in man's imperfect beginnings and amoral nature 
as a consequence of which only 'justice' is attainable. 
In my view, however, this reasoning seeks to create unnecessary distinctions, not in terms of 
the nature of the concept and conceptions of justice but in as much as while they are separate 
notions, they yet remain reliant on each other for their individual meaning. In order to 
appreciate the ideal of 'Justice', one must account for the reality of 'justice'. Conversely, in 
acknowledging the existence of 'justice', one is still accepting the relevance and primacy of 
'Justice' (one is simply now saying that while it cannot be attained, its significance can still 
be appreciated). I therefore, find no difficulty in premissing my reasoning on the situation of 
man in a postlapsarian world in which 'Justice' cannot be fully comprehended yet it is 
conceptually acknow I edged in order to facilitate the interpretation and meaning of 'justice'. 
Moreover, given modem day levels of sophistication (be they technological, scientific, or 
artistic) which have permeated all aspects of human existence, and which, in tum, have 
necessitated the birth of a 'conceptual scepticism', it becomes evident that inevitable tensions 
must exist between factual experiences and abstract thought. In other words, the existence of 
justice (in a generic sense) in a modem age can only be appreciated through an understanding 
of the justification on which it is grounded. Nonetheless, while absolute standards have had 
to be eroded in favour of mortal desires and capabilities, an awareness of the phenomenal 
extent of human potential is simultaneously developing (hence 'Justice'/'justice' and 
justice/justification tensions). In spite of such advances in human understanding, however, 
the legal system per se remains deluded by its own formalistic pretensions and seeks to 
portray itself as the embodiment of human aspirations regarding justice without questioning 
63 
decrees enforced by sanctions (and unrelated to any moral sphere). In other words, 
'natural law' is premised upon humankind's innate desire to strive for justice in the 
light of a benign framework, while 'positive law' has its roots in humankind's fears 
and uncertainties. 
JC Cascarelli 'Presumption of Innocence and Natural Law: Machiavelli and Aquinas' 
(1996) 41 American Journal of Jurisprudence 229 at 231. 
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its own legitimacy as a harbinger of such ideals. In itself, this is not surprising since any 
discourse is eager to establish its primacy as the ideal means by which to capture the essence 
of the human condition, and is loath to question its own abilities in this regard. While it is, 
therefore, important to question the law's integrity with regard to justice, it is also necessary 
to be aware of what questions to pose and what solutions they may proffer. For it is often in 
asking the 'right' question of the law, rather than simply demanding any answers of it that 
one gains a more incisive (not to mention complex) appreciation of its functions and 
effectiveness as a mechanism for the regulation of human existence and the attainment of 
human ideals. In this regard, I shall now list the three principal concerns to which I have 
tacitly alluded in the context of 'Legal Understanding of Justice' : Is legal discourse entitled 
to enjoy greater reverence than that which is accorded to other discourses? Is legal discourse 
more capable of responding to human uncertainties than other discourses? Is legal discourse 
(on its own) the most effective mechanism for the regulation of human society and the 
attainment of justice? My answers to these questions shall become apparent in the context of 
the next section ('Literary Understandings of Justice'). However, at this juncture it is worth 
nothing how MR Cohen64 incisively penetrates a weakness in the legal understanding of 
justice in a manner worthy of citing in full within this context: 
64 
"[U]niversality and individuality, justice and the law, the ideal and the actual, are 
inseparable, yet never completely identifiable. Like being and becoming, unity and 
plurality, rest and motion, th~y are polar categories. Deny one and the other becomes 
meaningless. Yet the two must always remain opposed. You may even insist that 
there is little difference, if any, between a positivism like Gray's which allows for 
moral judgements upon the law, and an idealism that admits the inherent limitation of 
any ideal of justice that can be applied to human affairs. There is a sense in which the 
same system of legal rights and duties might be expressed in positivistic or idealistic 
language. But not only is language itself a most important factor in human affairs -
since all sorts of emotional differences arise from differences of expression - but so 
long as our knowledge remains incomplete it makes a difference from which end we 
view the legal system. The positivistic and the idealistic perspective cannot be 
identical on the level of human knowledge. Positivists fail i~ying to separate law 
from all ideals, and Hegelians fail in trying to identify the ideal with some form of the 
MR Cohen Reason and Nature (1931) Bk III ch 4 at 426. 
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actual, whether the Prussian or any other state. The deeper and more ancient wisdom 
is to recognise that divine perfection is denied to human beings in legal as in other 
practical affairs. It is romantic foolishness to expect that man can by his own puny 
efforts make a heaven of earth. But to wear out our lives in the pursuit of worthy 
though imperfectly attainable ideals is the essence of human dignity." 
Such an appreciation of justice in terms of its paradoxical totality cannot, however, be 
effectively accounted for in terms of legal discourse alone. Within the legal arena all 
jurisprudential 'sorties' into justice somehow always centre on the issue of morality, giving 
rise to the old chestnut scenario embodied in the Hart-Devlin debate. Moreover, at no point 
in the dilemma does legal discourse suggest the possibility of an integrated vision which is 
able to assimilate the conflicting belief systems into a unified understanding of sorts. As far 
as the law is concerned, everything is an 'either ... or' situation, never an 'and' prospect. 
What is, therefore, required for the advancement of 'legal justice'65 in a beneficial direction 
is, I would venture to suggest, an analysis of the more complex understanding of justice 
presented by literature. 
2.2 Literary Understanding of Justice 
As has been seen, the primary motivation of the law is to create an illusion of absolute and 
omnipresent authority from within the context of its words by attempting to deny the existence 
of a specific author. This is partly achieved by means of the temporal distance between the 
framers of a particular text (i.e. legislative bodies and committees) and the interpreters of such 
texts (i.e. judges and lawyers), as well as the complex division of tasks and duties amongst these 
various groups with regard to the text. By so doing, the law hopes to create an omniscient aura 
in the belief that a cloak of objective values and benign authority best serves the ends of justice. 
In contrast, literature retains a poignant immediacy of purpose through the tacit intimacy 
between author and reader (who in the act of interpreting becomes an unwitting subject of the 
author). Ironically, I intend to indicate, that it is this very intimacy which makes the quest for 
justice within literature a distinctly noble and more achievable goal. This is because the 
attainment of justice requires a merging of the subjective inner existence of the individual with 
those of other individuals.66 The task is, moreover, eminently worthwhile (and problematic) 
65 
66 
i.e. The legal understanding of justice. 
'Justice' requires an element of empathic reasoning in its formulation which enables the 
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since it requires the interpreter to be willing to admit to his own vulnerability by coming to terms 
with the potential weaknesses of his perspective and recognising, through the process of 
understanding, that a myriad of other valid views exist. However, in spite of the difficult nature 
of the task, it is not altogether unrealistic because, unlike law which requires one to denounce 
subjectivity in favour of an objective perspective (in order to best serve the ends of justice), 
literature does not require a renunciation of one's subjectivity so much as an acknowledgement 
of it. 
It is, therefore, important to note that a 'literary bias' often focuses on a different conception of 
'justice' than that which is presented by means of pure legal understanding. The task of 
literature is at one and the same time, first, to do justice to the vagaries of the human condition, 
and secondly, to remain loyal to humankind's desire of a greater certainty beyond 'the Self (i.e. 
an innate sense of 'justice').67 The result is, therefore, a far more immediate and intense 
appreciation of the potential for justice than that which a purely legal understanding accords one. 
In this regard, however, the literary understanding of justice has not remained static, and in order 
to appreciate the nature of 'literary justice'68 one must analyse its temporal progression so as to 
ascertain its broad connection with,. and benefits for, legal discourse as a whole. To this end I 
have chosen to examine three literary genres of particular relevance in recent times -
Romanticism, Modernism, and Postmodemism. 
67 
.. , 
68 
individual to somehow look beyond the Self and transpose the situation of another into 
his own frame of reference. 
In contrast to my contention, however, and far from seeing literature's primary 
motivation' as the search for justice, Georges Bataille (Literature and Evil (1973)) 
regards literature as nothing more than a form of communication reliant for its cohesion 
and effectiveness upon an allegiance to Evil. This is not, however, to suggest that it is 
immoral, but rather that it requires a sense of 'hypermorality' i.e. an awareness of 
literature's potency as an arbiter of fate. In this sense, therefore, Bataille appears to 
acknowledge the capabilities of literature in structuring existence, however he regards 
the process itself to be tainted by prejudices and steeped in Evil. Moreover, such a 
perception can be closely aligned with that found in Edward Blake's Songs of 
Experience: See E Blake Songs of Innocence and Experience (1976) in which the adult 
can only recapture the immediacy of his childhood by ackndwledging the evil in 
experience where once he found only good. However, while Bataille focuses solely on 
the 'Evil' into which literature is immersed, Blake appears to accept the necessity of evil 
as an indicator of a complex and fulfilling appreciation of the possibility of justice. 
i.e. A literary understanding of justice. 
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(a) Romanticism 
The Romantic movement, whose origins can be traced back to the latter part of the eighteenth 
century, arose as a result of a fundamental ideological reappraisal of the relationship between 
'the Self and 'the other'. In essence, the notion of an objectively defined, and immanently 
knowable world from which humankind draws knowledge about itself began.to waiver in view 
of an increased awareness of the complex relativity of nature and the metaphysical isolation of 
the individual. Where once objectivity and justice were synonymously intertwined with each 
other in an incestuously banal paradigm of existence, there now emerged a complex 
self-reflection of the human condition based upon social isolation and metaphysical uncertainty. 
Moreover, such complex tensions, in turn, accounted for the tangible revision, by Romantics, of 
what they perceived to be man's social role and his societal obligations.69 Society became 
viewed as the artificial construct bridging the chasm between internal identity and external 
circumstances; and, the Romantics' prime desire was to analyse the interrelations between role 
and self, 'the Self' and 'the other' in an attempt to better understand man's interaction with the 
world. To this end, they devised an 'anti-role'70 designed to account for and penetrate the 
inevitable (some might say, necessary) masks behind which human participants conduct 
activities amongst one another, and thereby find some basis for meaning, value, order and 
identity.71 The 'anti-role' construct did not, however, represent a static vision of Romantic 
ideology; rather, it evolved successive personas in its quest to account for and relay man's 
societal insecurities. In this regard, George Braziller72 analyses the development of the 
'anti-role' tradition from its negative foundations in the 'Byronic hero', followed by the positive 
visions embodied in the 'Poet-Visionary', the 'Bohemian', the 'Virtuoso', the 'Dandy' and 
69 
70 
71 
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Note that while I make use of the term 'man', I intend it to stand as a general reference to 
both sexes. 
i.e. "a role that was different from all other roles in that it could not be integrated into the 
social structure of interlocking roles": See Braziller Romanticism- The Culture of the 
Nineteenth Century (1965) at 17. 
The foundational premise of Romantic ideology was that human existence was 
structured around the desire for order, value, and meaning, and that such attributes lay at 
the core of the notion of 'self. Thus, the focus of attention shifted onto 'the Self' as the 
receptacle for human potential and the catalyst for change. 
Op cit. 
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culminating in the 'Historian', and it is worthwhile to follow this same illustrative progression as 
an aid in comprehending Romantic concerns. 
Upon the putrefaction of Enlightenment ideology, resulting from a questioning of moral order 
and meaning, there emerged a symbol - the 'Byronic hero' - who took on the role of the social 
outcast and misfit within the context of a society alienated from itself. Gradually, however, the 
despair of the 'Byronic hero' gave way to the potential embodied in the 'Poet~ Visionary' who 
perceived the world with an innate sense of the justice to be found in the natural universe, even 
while acknowledging that effective comprehension and communication of such notions were 
beyond human capabilities. Within this context, the beauty and importance of art, therefore, lay 
in its ability to subsume all divisions and categories into a poignant revelation of untainted 
human experience - the process being, at one and the same time, both redemptive and 
reassuring. This process was redemptive inasmuch as it allowed one to progress beyond the 
confines established by society in general, and the social masks of individuals in particular; 
while also, by virtue of its task, necessitating a reappraisal of such social constructs and 
providing assurances of greater (and ironically, unknowable) possibilities from within this new 
framework of understanding. Similarly, the 'Bohemian hero' sought to distort his perceptions 
(aided by the use of alcohol and drugs) and thereby attain a clearer conception of reality 
unhindered by social norms and constructs; at the core of which often lay a strong reliance on art 
as a catalyst of thought and an "excuse for his deliberate offensiveness".73 Soon the notions of, 
'Virtuoso' and 'Dandy' emerged to increase the complement of anti-heroic figures to tackle 
societal role-playing. The 'Virtuoso' was characterised by his ability to portray 'the Self as the 
origin of potential perfection amidst societal ineffectuality. Moreover, what marked him out 
was his use of such genius in activities and pursuits which had no apparent impact on, or were of 
no immediate benefit to, the structure of social hierarchies. The 'Dandy', in tum, revealed the 
essential meaninglessness of such hierarchies by assuming a guise of utmost importance - that of 
the aristocrat - and playing it with ironic mastery. In so doing, the grave significance of social 
C?nstructs was denied, and the possibility of greater individual potential unleashed. 
,. -
~ 
73 Idem at 21. 
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understanding and communicating our experiences which will lead to a unification of 
individual experience, and the creation of an "integrated view of the world". 219 However, 
while White adopts Romanticist literature as a means of collapsing the dualist dichotomy, 
Unger does not fully explore, what Teachout regards as, "the important window of 
opportunity"220 of White's revelations. Thus, Teachout regards all of Unger's subsequent 
attempts to create some cohesion of understanding as theoretically tortured and incapable of 
achieving the type of integrated experiential vision he seeks. The reason for this failure 
(according to Teachout) lies in the fact that Unger isolates himself in abstract theory and is, 
therefore, incapable of reconciling himself with the vagaries of existence. Consequently, 
Teachout refers to Unger's visions as "though-tormented literature"221 which valiantly 
attempts to express concepts which by its very nature it cannot hope to achieve. 
It is this Ungerian sense of 'unity' in the abstract which Teachout disapproves of, and 
provides the basis for his point of distinction between communitarian failure and White's 
success. For unlike· the communitarian vision, White's Romanticist vision positions the 
potential of 'unity' within a symbiosis of actual experience and visionary desire. In other 
words, Teachout maintains that White's emphasis on Romanticist literature enables him to 
ground his understanding of 'community' in the realities of existence, while confidently 
peering into more abstract conceptions (as embodied in the world of the literary work) and 
consequently uniting the two. Moreover, White's sense of 'community' stems from his 
understanding of 'friendship' which he sees as resulting from the bonds between the 
individual and those around him. It is these links (such as those between writer and reader) 
from whence a 'community' arises, and which, in tum, "form a durable cultural community 
linking us backward and forward through time to generations that have come before and 
those yet unborn". 222 In essence, therefore, Teachout believes that "White's work allows him 
to achieve the expression of a deeply integrated view of experience - one in which there is a 
genuine reconciliation of the abstract with the concrete",223 and, moreover, one in which the 
reconstitution of the world towards a just future is the main concern. This is not, however, to 
deny the fact that injustice and suffering are integral parts of human existence. Rather, by 
219 
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Ibid. 
Ibid at 885. 
Idem at 886. 
Idem at 892. 
Idem at 888. 
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The tripartite structure ('Mosque', 'Caves', 'Temples') of A Passage to India serves to unveil 
the evolving complexity of the interaction between the characters in the novel. In the first 
section the title -'Mosque'- refers to the initial meetings between Aziz and Mrs. Moore in 
surroundings which present the promise of future cordial communication. Yet such 
communication is implicitly based upon an acknowledged difference and distance between 
English and Indian societies. There is a sense that there is something quaintly foreign about 
the Indian way of comprehension and that while this should not necessarily hinder 
cross-cultural communication the English characters do not contemplate the need for 
'connection' because they remain firmly entrenched in the justification of their own vision. 
In 'Caves', however, this vision is gradually eroded and the language upon which it is based 
is undermined. Out of the supposed certainty and clarity embodied by Western thought and 
interpretation there emerges a fundamental mystery which cannot be explained in language, 
namely, how does one structure meaning? This results in a crisis of understanding for the 
Western characters some of whom experience psychological breakdowns (Adela Quested and 
Mrs. Moore) brought on by the intensity of this non-verbal experience and the ineffectiveness 
of their culture (as embodied by the legal process) to account for it. While this represents a 
point of confusion f.or the characters concerned it also signifies a catharsis for them in as 
much as they are encouraged to acknowledge their inhibitions while not necessarily being 
freed of them. 
The final section - 'Temples' - attempts to reconstruct the broken down relationships between 
the characters on the basis of the failings in understanding which they have come to accept as 
an inherent component of human interaction. While no ultimate resolution is presented to the 
tragic inability of characters to connect with one another, the reasons for the failure of such 
connection are acknowledged and the hope of some future connection expressed. It is the 
expression of this possibility which is important since its actual attainment is, in any event, 
denied by the psychological division between 'the Self and the Other in their present state. 
As has been noted, an appreciation of the distinction between the story and the plot of A 
Passage to India is crucial for a proper understanding of the text. While the story relates the 
i'~pact of British rule in India to the reader through the medium of the relationship between 
various characters, the plot is concerned with analysing the way in which different discourses 
structure meaning in particular ways in an attempt to advance human understanding. In this 
regard, the socio-political tensions between British 'ruler' and Indian 'subject' presented in 
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is that we should randomly raise questions lacking in any particular value in the hope of 
somehow stumbling across some worthwhile insights. The fact that the final destination of 
this journey can never be truly realised while we remain subject to the limitations of the 
human condition is no reason in itself for abandoning the pool of shared wisdom from which 
we nevertheless still benefit. The little that we do know still forms a sufficiently stable 
foundation from which to launch cogent enquiries. Bearing this in mind, the mark of an 
incisive question is, therefore, the ability to appreciate the current status of human knowledge 
while retaining a desire to challenge the limitations of human understanding. 
Through the lens of postmodernism, I have sought to show that while narrative tools 
constitute our only means for interpreting our universe, no single narrative discourse suffices. 
We have to open our minds to the plurality and interaction of discourses if we are to 
understand the significance of living in a postmodern age and the role of justice in such an 
age. This is primarily because the postmodern condition gives rise to a crisis of 
understanding which is rooted in a fundamental re-evaluation of three traditional concepts: 
language, reality and 'the Self'. Whereas, prior to the advent of postmodernism, these 
concepts were clearly delineated and 'objectively' understood, postmodernism causes one to 
reflect on the subjective and incongruous characteristics embedded in such terms. 
Postmodernism destroys the traditionally constructed dichotomies of subject/object, 
good/bad, truth/falsehood, justice/oppression and merges them into the fabric of language 
which embodies all extremes and through which we interact with the world. Language is the 
central focus of postmodern sensibility and rather than describing what is know it, in fact, 
becomes the only factor accessible to human knowledge. For this reason, postmodernism 
challenges our perceptions in important ways and forces us to acknowledge that just as 
narrative provides us with the means for comprehending that which is 'just' both within and 
beyond ourselves, so too, it must contain the seeds of its own justification since there is no 
longer a universally accepted meta-narrative on which to rely. That which we create is 
merely the embodiment of that which is known to us. In other words, all discourses represent 
mediums of intelligibility through which we make sense of our individual and collective 
experiences and gain some understanding of that towards which we aspire. In a sense, we are 
all pre-destined to embark on the same journey of interpreting and coming to terms with our 
identity in a postmodern age, yet our discoveries and the effectiveness of our quest are 
distinctive to the individual and are by no means generic to humankind. For this reason, my 
focus has not been (and cannot be) linked to a particular conclusion or journey-end as my 
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Finally, and most importantly, the notion of the 'Historian' came to be associated with the 
Romantic culture since he governed the discipline which came to guide the process of reality. In 
an era in which a sense of alienation between 'the Self and 'the other' first came to be 
acknowledged, and the existence of reality beyond interpretation denied, all that remained was 
for 'the Self and 'the other' to define each other in terms of experience. And such experience 
was channelled through the avenues of history. 
In essence, the foundation underlying the development of Romantic 'anti-roles' was based upon 
the need to recalibrate perceptions around a new centre of value, order and meaning, namely, 
'the Self. However, the rationale for such value, order and meaning in the first place 
necessitated some form of explanation which, according to George Braziller developed in four 
distinct phases. The first of these developmental progressions Braziller termed 'Analogism' 
which was composed of sentimental and sublime motivations in an attempt to release 'the Self 
from its mundane constraints and thereby arrive at "the divine noumenon (or ultimate reality)"74 
. situated beyond nature. However, such an experience was valueless and amoral on its own, 
since it merely provided a basis for value without the necessity for action. And, as Braziller 
indicates - "without action, reality could not be encountered and the Self could not be 
realised".75 Moreover, it denied the possible resolution of the subject-object relationship by 
ignoring the complexities inherent in the formulation of 'the object' in favour of a complete 
absorption in the life of 'the subject', and a consequent disregard for all elements beyond 'the 
Self. The second phase, termed 'Transcendentalism', then sought to develop certain elements 
engineered by Analogism. It retained the sense of a world devoid of function and purpose which 
Analogism had initially devised, while simultaneously asserting that the rationale behind 'the 
Selfs' committed desire for order, value, meaning, and identity lay in a divine authority. In 
essence, "the Transcendental hero was to redeem the Self in the act of redeeming the world".76 
However, in situating such value within the human will and simultaneously providing an 
incentive for action, Transcendentalism in effect, condoned the real threat posed by the 
imposition of a stronger will (i.e. as embodied in the 'Transcendental hero') upon weaker ones. 
74 
75 
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Idem at 25. 
Idem at 26. 
Idem at 27. 
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Thus the foundation of Romantic morality, in the form of empathy, was prejudiced if not 
completely undermined since empathy requires one to acknowledge and appreciate existence 
beyond 'the Self in order to assert the existence of 'the Self in the first place. Furthermore, by 
asserting the primacy of any one particular will above a host of others, the latter's humanity was 
alienated and an absolute value structure (be it good or evil) constructed for all to abide by. The 
difficulty of such conception being that the notion of morality is itself rendered meaningless 
thereby, since (as already alluded) the imposed value structure which binds all human actors 
may itself be steeped in injustice and corruption. Moreover, such heroic world redemption is 
seen in an inevitable and absolute light through Transcendentalism, whereas the Romantic 
preoccupation is with journeying towards a sense of order and value (as opposed to necessarily 
arriving at a particular value construct) from within the context of an organic morality born of 
the world; and the progress of the journey is often tinged with fear and self-doubt as to the 
potential outcome. The third phase of Romantic rationalisation therefore sought to extinguish 
any sense of heroic suprahuman determination of value by asserting in its place a purely mortal 
consciousness which is driven by the conviction that all beliefs are merely creatures of their own 
creation, all perceptions simply illusions. Strictly speaking, of course, the notion of perception 
cannot control the mass of reality on its own; to.create some orderly coherence of perception one 
must have an awareness of definitional concepts which can then be used to encompass a large 
and unwieldy group of objects or conceptions. This is common to language generally, whether 
it be legal or literary in nature, and can be illustrated by reference to two concepts - 'ownership' 
and 'character'. In the legal sense, the concept of 'ownership' is used to describe such varying 
conceptions as physical possession (in the form of holding an object or controlling access to it); 
enjoyment of the fruits of the object (ius fruendi); mental intention to own such object; right to 
abuse the object (ius abutendi); right to dispose of the object; right to grant third parties access to 
the object and, possibly, rights in it as well. Similarly, in the literary sense, the concept of 
'character' is conceived of through an understanding of its relation to the sum of its parts - i.e. 
the conceptions which it encompasses. Thus, the use of the word 'character' encompasses an 
a~preciation of honour, valour, jealousy, greed, hatred, indifference, and other qualities 
indicating temperament and psyche. While such vision of necessity deems the world to be 
unredeemable, its apparent tragedy is, in fact, the ultimate triumph since it provides one with a 
vision of one's naked and alienated self without the comfort of idealistic perceptions for support. 
By so doing one is therefore obliged to acknowledge "the unredeemable character of 
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experience"77 and accept that all value germinates in, and feeds off, this extended sense of 
alienation which lies at the heart of 'the Self. However, Objectivism's failing was that (as with 
Analogism) it provided the individual with no real "imperative to action",78 as well as no means 
of expressing the enormity of the experience from whence value was distilled. As Braziller 
states " .. .there was no defence against the hell of existence. It required a tough-mindedness 
which even the tough-minded could not endure, for it provided no mode of existence, of getting 
from day to day".79 So it was that the final stage in the Romantic process, 'Stylism' 
(conventionally referred to as 'Aestheticism'), evolved so as to alleviate some of the angst left in 
the wake of Objectivism. It achieved this by surrounding the individual with a "culturally 
transmitted pattern of action"80 to supplement the vagaries of individual circumstances, while 
allowing the individual to simultaneously formulate his own unique approach (i.e. 'style') to 
general scenarios, thereby retaining a sense of selfhood and a defence against the brutality and 
unpredictability of existence. In essence, therefore, while style symbolised the essential and 
constant. identity of selfuood as it journeyed from predicament to predicament, it also shielded 
"the Self' from the malevolence of circumstances by means of an intricate social pattern of 
predictable responses. However, as Braziller indicates such predictability was not without 
dangers, as it too often lapsed into the comfortable rut of mannerisms devoid of substance 
beyond the facade of the roles they created. 
Ultimately the Romantic desire for the re-evaluation of 'the Self was closely aligned to a 
distinctive understanding of the soul rooted in humanist philosophy. Within this conception, the 
soul became the medium for all achievement and the signifier of all potential. This was based 
upon the tacit presumption that the soul contained an inherent core of integrity which could be 
relied upon to facilitate the attainment of human ideals. However, the difficulty (and some 
might say the inevitable consequence) of such an analysis was the metaphysical constriction of 
the soul by diminishing its potential through the act of intellectual contemplation. Nonetheless, 
the splendour of our selfuood, as embodied in the soul, was that both elements (i.e. selfuood, and 
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Idem at 29. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Idem at 30. 
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soul) were self-propounding notions, thereby making individuals1 the culmination of their own 
imagination. In so doing, the essence of 'Being' was accounted for, and the existence of 
'Becoming' was hinted at. (The ultimate irony, of course, being that the act of discovery, in 
both cases, only served to propound the view that beyond all questions lay an even greater 
uncertainty which defied any comprehension.)81 And it was within this void of uncertainty that 
Romantics fell back on the notion of 'justice' to comfort themselves from the implications of a 
universe free-falling into a meaningless abyss of despair. It must be noted, however, that at no 
time were references to 'justice' overtly manifest in such Romanticist writings; nonetheless, all 
their concerns were tacitly underpinned by this notion, inasmuch as the belief in 'justice'82 was 
their only guarantee against the anarchic dissolution of human hopes, and possibly even the 
human soul. 83 
Ultimately, however, Romanticism proved incapable of attaining its ideal of comprehending 
existence by destroying the schi&m bet\\leen the isolation of 'the Self and the existence of 'the 
other' without the need to sacrifice one or the other. Nonetheless, while it may have failed in 
this regard, it remains a valuable primary gateway into the sense of empathic comprehension 
around which literary understandings of justice invariably revolve. Moreover, as noted in At the 
Limits of Romanticism, 84 romanticist ideology continues to filter into contemporary methodology 
81 
82 
83 
84 
Possibly, the most poignant description of this essential uncertainty is to be found in 
William Wordsworth's Ode: Intimations of Immortality 
"But for those obstinate questionings 
Of sense and outward things, 
Fallings from us, vanishings; 
Blank misgivings of a Creature 
Moving about in worlds not realized ... " 
Moreover, in this regard, LT Swingle The Obstinate Questionings of English 
Romanticism (1987) analyses in detail the conception of Romanticism as an ideology 
versus the notion of it as a purely questioning entity. 
In the sense of a notion embodying certainty, continuity, and benign immanence. 
In contrast, some scholars might choose to label such ends 'love', 'faith' or 'destiny'; 
however, I merely regard these as possible avenues along which to progress in search for 
'justice' rather than being ends in themselves. In this sense, therefore, central to the 
attainment of 'justice' within a Romanticist paradigm is the complex acknowledgement 
of existence both within and beyond 'the Self. Nonetheless, such acknowledgement is 
solely justified in terms of the end towards which it leads. 
MA Favret, NJ Watson (eds) At the Limits of Romanticism (1994) at 6, hereafter 
referred to as Limits of Romanticism. 
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from New Criticism through to deconstructionism to form what Alan Liu refers to as 'new 
formalism', which in many ways represents the bedrock for all subsequent literary constructs, 
whether they choose to acknowledge it as such or not.85 
(b) Modernism 
The Modernist tradition evolved out of man's continuing post-Romantic quest to attain a greater 
understanding of the relationship between 'the Self' and 'the other' within a changing 
socio-political context, and cultural environment. To this end, therefore, I contend that it would 
be unwise to maintain that modernism represents a fundamental diversion from Romantic 
perceptions; rather the beauty (and complexity) of the process lies in its continuity and the 
essential integrity of the notion of 'justice' which it bears with it in its journey towards a greater 
understanding of the human condition. Unlike Romantic comprehension, however, modernist 
visions of justice are rooted in an ironic understanding of existence. This stems from the 
modernist appreciation of man's own limitations in coming to terms with the complex 
ambivalence of the world, which requires philosophical inklings to be tempered by pragmatic 
Iimitations.86 The most significant of which is the acknowledgement that "the only destiny man 
can aspire to is conditioned of necessity by his finitude";87 yet, the very existence of such a 
definable and brief framework is no reason for one to denounce the· possibility of a greater 
potential within its confines.88 Such tension-laden complexities are necessarily discomforting, 
and prove problematical. Nonetheless, in working within the various possibilities which 
modernist thought presents one implicitly affirms the integrity of existence by denying the ·· 
assertion that life is devoid of purpose and that communication is nothing more than solipsistic 
rantings. In essence, one concedes that there is a core ambition which is shared by humanity (by 
virtue of our nebulous existence), namely, the hankering after justice.89 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
Limits of Romanticism at 1-19. 
Within the modernist tradition there is always the sense that the magnitude of the search 
is too great a burden to be borne by the enquiring party. This intensity is, therefore, 
defracted by means of ironic conventions. 
CI Glicksberg The Ironic Vision of Modem Literature (1969) at 7. 
This 'greater potential' is synonymous with justice. However, as already noted, unlike 
literature, legal discourse seeks to account for it beyond subjective boundaries in the 
realm of objective value judgements. 
Some may assert that this journey is no more than a quest based upon an illusion. 
However, illusory or not, it proves to hold sufficient magnetism to draw humanity on. 
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Modernism's search for answers in a relativistically constructed universe carries with it a tacit 
vulnerability inasmuch as it requires man to strive towards a perfection within himself which he 
has no guarantee of attaining (by virtue of the constant reminder of his own relativity of 
experience). Nonetheless, it is a journey which must be undertaken since it represents a defining 
feature of humanity in relation to other existence on earth. (i.e. the desire for justice coupled 
with the uncertainty of its attainment is a quandary solely reserved for human contemplation.) 
Moreover, the potential of its attainment (no matter how slight) and the subsequent dawn of 
self-fulfilment which it is likely to herald is sufficient, in itself, to warrant the continuation of the 
search. In essence, therefore, the question of whether justice should be sought within or beyond 
man is subject to the acknowledgement that man himself wields the ultimate sanction of 
interpretation. Not only are the consequences his to bear, but the choices his to make. 
Moreover, if one acknowledges that the world of meaning and understanding is determined by 
imperfect mortals who, in tum, are also governed by such concepts, then the question arises to 
what extent it can be said with any certainty that sense can be made of existence. The answer to 
this depends on one's own fundamental framework of perception. Either one believes in the 
essential integrity of existence (this is not to deny the chaos and vagaries of humanity,- but 
merely to maintain that despite such uncertainty, the framework within which existence operates 
is structured and directional), or one adheres to the notion that not only is existence formless, but 
it also lacks a continuum along which to develop. In my estimation, there are two possible 
worlds in which the application of a continuum of understanding would serve little purpose. 
The first is a world of absolute flux in which no progression (in the sense of movement in a 
particular direction) exists; and the second, is a world which has reached its point of 
termination, and hence leaves nothing further to be understood. I submit that one cannot 
convincingly account for human existence in either of these paradigms. 
It is interesting to note that Modernism has attempted to distance itself from the stultifying 
Romantic paradigm by creating its own traditions and heritage, yet in doing so it adopted 
'; ~ 
. 
mythical devices (not unlike those used by the Romantics) with which•to chart its progress.911 
90 TS Eliot, for example, believed that art represented the only infallible construct capable 
of ordering existence effectively. 
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Through the aesthetics of art, for example, modernist proponents sought to organically unify 
human desires and experience into a heightened awareness of perfection and order. 
Nonetheless, the modernist ethos has found itself uncomfortably confronted by the desire to 
transcend its soci-historical context on the one hand, while being a creation of it (and 
consequently subject to it) on the other. In essence, therefore, I would characterise modernism 
as both a reaction to human suffering, and a cause of it. For in its desire to 'do justice' to the 
human condition, modernism invariably heightens the crisis of the subject by refusing to 
alleviate his essential uncertainties.91 Nonetheless, the wisdom of 'modernism' lies in its 
acceptance of the fundamental 'dynamic energies' 92 present behind the veil of everyday 
rationality93 coupled with a sense of the infinite justice which resides beyond mental 
comprehension (but within human experience).94 
(c) Postmodernism 
If modernism proves to be problematical in terms of its complex understanding of existence, 
then postmodernism may be said to cast an even wider net of unease upon humankind's 
cosmological deliberations. The reason for this is often attributed to postmodernism's acute 
awareness of the fragmentation of sentience, culminating in a fundamental indeterminacy with 
regard to all human interpretations. It is important to note, however, that such consequences are 
not necessarily devised so as to thrust humankind into a chaotic abyss of non-meaning for its 
own sake. Rather, the rationale behind the postmodernist approach is intricately tied to its desire 
to decanonize cultural discourses and thereby deconstruct the inhibitive social hierarchies 
through which humankind has, until recently, been obliged to comprehend existence. For this 
reason, I suggest that the fundamental ambition underlying the postmodernist quest is man's 
desire to attain an effective conception of 'justice' in the hope of better representing the human 
91 
92 
93 
94 
Moreover, this is not so much through any failing of modernism as an incisive indicator 
of human experience, but, in fact, precisely because it manages to pierce human frailties 
so effectively that it leaves one somewhat aghast at the enormous implications of one's 
task. 
Bernard McGuirk Theorising Modernism - Essays in Critical Theory (1993) S Giles (ed) 
at 17. 
Unfortunately, however, as a consequence of this realisation many prominent figures in 
the modernist tradition have been led to despair and untimely death, e.g. Vincent van 
Gogh, Virginia Woolf. 
Referred to as 'binary perception' by Bernard McGuirk in Giles op cit at 53. 
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condition.95 The complexity of this approach, however, resides in its insistence on subverting 
pre-existing paradigmatic structures to the extent that the dichotomy between 'the Self and 'the 
other' is partially erased. This is due to the fact that the former notion is denied any primacy as 
a measure of judgement or understanding. This ultimate rejection of 'the Self as a quantum of 
value is vital, in my view, if an effective image of 'justice' is to be attained since 'justice' 
requires the ability to empathise with others, and in so doing deny oneself. However, within 
present human discourse (whether it be legal, literary, or scientific) constrained by language 
which is based upon identity, the element of 'justification' always imposes its will on the 
equation. As a result, therefore, 'the Self and 'the other' can never be fully integrated with each 
other, and consequently 'justice' can only be viewed in terms of conceptions without the concept 
itself ever being fully comprehended or attained. Nonetheless, despite the intricacy of post-
modern pursuits, a sense of teleological purposefulness is retained through its inevitable 
historical connection with the past and its organic progression towards an immanent awareness 
(though partial comprehension) of 'justice'. It is, of course, ironical that post-modem ideology 
should unwittingly retain a sense of historicism when it is, after all, seeking to weld human 
understanding into a unified comprehension of existence and meaning beyond historical 
constraints. Yet such a situation is inevitable since the human mind has difficulty in interpreting 
language and extracting meaning from it outside of an historical context. Therefore, 
postmodemism's attempt to deconstruct historicism is in itself based upon an internalised causal 
timeframe. As Mihai Spariosu96 notes "postmodernist literature attempts to deal with a world in 
which all discourses have become allegorical".97 
In this regard, moreover, there is no unitary or unified voice which may be distinguished as 'the' 
postmodernist discourse since the spectrum of ambition within post-modem purview range from 
the revisionary to the anarchic.98 Yet, in spite of such divergent opinions amongst its adherents, 
the essence of the post-modem dilemma remains the desire to justly reflect existence. Within 
the postmodernist paradigm this represents a dilemma because it strives to emulate the 
95 
96 
97 
98 
In this regard, the postmodernist paradigm is merely the present-day culmination of 
man's continuing desire, through the medium of literary discourse, to arrive at an 
understanding of 'justice'. 
M Spariosu Exploring Postmodemism (1987). 
Idem at 61 (own italics). 
One needs only to look at the writings of Umberto Eco The Role of the Reader-
Explorations in the Semiotics of Texts (1979), Friedrich Nietzsche Beyond Good and 
Evil (1990), and Jacques Derrida Acts of Literature (1994) to verify this statement. 
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immediacy of existence through, what it regards as, the constraining and inhibitory functioning 
of language in an irrational universe. Furthermore, it hopes to attain its objective by 
acknowledging a multiplicity of centres of consciousness. And it is this quintessential search for 
justice which dictates the construction of any particular post-modern perspective. 
Nietzsche,99 for example, while maintaining that the world lacks order, value and meaning'00 at 
no time denied the desire for, or existence of, justice as part of the human psyche. Instead, he 
simply located it within the ego, and saw the potential for joy arising from the realisation that we 
create and renew our being from a nothingness which both underpins and presides over all 
creation. Moreover, the primacy of the ego may be tempered by an acknowledgement of 
another ego's equality in so much as they share a similar will to power and standard of value.101 
In effect, therefore, the noble soul is identified by its egoism and uncompromising demand of 
self-sacrifice and subordination on the part of less distinguished egos, and it is this essential 
expectation that embodies justice in Nietzschean ideology. Beyond this solitary truth float the 
changing compositions of metaphysics which deny assumptions of certainty or intelligibility. In 
turn, Derrida102 focuses his deconstructive task upon the linguistic indeterminacy with which 
human aspirations are formulated, and the vain attempts of man to somehow renounce the 
necessity for language in his understanding of the world. It is this Derridan belief in the 
pervasive primacy of linguistic (particularly textual) hermeneutics that has led Christopher 
Norris103 to comment that "Derrida's writings seem more akin to literary criticism than 
philosophy. They rest on the assumption that modes of rhetorical analysis, hitherto applied 
mainly to literary texts, are in fact indispensable for reading any kind of discourse, philosophy 
included" thus, literature comes to embody the principal concern of philosophical discourses, as 
well as being emblematical of the vision towards which they strive, namely, a sense of truth 
through justice.'04 However, the paradox underlying the journey towards justice is that "[t]here 
99 
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A Nehamas Nietzsche- Life as Literature (1985) at 48. 
This is based upon his belief that value and identity are illusions, and that no finality can 
ever be attained. 
This limited acknowledgement of fellow psyches is permitted so as to prevent the 
atrophy and dissolution of both social and natural structures (such as class and power) 
which Nietzsche sees as vital for the co-ordered and effective attainment - or exploitation 
- of a just balance within human existence. 
J Derrida Writing and Difference (1990) at 156. 
C Norris Deconstruction: Theory and Practise (1983) at 19. 
In this regard, therefore, it seems appropriate to conclude that "literary texts are less 
deluded than the discourse of philosophy, precisely because they implicitly acknowledge 
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is no language so vigilant or self aware that it can effectively escape the conditions placed upon 
thought by its own prehistory and ruling metaphysic". 105 In effect, therefore, it would appear 
that at best, justice represents a compromise, and at worst, an illusion. Central to this particular 
understanding lies the appreciation that the task of deconstructionism is itself rooted in the very 
object which it seeks to amend. 106 Thus, it follows that what Derrida refers to as "a primordial 
intuition of the other's lived experience", which is the only effective means by which language 
can "fulfil the condition of self present meaning",107 cannot be attained given our present 
temporal and spatial limitations. Finally, Ecow8 confronts the creation of texts through the 
organic interaction between the author and the text, and the reader and the text. For him, the text 
represents the essence from which meaning is drawn which, in tum, is interpreted or decoded by 
means of channels of communicative understanding which pierce the core of textuality and unite 
both reader and author in a common body of co-operative integrity. Therefore, by inviting the 
reader to partake in the production of a text through the act of reading, Eco in no way establishes 
a dangerous precedent or creates the potential for a complete breakdown of textual objectives. 
Rather, his belief appears to rest on the premise that it is only through the involvement of the 
reader, in the first place, that the true value of a particular text can be appreciated. This 
collaborative task is facilitated, to a large extent, by what Eco regards as humankind's 
deep-rooted sense of the shared mythology of Adam's fall from grace, and our present existence 
in a postlapsarian environment. For it is from within this acceptance of the loss of our innocence 
that the knowledge of language's multivalent nature arises; and it is the realisation of language's 
awesome power which encourages man to harness its potential and to reformulate its context by 
reinterpreting its meanings. In effect, therefore, for Eco, Adam's action in eating the apple and 
humankind's subsequent banishment from the Garden of Eden are the two most exquisite 
accomplishments to ever have occurred. For it is as a result of them that justice came to be seen 
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107 
108 
and exploit their own rhetorical status": Idem at 21. 
Idem at 22. 
i.e. "[Deconstructionism] seeks to undo both a given order of priorities and the very 
system of conceptual opposition that makes that order possible." Therefore, it becomes 
"an activity of reading which remains closely tied to the texts which it interrogates, and 
which can never set up independently as a self-enclosed system of operative concepts" 
Idem at .31. 
Idem at 46. 
U Eco The Role of the Reader- Explorations in the Semiotics of Text (1979) at 96. 
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as created of language, understandable in terms of language, and attainable only by means of 
language. 109 
Admittedly, part of the increased complexity of post-modem analysis has to do with the aversion 
of its adherents to being seen as genre specific in their approach to the tasks which they 
undertake, coupled with the denial of causality entrenched in post-modem thought. This 
invariably results in the text being infused with the multiplicity of discourses vying for 
supremacy in a body of indeterminate meaning. Nevertheless, as has already been shown, the 
compass guiding post-modem ideology is itself based upon the notion of justice (however this 
may be understood or interpreted), and it is this aspiration which seeks to compose human 
understanding into a cohesive vision of the future. As Fredric Jameson 110 notes, "in a fallen or 
class society, science, the Utopian, and indeed everything else of value, must ... always function 
as an ideology. There can be no escape from this ideology, that is to say from our rationalisation 
of the blood guilty of our own positioning and class situation in this society". 111 Therefore, 
while postmodemism might wish to deny such philosophical tenets, the fact remains that it 
works within their framework to try and achieve its ends, since this is the only means by which 
postlapsarian man can make sense of existence.112 In this regard, moreover, the post-modem 
concern may ultimately be seen as the crystallisation of an attempt to 'write the future' and 
record destiny in the context of a 'future imperfect' .113 While this may appear illogical when 
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Nietzsche, Derrida and Eco are thus, not primarily concerned to replace one system of 
discourse in lieu of another. Rather their conduct is broadly centred on the motivation to 
rediscover the plurality of Discourse itself. As Christopher Norris notes, 
"[ d]econstruction begins with the same gesture of turning reason against itself to bring 
out its tacit dependence on another, repressed or unrecognised, level of meaning": See C 
Norris op cit at 64. 
F Jameson The Seeds of Time (1994). 
Idem at 77. 
While more radical post-modern scholars would argue that there is no point in trying to 
make sense of anything since everything is a meaningless illusion, the fact remains that 
the post-modern quest to subvert previously accepted canonical and ideological 
structures is based upon the tacit desire to restructure the human understanding of 
existence so as to better reflect reality. And it is by doing justice to the human condition 
that one can then amass the knowledge and wisdom required to better comprehend the 
concept of justice itself. In essence, the philosophy of justice i~ inevitable concern of 
post-modem discourse. 
As Geoffrey Bennington contends, postmodernism represents a means "of writing the 
future as the destiny of indeterminate or disfigured destination" which "has consistently 
been marked by a negative pathos, at best by a sort of stoical resignation.":See D Wood 
(ed) Writing the_Future (1990) at 28. 
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viewed along a linear continuum leading from past, through present and into future, post-modern 
philosophy turns the temporal sequence back into itself so that a hermeneutic circle is formed 
leading from past into present, and future into past thereby simultaneously embodying "a model 
of some sort of perfection of thought", as well as "a description of thought's own self-deception 
and imperfection".1 14 However, given the limitations of man's existence,115 emphasis must lie 
with the latter notion, which conceives of the philosophical process as "a way of expressing the 
real presence and foreknowledge of what is not, or cannot, ultimately be anticipated or 
known" .116 Moreover, the eminence of the future rests in the rich potentialities and awesome 
possibilities which it hints at, as well as its embodiment of a "legacy that far surpasses what can 
and does get actualised".117 Therefore, the primacy of the present is tacitly denounced, and its 
role as the sole arbiter of reality decried in favour of a resolve based on future experience. 118 
Linda Hutcheon astutely comments that "[it] is not that the modernist world was a world in need 
of mending and the post-modern one beyond repair". 119 Rather she maintains that, 
"[p]ost-modernism works to show that all repairs are human constructs, but that from that very 
fact they derive their value as well as their limitations. All repairs are both comforting and 
illusory. Postmodernist interrogations of humanist certainties live within this kind of 
contraction".120 And it is within the psychedelic perspective, created by postmodernist 
awareness, that the formalistic and conventional borders (both temporal and conceptual) of 
traditional understanding begin to dissolve, and a greater appreciation arises. 121 In essence, a 
deeper self-awareness burgeons from the intensity self-conscious demands placed upon the post-
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Dennis J Schmidt Writing the Future at 67. 
i.e. While man may be able to conceptualise the syntactic integration of the different 
tenses, he remains, as yet, unable to give effect to this potential. 
Idem at 72. 
Idem at 73. 
This should not, however, be viewed as a necessarily vain goal for human contemplation 
since the intense and varied futures symbolise an acknowledgement of the hope yet to 
come which, by its very nature, remains unfulfilled in the present. 
L Hutcheon 'Beginning to Theorise Postmodernism' A Postmodern Reader (1993) J 
Natoli, L Hutcheon (eds) at 248. 
Moreover, Hutcheon is of the opinion that the value of such speculation and reflection 
lies in the fact that "the knowledge derived from such enquiry may be the only possible 
condition of change": Ibid. 
The mechanism facilitating such new awareness, according to Hutcheon, lies in the post-
modern preoccupation with parody which "paradoxically both incorporates and 
challenges that which it parodies" by revealing the "ironic discontinuity ... at the heart of 
continuity, difference at the heart of similarity": Idem at 251. 
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modem discipline. By so doing, accepted traditions simply become provisional discourses 
lacking in any immutable principles of legitimacy, and postmodemism presents itself as merely 
another interpretative discourse providing alternatives to (rather than thrusting its vision upon) 
the canonical narrative. Clearly, this denies the possibility of a comfortable resolution to 
questions of ideological primacy, discursive hierarchies and human understanding, yet this 
uneasy detente should not be dismissed off-hand as intellectually tortuous and pragmatically 
worthless since it quite possibly provides one of the most effective channels for viewing 
humankind's omniscient potential. The reason for this lies in the ability of postmodemism to 
release man from the conceptual constraints that previous methods of understanding have 
wrought upon him. Ultimately, the post-modem vision is forged on the anvil of 
deconstructionism which seeks to redefine and re-evaluate accepted hierarchical norms by 
seeking to forsake the duality of 'either/or' affirmations in favour of a multipolar modality of 
comprehension. Old assumptions are discarded, and previously held expectations debunked. 
Yet, though this intellectual morass which is left in its wake, the mark of post-modem enquiry 
rests in its refusal to provide a particular and tangible path forwards. This is not, however, to 
suggest that any text has limitless readings or that any discourse lacks essential credibility. 
Rather, it merely denotes the fact that all claims to perceptive integrity on the part of discourses 
are grounded in their own fallibility. 122 Therefore, from within the plurality of discourses lies an 
acknowledgement of their individual vulnerability and frailty. However, even adherents of 
deconstructionism appreciate that beyond this mire of meaning and misunderstanding resides a 
sense of integrity which is, at the very least, born of the pragmatic realisation that without some 
shared basis of communication and understanding any potential for change is destroyed. 123 Put 
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As Barbara Johnson appositely contends, in regard to the 'deconstructive impulse', ... 
"[i]t is only by forgetting what we know how to do, by setting aside the thoughts that 
have most changed us, that those thoughts and that knowledge can go on making 
accessible to us the surprise of an otherness we can only encounter in the moment of 
suddenly discovering we are ignorant of it": See B Johnson A World of Difference 
(1991) at 16. 
In effect, therefore, without this mutuality the very changes which postmodemism seeks 
to institute would be impossible to implement since the canonical regime of 
understanding would be eliminated and no replacement framework of comprehension 
proffered by way of a reconstitution of human apprehensiofh.. As Wayne C Booth 
observes "even if no one can ever embrace more than one mode (however complex), 
even if no critical position is finally invulnerable, there are still strong reasons for acting 
as if one might offer a full embrace, not just to one but to many, because to do so will 
reduce the amount of meaningless critical conflict in the world and help to preserve the 
exemplars": See WC Booth Critical Understanding (1979) at 217. 
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differently, it is only through a conscious reliance upon, and progression towards, a moment of 
justice that one can successfully collate the discursive plurality emblematic of postmodemism.124 
2.3 Fusion of Understandings 
Having analysed the legal and literary formulations of 'justice' it is now appropriate to consider 
what benefits a fusion of these understandings might have on human endeavour in general and 
legal practise in particular. In doing so, however, it is necessary to briefly recount the 
conceptual framework within which legal hermeneutics has evolved from a historico-political 
perspective. 
One of the motivational forces behind the emergence of the 'interpretative legal paradigm' has 
been the growing awareness among legal scholars that the pre-existing formalist legal structures 
were themselves subject to imperfect agents with subjective concerns. Moreover, this arose out 
of a general multidisciplinary desire to overtly recapture the cultural and historical context of 
human interpretative undertakings so as to provide them with an organic justification. 125 
Acknowledgement of the human condition, therefore, in aspects relating to the interaction 
between 'the Self and 'the other' attained a paramountcy previously denied it; and the only 
acceptable standpoint from which to confront such a capricious state of affairs was from within 
its midst.126 Clearly, this proved troublesome and the notion of 'culture' thus became a means 
. for assisting in the creation of certainty in a world which denied the existence of 'absolutes'. 
Legal theorists have, however, been slow to divest themselves of the belief that meanings 
somehow reside 'in' language. Rather than merely regarding words as motiveless indicators or 
accepted symbols which through the context of language, serve to construct the world and the 
bounds of 'the Self and 'the other', legal scholarship, for the most part, has steadfastly 
124 
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In this context, I specifically refer to a 'moment', rather than a 'state', of justice because 
I regard the former as a pragmatic (and not necessarily static) possibility, whereas the 
latter notion has connotations of theoretical idealism removed from any obligatory 
connection with that which is morally attainable. 
In the legal context, rather than regarding an analysis of culture to be 'an experimental 
science in search of law' it became 'an interpretative one in search of meaning': C 
Geertz 'Thick Description : Towards an Interpretative Theory of Culture' The 
Interpretation of Cultures : Selected Essays ( 1993) J Block ( ed) at 3. 
On this basis Geertz (op cit), reflects on the German philosopher Hans-George Gadamer 
who maintains that if an individual's access to reality is reliant upon specific cultural 
prejudices or historical preconceptions, then it would appear that claims by any 
intellectual discipline to a greater or more intense knowledge of the human experience 
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maintained that language simply reflects reality. For this reason, interdisciplinary studies (and 
specifically law-literature studies) have opened an important avenue through which various 
discourses can impact upon one another, and from which the law, in particular, may begin to 
take its first to query the conceptual foundations of formalism. The 'realists' embarked on an 
interpretative reassessment of meaning which naturally progressed from an analysis of word 
meanings based upon authorial intent towards a greater understanding of the socio-political 
climate in which such meaning was founded. Bearing this in mind, the question faced by 
judicial authorities is no longer 'which litigious party is telling the truth?', but rather 'which 
litigious party's version of the truth am I to accept?' 127 
This conceptual progression has resulted in the unfortunate polarisation of positivism and 
subjectivism as the only two jurisprudential choices, with regard to the legal discipline, which 
are available to an individual. Owen Fiss,128 however, seeks to resolve this dilemma by 
constraining the determination of meaning by means of "disciplinary rules" which interpose 
themselves between the reader and the text and function as a body of norms which transcend the 
act of individual interpretation. Moreover, such rules are bolstered by an "interpretative 
community" which acknowledges their authority. In so doing, Fiss seeks to divert the focus of 
the enquiry away from the positivist-subjectivist dichotomy (into which it had lapsed) and onto a 
path of integrated understanding.129 Similarly, Walter Gibson130 has sought to show how certain 
literary terms and conceptions can be of use to "writers of legal compositions".131 Moreover, in 
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are unfounded. 
Unfortunately however, while this may represent the extent of jurisprudential 
advancement, the mechanics of the legal process remain restrictive and formalistic in 
content. (One of the law's prime arguments for the retention of a positivist paradigm has 
been that without it human existence would lapse into nihilistic subjectivity). 
0 Fiss 'Objectivity and Interpretation' (1982) 34 Stanford Law Review 739 at 744. 
However, as previously mentioned, the legitimacy of such an "interpretative 
community" is itself open to speculation when one considers that it is often a 
predominantly white, male, middle-class enclave of opinion. In this regard, WC Dimock 
notes in regard to literature that 'novelistic justice' is merely a manifestation of 
'gendered justice': See WC Dimock Residues of Justice (1996) at 23-56. 
W Gibson 'Literary Minds and Judicial Style' (1961) 36 N~ York University Law 
Review915. 
Ibid. Gibson provides interesting insights into the question of judicial style and language 
through an analysis of the impact which a literary understanding and focus has on legal 
scholarship. Moreover, his discussion is refreshing inasmuch as he approaches the topic 
as an English scholar and academic who lacks formal legal training. 
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doing so he analyses an interesting predicament (already alluded to) at the core of judicial 
decision making, namely, the duty of a judge to, effectively, provide a 'yes' or 'no' decision 
which simultaneously conforms to judicial precedent as well as his own (i.e. the judge's) 
understanding of justice. Gibson thus states that it is of vital importance that legal scholars 
should be made aware of the schism existing between their crude, abstract, and analytical 
interpretations of human experience, and the reality of "the vast flood of unorganised sensations, 
flowing, more or less haphazardly into the infinitely receptive consciousness of human 
beings". 132 And the only available means by which humankind can effectively confront its 
desire of understanding is through language. As M Seagle asserts: 133 
"How better to give form and shape to amorphous custom, to 
give law the appearance of definiteness and certainty, than to 
write it down in books." 
By so doing, a measure of logical progression and inevitability is infused into the chaos of 
existence. 
Possibly the most succinct analysis of the situation is provided by L Whitehead134 when he 
states: 
"The most obvious aspect of this field of actual experience is in 
its disorderly character. It is for each person a continuum, 
fragmentary, and with elements not clearly differentiated ... To 
grasp this fundamental truth is the first step in wisdom . .. This 
fact is concealed by the influence of language ... which foists on 
us [apparently] exact concepts as though they represent the 
immediate deliverance of experience." 
The literary author is, however, at an advantage in being able to more effectively reflect this 
'continuum' and retain some of the immediacy of existence in his work by focusing on human 
nature (rather than 'legal fact') and thereby avoiding the pressure of reaching conclusions merely 
so as to create (false) certainty. It is from this example, therefore, that legal scholars can glimpse 
valuable insights into the relationship between their use of language and the incomplete human 
132 
133 
134 
Idem at 916-17. 
M Seagle The Quest for Law (1941) at 151. 
L Whitehead The Aims of Education (1929) at 157-58. 
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existence which it both presupposes and constructs. In this regard, Michael Kaufman135 
proposes a strategy for reconstructing the value of friendship within the law in the light of 
deconstructionist critiques.136 And with regard to law in particular, he notes that 'friendship' has 
been eroded owing to a 'fear of sentimentality' 137 together with the increasing influence of the 
deconstructionist movement whose philosophies have served in widening the schism between 
the conception of 'the Self' and the nature of the community. Most significantly, he furthermore 
cautions that one should not simply ignore the decline of 'friendship' in legal discourse for, to do 
so "would be to ignore the role which the law does [sic] play in shaping and reflecting our 
values"138 (or at least in reinforcing them). However, given the complex nature of 'friendship', 
mere legislative enactments will prove hopelessly inadequate in addressing the current 
imbalance. Therefore, the strategy to be implemented, according to Kaufman, must encompass 
law, literature, and philosophy.139 
135 
136 
137 
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M Kaufman 'The Value of Friendship in Law and Literature' (1994) 60 Fordham Law 
Review 4 at 7. 
He, however, appears to impose a narrow understanding of 'friendship' onto the 
Jaw-literature field by defining it as a relationship which exists "among the authors of 
literature, philosophy and law" and which is focused "through the medium of the texts 
which they write": Idem. Thus, it would appear that the reader who engages with a text 
is precluded from partaking in the 'friendship' it offers. 
Kaufman takes this phrase from Ronald Sharp who stated that the absence of the value 
of friendship from all disciplines "has much to do with the fear of sentimentality" which 
in tum, stems from an inherent dread amongst modem theorists of locating their 
perspectives within false centres of consciousness: See R Sharp 'Friendship' (1980) 2 
Kenyon Review 1 at 1. 
Kaufman op cit at 659. 
Within the literary context, a strategy for the resurrection of 'friendship' is advanced by 
Wayne Booth: See WC Booth 'The Way I Loved George Eliot : Friendship With Books 
as a Neglected Critical Metaphor' (1980) 2 Kenyon Review 4 at 4. Booth maintains that 
the author and reader should be united in 'friendship' through their common love of 
virtue as reflected in the text. Moreover, the strength of this 'friendship' should be 
evaluated in terms of an Aristotelian moral hierarchy with 'useful books' at the base and 
'good books' at the apex. However, Kaufman criticises Booth's approach as a nostalgic 
hankering for a 'centred universe' by means of Aristotelian logic which merely reveals 
"Booth's false hope in the ability of man to find a unique wor.Q, a mastemame, or an 
ultimate concern": See Kaufman op cit at 661. Furthermore, as Jacques Derrida asserts 
"[t]here will be no unique name, not even the name of Being. It must be conceived 
without nostalgia; that is, it must be conceived outside the myth of the purely material or 
paternal language belonging to the lost fatherland of thought": See J Derrida Speech and 
Phenomena and Other Essays on Husserl's Theory of Signs (1973) at 159. 
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It is with such ambitions in mind that James Boyd White140 maintains that the act of reading 
contains an integrity of its own which goes beyond the acquisition of knowledge and 
encompasses an ethical catharsis which forms one's character. Thus, White looks upon reading 
as a process of self-revelation and understanding with regard to the community and the 
individual's interaction with it. However, in analysing various texts the essential predicament 
which he faces is the mercurial nature of 'the Self in its social context. As White asserts, 
"[w]henever we speak or write we define ourselves and another and a relation between us, and 
we do so in words that are necessarily made by others and modified by our use of them". 141 
Thus, not only is language central to the formulation of individual character and human 
interaction, but it is also partly inherited and partly dependant on our use of it. It is important to 
note, however, that the ambiguity of language does not, in White's estimation, imply that 
meaning be made through an organic process of 'reconstitution of language and community'. 142 
Moreover, such a process only emerges by means of complex literary processes at the core of 
which rests a reverence for the written word coupled with a proactive reading of the text. By 
applying this technique, therefore, a course of cultural re-alignment occurs which aids in the 
establishment of a community143 between author and reader through the channels of the text. 144 
Once this has been attained, White then proceeds to establish a connection between the personal 
'friendships' embodied in texts and larger political relationships, thereby adopting an 
Aristotelian belief that justice and friendship are concerned with fundamentally the same 
ideals. 145 
However, given humankind's present day concerns, reflected in the literature of 'alienation', 
Richard Weisberg asserts that White's concept of 'friendship' is naive since even scholars are 
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JB White When Words Lose Their Meaning (1984). 
Idem at 276. 
Idem at 278. 
As with Kaufman, White perceives this textual community to be a form of friendship. 
See William H Page 'The Place of Law and Literature' (1986) 39 Vanderbilt Law 
Review 391 at 413 - 414. 
White illustrates this point by analysing the culture of argument depicted in Thucydides' 
History, which collapses because of the society's absorption in the ideal of self-interest to 
the exclusion of a notion of justice which would provide 'the Self with meaning: See 
JB White When Words Lose Their Meaning (1984) at 91. Moreover, according to 
White, the nearest any legal system has come to attaining these aims has been the 
American constitution "whose function is not to create power but to establish a language 
and a set of roles and occasions for speaking, which, with the participation of the people, 
create a government": Idem at 253. 
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susceptible to ressentirnent. 146 In any event, one should not simply disregard White's insights 
offhand since he in no way suggests the need to accept an author's ethical views in an uncritical 
fashion; rather, he merely elaborates on the possible ways in which character may be moulded 
through the act of reading. 147 In this regard, moreover, White engages with the past by not only 
insisting on the correlation between text and context, but also through his transformation of the 
past by means of an act of hope, culminating in a vision of the future. 148 
Underlying White's approach to law, therefore, resides the unwavering belief in law's sense of 
connection with the past as well as its rhetorical potential to reshape the future. All conceptions 
of an objectified and inviolable system of reasoning are denounced, and replaced by a pragmatic 
and socio-historically rooted paradigm. Yet, despite what some scholars might regard as 
bordering on 'historicism', White maintains the immediacy and vitality of legal discourse by 
virtue of its existence as a rhetorical expression. At the most basic level, the connection between 
law and rhetoric (or more correctly, the existence oflegal rhetoric) manifests itself in three ways. 
First, by virtue of the fact that the lawyer is obliged to communicate with his audience in a mode 
of language which they regard as legitimate and comprehensible given their particular frame of 
reference. Secondly, given the sequential nature of the legal process, a creative element is 
necessitated so as to guide and enrich the law. And finally, the act of communicating through 
legal discourse constitutes the creation of a 'rhetorical community' which embodies the cultural 
identity and moral character of a people.149 This sense of creation and constitution is thus an 
integral aspect of legal discourse which, when acknowledged as such, enables the law to be seen 
as a continually evolving and adapting process of comprehension, rather than as an omnipotent 
146 
147 
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This is in contrast to White's belief in the ethical integrity of the text. 
If one had to draw a crude distinction between the approaches of Weisberg and White, it 
would probably be as follows. Whereas Weisberg tackles (what he perceives to be) 
dilemmas inherent in the relationship of language to justice, White maintains that no 
such dichotomy exists. This is due to the fact that, in White's view, when reading, 
writing, or speaking, an individual's entire consciousness is absorbed in the act. 
Therefore, "in a sense we literally are the language we speak", and on this basis language 
is justice: See JB White When Words Lose Their Meaning at 20. 
In Acts of Hope : Creating Authority in Literature, Law and Politics (1994), White 
analyses speeches, made by Nelson Mandela and Abraham Lincoln, as examples of the 
ability to reconstitute a community through 'acts of hope' eml)qdied in the rhetoric of 
moral integrity and justice. In this context, the reference to Mandela is particularly 
apposite as it traces his use of a canonical discourse imposed upon him, and his 
transformation of this past into a redeemed future by means of rhetorical constructs. 
JB White 'Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law : The Arts of Cultural and Communal Life' 
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force to which one should simply acquiesce. 150 In essence, therefore, "[t]he law should take as 
its most central question what kind of community we should be, with what values, motives and 
aims. It is a process by which we make ourselves by our language". 151 On this basis, the 
important realisation emerges that language is not merely a series of hollow measurements of 
communication but a means by which identity is forged and perceptions focused; and there is 
no human reality which predates such linguistic interaction. 
White strongly distances himself from attempts to compartmentalise existence into 
intellectual/emotional, physical/psychological dichotomies. Instead, through the linguistic 
creation of self and community, he seeks to encourage an 'integration' of the various layers of 
perception and presence.152 In this regard, therefore, the techniques he employs in relation to the 
study of law and literature are designed to reinterpret their essential functions in the world. 
Whereas law is often regarded as a tightly structured discourse, and literature an expansive one, 
White endeavours to indicate the intense morality and awesome potential of each when 
transposed on the other. Reading literature is seen to bear a resemblance (albeit a general one) 
to the appreciation of a legal text based upon the shared belief in a value system from whence all 
further enquiry emanates. Moreover, both discourses, through their common linguistic 
foundations, engage the human consciousness in an act of understanding which is made all the 
more meaningful when the discrete intercourses are undertaken simultaneously.153 The task is 
plainly not a simple one, but one which can nevertheless be realized through a process of 
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(1985) 52 University of Chicago Law Review 684. 
It is in this light that White comments ''To look at the law in this way is to direct one's 
attention to places that are normally passed over : to the way in which our literature can 
be regarded as a literature of value and motive and sentiment; to the way in which our 
enterprise is a radically ethical one, by which self and community are perpetually 
reconstituted; and to the limits that our nature and our culture, our circumstances and 
our imagination, place on our powers to remake our language and communities in new 
forms": Idem at 696. 
Idem at698. 
This is the case not only within a particular discourse, but extends across individual 
discourses. Moreover, it should be noted that Whitean 'integration' does not signify the 
creation of, or arrival at, a single and supreme language, but rather the accommodation 
of numerous discourses into a conciliatory vision of the world- '.~ask which is complex, 
yet rewarding, for in its attainment rests our own transformation. 
Clearly, a similar or greater benefit would accrue to humankind were other discourses 
likewise to be 'integrated' with each other or with those already mentioned. However, 
given the scope of the present thesis, I must abstain from entering such rich and vast 
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'translation' which seeks to interpret the transposed discourses in a spirit of esteem for both, 
culminating in the "creating of new compositions that will establish mutually respectful relations 
between them". 154 
The sense of language which White, thus, evokes is one of fluidity requiring the continual 
reconstitution of understanding so as to effectively reflect 'the Self, the community, and their 
interrelationship in contemporary existence. As a consequence of this, White views the legal 
process generally, and legal discourse in particular, as a microcosm of the larger human 
endeavour to reformulate ourselves by re-evaluating our respective experiences or stories. To 
this end, the essence of the legal process, namely, the 'legal hearing' is, for White, an arena in 
which competing constructions of discourse (and hence reality) interact with one another to 
create a sharper awareness of who we are and how we are constituted. And, in so doing, the 
potential arises for a "simultaneous affirmation of self and recognition of other" at the point at 
which the discourses connect. 155 The whole process thereby becomes one in which the sequence 
of causation no longer follows a linear progression,156 and instead adopts a circularity of purpose 
whereby the creators of language are also deemed to be its subjects as well.157 On this basis, the 
nature of 'concepts' creates, by its very formulation, a distinctly untenable situation for White 
inasmuch as it suggests the existence of assumptions and ideas bearing no correlation to 
language. 158 Equally, it requires one to allege the existence of a distinctly non-lingual portion of 
oneself, (a declaration for which White displays an acute sense of alarm).159 In essence, one can 
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areas of scholarship and confine myself solely to the discourses of law and literature. 
JB White Justice as Translation (1990) at 20. The novelty of such an 'analysis' is that it 
defies its own linguistic constraints by not only deconstructing both discourses to their 
essential 'core', but then reformulating this core into a just perspective of our own actions 
and motivations. 
Idem at 24. 
i.e. One in which the direction of events is dictated by an individual through the medium 
of language and has its effects upon inanimate objects and the 'outside world'. 
Language, rather than human agency, therefore, becomes the motivational force behind 
existence, and nothing pre-dates it or exists beyond its sphere. 
By this it is not implied that language cannot successfully define such notions, but that 
these concepts exist apart from and irrespective of any verbal identification in the first 
place. 
It should be noted, however, that White's unease does not stem from the possibility of 
such personal silence (per se) beyond language, but from the worrying realisation that 
such solipsistic tendencies may gain credibility and be seen as reason enough for not 
seeking to bridge the chasm between 'the Self and 'the other'. In other words, White 
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reduce all these concerns into White's central thesis, namely, that by communicating in terms of 
'concepts' one stands the risk of assuming that they embody a unitary certainty which can be 
homogeneously determined by means of a host of heterogeneous discourses. The ultimate effect 
of which would be the unfortunate conclusion that disparate languages are a hindrance to 
comprehension and should be replaced by one metalanguage "in which all propositions can be 
uttered, all truths stated".160 It is the simultaneity of contrasting identities and meanings, 
characteristic of language, which White, thus, seeks to re-awaken, and thereby indicate that there 
resides within each individual a core meaning which is uniquely his and which bears the seeds 
of truth. 161 Through the avenues of literary - rather than conceptual analysis of language, 
therefore, White alleges that the natural tensions present in communication can be effectively 
confronted and contained resulting in a measure of integration rather than alienation. In itself 
this process has extreme ethical implications for it requires one to entertain thoughts about one's 
own uncertainties and lack of knowledge which, through the ebb and flow of experience, come 
to form the basis of an organic (as opposed to a complete) appreciation of human dilemmas. 
Chief amongst these is the search for justice within a world defined by mortal constraints. 162 
The process of 'translation' is, therefore, an essential element in the scheme of human 
understanding, as far as White is concerned, for it brings one to the brink of individual 
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seems to be suggesting (somewhat strangely) that by not attempting to talk about the 
most intimate and difficult to relate aspects of personal identity, we may be able to 
communicate better with one another. 
JB White Justice as Translation (1990) at 31. This belief is rooted in the Whitean 
ideology that understanding is created by virtue of the interaction of discourses, rather 
than through the erosion of 'inessential' voices from the scheme of interpretation. 
In this context, the idea of 'concepts' again proves intellectually troublesome and 
inaccurate for White since it suggests a means by which all elements of personality and 
perception can be understood in terms of a universal dimension (i.e. everything is 
ultimately knowable). When, in fact, White contends that certain elements of our 
identity (which in effect means our discourse) remain comprehensible to ourselves only 
and no one else. This is not to say, however, that these components cannot be verbalised 
or expressed in terms of language, but that even when they are we cannot expect others 
to fully relate to their value. 
For White, 'translation' is seen as a discourse which provides ways of understanding 
human associations with both languages and other people. The N.(lSOns for this are that it 
is only through the process of translation that one can attempt to bridge the divide 
between what is said and what is understood. In so doing, one also comes to formulate 
an awareness of the individuals behind the other discourses, and the relational context to 
that of one's own identity. Through this relationship of integrity to what is spoken 
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discourses and provides for "the composition of one text in response to another, as a way of 
establishing relations by reciprocal gestures". 163 Moreover, it indicates the constraints of our 
own discursive perspective and challenges us to integrate more fully into an existence of mutual 
respect and communal harmony.164 Applied to the law, therefore, the act of 'translation' presents 
an opportunity for legal discourse to be refocused upon its primary motivation as a tool of 
interpretation through the creation of a channel of integrity between opposing discourses. In 
other words, the law is denied its formalistic armour of supreme authority and cloaked in the 
humble garb of an interpretative functionary. By so doing, the integration of understandings 
becomes possible, and justice foreseeable. Yet, in White's post-modem paradigm it should 
always be noted that the only truth of lasting value remains the realisation that "we all inhabit 
different languages, which cannot be reproduced to the language of another" .165 This is not, 
however, to imply that the legal process is invariably ineffective in its role as an arbiter of 
human discourses. Rather, what White's argument indicates is that our assessment of the legal 
process must itself be re-evaluated so that we come to understand it as simply one of many 
methods of 'translation', and a discourse in its own right, which may itself be the subject of 
'translation' .166 Invariably, therefore, human understanding and coexistence comes to be seen as 
more art than logic and more creation than predetermination. The tools of 'translation' are ours 
to utilise, and if managed effectively, will provide us with a means of moving towards a sense of 
justice both within and amongst ourselves.167 
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amongst discourses 'Whitean justice' is born. 
JB White Justice as Translation (1990) at 255-256. 
This is surely nothing less than justice in action. 
JB White Justice as Translation (1990) at 263. 
While this may be a disconcerting thought since it implies an infinite regress of 
translation upon translation, it should be remembered that White's emphasis rests on the 
process of 'translation' per se. Thus, a single act of 'translation' (no matter where it lies 
on the scale of regression) is sufficient, in itself, to bring back the world from the 
precipice of anarchic misunderstanding, provided, of course, that it is instituted in a spirit 
of ethical integrity. 
In contrast to all that White has to say, one of course finds other scholars insisting upon 
the inadequacy of this paradigm altogether. CH Perelman, for example, maintains "the 
diversity of laws is proof of our ignorance of true justice ... Disagreement is a sign of 
imperfection, of a lack of rationality. If two interpretations of the same text are 
reasonably possible, it is because the law is ambiguous, therefore imperfect": See CH 
Perelman Justice, Law and Argument (1980) at 164. Having stated this, moreover, 
Perelman notes that the only solution is the imposition of rationally biased (and hence 
formalistically based) strictures to guide legal enquiries towards the ends of objective 
justice. In tum, WC Dimock asserts that justice in a human context is, by its very nature, 
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At this juncture it appears apposite to reintroduce certain tenets espoused by Jacques Derrida as 
a means of governing the process of 'translation'. Derrida and deconstructionism are often 
regarded as synonymous in light of the principle of 'difference', and it is to this inversion of 
hierarchies which I consequently tum as an initial gateway into an effective synthesis of legal 
and literary understandings. Derrida observes that the process of deconstruction is applicable to 
any classification of ideas168 and serves as a means for re-evaluating the most essential notions 
we have of both the world and ourselves. The importance of the deconstructive task is to 
re-awaken our senses to forgotten truths. In the legal context this means we must develop an 
awareness that any given legal system is the embodiment of a community's aspirations to attain a 
sense of 'justice',169 which presupposes the existence of some moral strictures or, at the very 
least, a sense of the polarity and opposition of certain notions (such as good/bad, right/wrong). 
Having established this, one has consequently (and in all likelihood unconsciously) privileged 
certain assumptions above others. It is in this regard that the deconstructive process guides us 
towards the understanding that the legal framework is itself a method of privileging texts, and a 
metaphor in its own right. All that we achieve through the law is simply a means of 
168 
169 
an incomplete action and that any attempt to universalise or objectify it is fraught with 
unrealistic intentions: See WC Dimock Residues of Justice (1996) at 57-95. It is this 
very point, moreover, that is picked up on by Rosemary J Coombe when she states that 
"we can engage in critique without claiming any transcendental observation point 
because the form of life in which we are embedded is not a singular, hermeneutically 
sealed system, but a constellation of shifting conjectures of multiple discourses which 
itself provides resources that make criticism both possible and meaningful": See RJ 
Coombe 'Legal Interpretation' (1989) 34 McGill Law Journal 642. 
One of Derrida's most interesting applications of the deconstructive task is centred on the 
bias within Western civilisation, towards oral discourse above written discourse. By 
regarding speech as a manifestation of the written word (rather than vice versa), one 
inverts the hierarchy and creates a temporary privileging of new sources. The guiding 
philosophy is that, at any given point, the nature of deconstruction is such as to provide 
only temporary insights into the creation of meaning which are themselves then open to 
a further cycle of reduction, ad infinitum. The essential concern, of course, does not rest 
in a bizarre desire to attain a nihilistic utopia, but rather to question our own perceptions 
at any point in the cycle and thereby progressively reform our vision. Such a process is 
clearly in motion throughout our lives, and the potential for its~solution would appear 
to lie either before or beyond our present existence, yet, interestingly enough, Derrida 
indicates that it is within our existence as well since, for him, there is nothing outside of 
the text. 
Whether the 'justice' so desired is, in fact, morally defensible is not at issue here, what is 
important is the belief that the ends to which the action leads are just ones. 
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interpretation, and the legitimacy of such interpretation rests on the tacit assumption or 
justification that this particular system is the most effective one to channel human actions 
towards our reflected desires. In deconstructing legal texts, therefore, the intention is not one of 
denial (i.e. denial of certainty), but rather affirmation of human potentialities. Furthermore, 
when one encourages the synergy between legal and literary understandings and into this one 
distils the energy of deconstructionism, the result is a far richer blend of human competency 
capable of ascertaining the complex essence of 'justice' to a greater extent than otherwise 
possible. 
When the tensions between legal and literary discourses are lessened, and ambitions refocused 
upon mutual understanding, the task not only becomes more complex, but the benefits, more 
rewarding. 110 On the one hand, the intellectual solace found in the creation of individual and 
distinct discourses is eroded, while on the other, the possibility for the comprehension and 
attainment of 'justice' is increased. In all these efforts, however, it should always be borne in 
mind that the intention of creating a fusion of understandings is neither to formulate a single 
narrative structure nor to impose a unitary vision of 'justice', but merely to create a deeper 
awareness of our own identities, how they are formed by various discourses, and how we seek to 
channel them towards an understanding and potential realisation of 'justice'. 
Conclusion 
Theories of justice are diverse in scope, and often complex in content. This fact, I neither 
dispute nor seek to trivialise. On the contrary, while I acknowledge the existence of these 
factors my focus lies elsewhere. It has been my intention to show that the search for justice is of 
fundamental concern to human existence and that this concern manifests itself in the various 
discoursive representations which justice assumes in different disciplines.171 At the most basic 
level, the fusion of legal and literary understandings of justice highlights the need for law and 
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While it is acknowledged that the likelihood of a complete resolution to such tensions 
appears unlikely until such time as human comprehension enters another dimension of 
validity, nevertheless, our duty as human agents is to strive for such greater 
comprehension through the fusion of understandings. In so doing we do justice to our 
communities and ourselves by redefining both so as to serve the future with integrity and 
judgement. 
Clearly, for present purposes, I have exclusively focused upon legal and literary 
discourses and venture to suggest that they be taken as representative of inherent human 
concerns regarding justice. 
128 
\ f'., . 
(J ~~" -, 
society to coexist in a harmony of ideals and values if unnecessary friction is to be avoided. / 
Moreover, it has been my contention that literary discourse provides the law with an effective \~ 
the human condition upon which society is based. Without such an understanding and 
"' illustration of the benefits of applying empathic reasoning to come to a better understanding of ( 1 
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with people's senses and act as an affront to their sensibilities. The very fact that the human 
condition is founded upon a range of interrelated and contradictory desires and emotions is 
reason enough for the law to take note of, rather than simply discard, these factors when arriving 
at conclusions which affect people's lives. . 
In many ways such an approach makes the task of the courts harder since they are obliged to 
acknowledge their formalistic allusions and face the brutality of a particular factual matrix head 
on. However, it must be remembered that the primary responsibility of the law is to provide 
just, rather than convenient, results; and in so doing if this means that courts must embark on a 
tortuous journey in which they experience the pain of empathy, then the agony of such 
self-discovery is outweighed by their arrival at a just decision.172 More than this, however, and 
whether we like to admit it or not, both legal and literary discourses entertain philosophical 
allusions inasmuch as they are mediums desirous of providing us with an appreciation of justice. 
With this in mind, therefore, the fusion of understandings of justice serves to create an 
environment in which we can better comprehend the totality of the ideal. However, (as shall be 
more fully explored in the next chapter) this search for 'justice' relies on the existence of a 
172 Gretchen Craft, in contrast, would retort that the law cannot allow people to be 
consumed by what they watch and that it is necessary to shield them by means of 
dispassionate language. The rationale for such an argument is (as TS Eliot succinctly 
stated) that "humankind cannot bear too much reality": See TS Eliot: A Collection 
(1987) Four Quartets at 35. Undoubtedly, there is truth in such an assertion and it is 
partly for this reason that the law constrains the evidence brought before it by means of 
evidentiary rules and the like. However, this is not to say that empathy and emotion 
should per se also be disregarded from legal enquiries, since they have what Joseph 
Conrad referred to as the essential ability to present "all the trutks of life" in a "moment 
... 
of vision": See L Feder (ed) Heart of Darkness: An Authoritative Text, Background and 
Sources (1982) at 51. It is this truth and vision which the law must strive to attain by 
means of empathic understanding and connection with the lives of its subjects. For it is 
such connection that is required if the law is to be regarded as an honest reflection and 
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perpetual tension between knowledge and ignorance, the given and the unattainable. Whether 
we can effectively attain a sense of justice (and if so, most importantly, what kind of justice it 
will be) given human circumstances is therefore something which requires further analysis. 
legitimate embodiment of a people's desires and morality. 
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CHAPIER3 
JUSTIFICATION 
Introduction 
Having traversed the illusive portals of justice in the last chapter, an important stage in the body 
of this text now presents itself with the more thorough introduction and analysis of the concept 
of 'justification'. 
I use the term 'justification' to denote the moral, political, social and economic rationales 
underpinning both legal and literary disciplines. However, all these enquiries are undertaken 
with the view that any justification is per se based upon the chaos of human existence, and 
consequently prevents the attainment of 'justice'. In this regard, moreover, I will seek to prove 
my contention by referring to four indices, which represent the cornerstones of my 
understanding. First, in terms of the deconstructionist framework (from within whole realm I 
argue) 'justice' is of necessity defined in terms of the existence of, and its relationship to, 
'injustice' .1 Therefore, at the moment at which 'justice' is attained, law and literature lose their 
justificational foundation.2 Secondly, one cannot faithfully express such noble intentions as 
those which 'justice' embodies through the imperfections of language.3 Thirdly, law and 
literature share conflicting desires inasmuch as they seek certainty and justice yet cannot divest 
. themselves of the uncertainty of existence from whence they were born. Finally, law and 
/ literature can never attain a state of justice because human beings have limited perceptions to 
( begin with.4 
\~ 
2 
3 
4 
i.e. The chaos of human existence born of uncertainty and limited knowledge. 
In essence, therefore, neither extreme (i.e. a complete state of 'justice' or 'justification') 
can be fully embraced and a tentative state of suspended animation between both 
extremes must be accepted. The reason for this is that one canD.Q_t divorce 'justice' from 
'injustice' just as one cannot separate 'justice' from 'justification'. 
Consequently, one can only attain relative justice rather than absolute justice since the 
law is inherently unjust due to the fact that the language on which it relies is flawed and 
imprecise. 
i.e. We can only ever know so much and no more; and by implication, therefore, we can 
never attain the absolute knowledge required for a state of justice to be assumed. 
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Undoubtedly, the justificational paradigm which I impose upon the field of legal and literary 
endeavour is somewhat heterodox, particularly given my focus upon the human need to strive 
towards justice. However, in my view, the marriage of the concepts of justice and justification 
in the body of this work does not represent a flaw of reasoning or an inconsistency of logic. 
Rather, the progression towards justification epitomises the natural tension and organic 
complexity of the journey upon which I have embarked. In denouncing the formalistic 
contentions of those who would have us believe that strict compliance with the letter of.the law 
is the only measure of justice, I have entered an interpretative realm where there are no longer 
any easy resolutions, only enigmatic possibilities. Drawing from the work of James Boyd White 
and expanding upon his reasoning, I therefore structure the justification of legal and literary 
discourses around a culture of argument and integration. In itself this requires an 
acknowledgement of the tensions inherent in the search for 'justice' and, by implication, leads to 
the need for a reassessment of previously asserted legal and literary justifications. I will use the 
present chapter to show that the inflexibility of past assumptions has become an inadequate tool 
with which to tackle our present awareness of future uncertainties. 
3.1 Legal Justifications 
The formalistic nature of legal discourse is such that it would have one presume it to be the only 
effective means of comprehending and attaining justice. In this regard, justifications of the law 
often incorporate ethical and moral dimensions in an attempt to construct their own validity. 
By its very nature, legal discourse represents a paradigm of human understanding and is, by 
implication, therefore, simply one of a myriad potential gateways that can assist one in coming 
to terms with the morality inherent in the nature of justice. However, the consequence of 
framing the relationship between law and justice in these terms is that while it serves to indicate 
the existence of an association between the two institutions, it tacitly acknowledges that the law 
is by no means necessarily the sole or most effective vessel in which principles of justice may be 
said to reside. Bearing this in mind, it becomes apparent that attempts to completely unite law 
and justice in a shared moral enterprise incorrectly evaluate the nature of their association. 
Inevitably there is a degree of interaction between law and morality inasmuch as they are both 
creations of their societal context,5 yet they retain an individual integrity which must be 
5 i.e. They are both formulations based upon a particular community or society's value 
structure and its understanding of concepts such as good/evil, right/wrong. 
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acknowledged.6 To the extent, therefore, that a particular law, legal structure or legal system is 
said to present an objective vision of reality (according to a sector of society) has nothing to do 
with its inherent objectivity per se and everything to do with the shared morality of the 
community so viewing it. Consequently, I have no difficulty in acknowledging the moral 
dimension embedded in the legal process, but I do have the gravest of objections to the 
monopolisation of morality by the law. In spite of this, however, morality remains one of the 
primary justifications of the law, and manifests itself in an assured manner which belies its own 
frailty and uncertainty. With this in mind, it appears fitting to briefly contrast the moral visions 
of the law which certain legal scholars harbour, with a view to showing that academic 
understanding of this dimension of legal justification is itself a cacophony of interpretations. 
At the one extreme of the spectrum resides Jeremy Bentham,7 who embodies the legal positivist 
traditions of judicial analysis. In general terms, Bentham advocates the separation of law from 
morality and consequently has criticised natural law's philosophy of intuition with regard to the 
existence of divine guiding principles and the ability of reason (when applied to specific 
situations) to provide universal truths. In its place, Bentham chose to construct a system of 
hedonistic utilitarianism whose primary concern was centred on individual happiness, and the 
overriding desire was to facilitate such freedom by curbing existing legal restraints. In this 
regard, the individual was deemed to be driven by pleasure-seeking desires (good) above pain 
(evil), and consequently the sense of primary good Gustice) arrived at was no more than "the 
aggregate of individual surpluses of pleasure over pain".8 As clinical as this reasoning may 
appear it nonetheless bears the markings of morality inasmuch as it is a construction of human 
6 
7 
8 
Taking this argument to its extreme conclusion, Jeremy Bentham and John Austin 
together with other legal positivists seek to clearly delineate 'law as it is' from 'law as it 
ought to be' in an attempt to completely divorce moral issues from the life of the law. 
However, in itself this extreme response indicates a flawed understanding of the very 
nature of law in that a sense or morality (out of which our understanding of justice flows) 
underlies all our actions and all our discourses. Whether that particular sense of morality 
comes within other peoples' interpretive framework or not is beside the point. The very 
fact of its existence is what is important: See J Bentham An Introduction to the 
Principles of Morals and Legislation (1988), J Austin The Province of Jurisprudence 
Determined (1988). 
J Bentham op cit. 
J Stone op cit at 122. 
133 
contemplation designed to provide all human actions with a motivational force beyond their 
immediate context.9 
While the ultimate aim of Bentham's jurisprudential paradigm was to provide a systematic 
justification for the need to adhere to legal precepts, one must also see his work as a desperate 
search for certainty within an age of acute despair and social turmoil.10 This contextual 
appreciation of the fragmented state of the English legal process (in particular) provided 
Bentham with the foundation for his philosophical formulations and directed his work towards a 
system of classifications designed to shatter the fictitious illusions behind the wheels of justice. 
In this regard, legal discourse had to be reformulated around new structures and different 
understandings by means of a renewed awareness of the relationship between language and 
metaphysics. In essence, Bentham encouraged the realisation that we have to contend with a 
discursive structure which is inherently ambiguous, and words must, therefore, always be 
deciphered in context as well as being seen to embody ideas beyond their linguistic or oral 
representation. The reform of the law was ultimately the medium through which Bentham 
sought to recalibrate a decaying social structure and thereby guide people towards the attainment 
of happiness by means of the principle of 'utility'. 11 In order to facilitate this, however, Bentham 
insisted upon drawing a distinction between 'fictional entities' and 'fabulous entities' within the 
realm of jurisprudence. The latter encompassed natural rights and had to be purged from the 
legal vocabulary altogether, while the former consisted of legal rights and had to be merely re-
assessed so as to resume an effective role in the political structure of society. By so doing, 
Bentham maintained that one could give effect to reforms and bring an end to much political 
conflict. The difficulty is, however, that rather than elaborate upon the reasons for such a 
conclusion, Bentham took them for granted as the only legitimate outcome given the factual 
9 
IO 
II 
In itself this is somewhat ironical inasmuch as Bentham's implicit intention was to create 
a system of legal governance based upon a concept (i.e. 'the principle of utility') which 
lacked any ethical content and was consequently immersed in objective rationality. 
At the time at which Bentham English society was plagued by a high rate of 
unemployment, compounded by entrenched social stratification, which created a climate 
in which delinquency and crime flourished. Moreover, the loose structure of the 
common law in terms of its content and implementation proved to be an ineffective 
sanction in such troubled times. 
The principle, in effect, shifted the burden of proof onto the individuals who wished to 
curtail particular pleasure-seeking activities by requiring them to prove that the pleasure 
gained by a particular person or sector of society was outweighed by identifiable and 
causally related pains to specific individuals or groups. 
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matrix. Little explanation was given for this reasoning, but then he presumed little was needed. 
Despite this personal conviction in his own beliefs, however, Bentham readily conceded the 
uncertainty within human knowledge and the likelihood of most ideological aspirations 
remaining within the realm of the hypothetical. In consequence, he was under no illusions that 
the primary motivation of the legislator in placing restraints on individuals so as to ensure the 
greatest happiness for the greatest number required a shift in personal ideology from egoism to 
utilitarianism, and that this in turn was . something which not necessarily all people were 
prepared to abide by. This dilemma was particularly acute for those in positions of legislative 
authority, for they possessed control over judicial sanctions and were in one sense above the 
law, yet had to subject themselves to the same constraints as all subjects before the law if the 
system was to retain its integrity. While not providing a detailed account of how this could 
pragmatically be achieved, I suggest that one must assume that Bentham's tacit presumption 
underlying all his work is that human beings are guided in their actions by a moral core, 12 and 
that the aim of a utilitarian paradigm is to ensure that the dictates of the law coincide with this 
moral pith so as to ensure that the conditions for justice are established. Once a utilitarian 
paradigm is adopted, therefore, the resulting system creates its own justification and in a sense 
wills itself into being based upon its own moral dimension. On this basis, while Bentham would 
appear to reject the notion of any moral justification of the law, his utilitarian principles of 
pleasure and pain are (of necessity) determined in relation to a moral foundation and within the 
framework of a moral understanding. Expanding upon this line of interpretation, one could 
consequently conclude that in distinguishing between 'law as it is' and 'law as it ought to be', 
Bentham is not denying the legal process an element of morality but merely cautioning against 
the assumption that simply because the law ought to be associated with moral ideals it 
necessarily follows that it is. The only ideological paradigm in which this expectation can be 
taken for granted and effectively fulfilled is a utilitarian one. 
In effect, Bentham's tacit credence of the notion that the legal structure is the chief mechanism 
for the regulation of social interaction implies that he concedes there is no inherent correlation 
between basic human ambitions and the strictures of public obligations. This is not, of course, to 
s~gest that the two do not often correspond (for how else could on~ccount for the relative 
12 
~ 
The inevitable concession has to be made, of course, that some individuals are guided to 
a greater extent than others by this sense of entrenched morality. 
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ease with which hannonious social intercourse appears to predominate), but merely that they 
should not be viewed as mutually inclusive terms. 
In a similar vein, while it is generally acknowledged that the concepts of pleasure and pain lie at 
the heart of the principle of utility, what is not so clearly delineated is the nature and extent of 
their mutual relationship to the structured moral concepts embodied in 'good' and 'ought'. 
Certain fairly recent interpretations of Bentham's work by scholars such as B Parekh13 and JP 
Plamenatz14 favour the idea of inferring absolute mutuality to the notions of pleasure and of 
good. However, as PJ Kelly15 alleges, to create such an incestuous connection between pleasure 
and good is to collapse the identity and meaningfulness of morality (as understood through the 
prism of utility) into the "tautologous claim that Pleasure is pleasurable".16 Therefore, Kelly 
maintains that Bentham's primary concern lies beyond a supposed desire to unite good and 
pleasure within the moral canvas of utility so as to provide a justification for the legal process.17 
Rather, the focus of Bentham's analysis of good and pleasure (according to Kelly) is aimed at 
providing a deontological rationale for such morally-laden concepts. Therefore, he notes, "[t]he 
principle of utility is used by Bentham as a metaethical principle which provides the criterion of 
meaningfulness for moral judgements, and for the terms of moral discourse. The criterion he 
adopts for the meaningfulness of such terms are derived from reflection on the point of moral 
discourse" .18 · In this regard, there are, of course, real difficulties in installing the principle of 
utility as the seat of moral obligation inasmuch as such a utilitarian paradigm is suspended by 
the vying forces of individual ambitions and communal desires. This is not to presume that 
individual human actors are incapable of distinguishing between pleasure and pain, but rather 
that morality is essentially a collective enterprise focused upon the conditions of social 
interaction over which the individual has no command. As a consequence, the individual cannot 
ensure either the attainment or the maintenance of suitable conditions in which his actions can 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
B Parekh (ed) 'Bentham's justification of the Principle of Utility' Jeremy Bentham: Ten 
Critical Essays (1974). 
JP Plamenatz Man and Society (1963). 
PJ Kelly Utilitarianism and Distribute Justice (1990) at 44-70. 
Idem at46. 
Kelly supports his allegations by reference to the fact that in An Introduction to the 
Principles of Morals and Legislation and Deontology together with A Table of the 
Springs of Action and Article on Utilitarianism, Bentham at no point overtly insists upon 
a synonymous connection between good and pleasure or pleasure and right, other than to 
show how they mutually function as independent entities within the realm of utility. 
Kelly op cit at 47-48. 
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be co-ordinated with those of others. And without such interaction (upon which social well-
being depends) the conditions for the existence of rules and norms are eroded and the emergence 
of expectations and expectation utilities destroyed. The rationale for this complex interaction 
and ensuing tension lies in the fact that by obliging the individual to act in a manner which 
enhances societal interests he would, of necessity, have to determine whether to abide by such 
externally imposed constraints which, in tum, would inhibit the expansion of personal 
expectations. Moreover, if one contends that an individual ought only to submit to a right 
justified in terms of utility, then such right cannot be regarded as a condition for expectations 
since it remains arguable as to whether it provides a satisfactory justification for action in the 
first place. This is because a utilitarian paradigm on the one hand requires individual actions to 
abide by societal regulations so as to develop a consistent pattern of behaviour, while on the 
other hand allowing legislators to bypass their own laws in circumstances where the dictates of 
social well-being so demand. In essence, therefore, "[u]nless legal norms and rights function as 
authoritative reasons they cannot function as a source of expectation" .19 The consequence of this 
is that in order for the principle of utility to be regarded as a pragmatic framework influencing 
the actions of a society it must be seen as going beyond the balancing of pleasure against pain, 
and must encompass the task of advancing individual actions towards the principal ambition of 
social well-being (which itself is a necessary element in the concept of justice). In so doing, 
Bentham's system of legal justification seeks to consolidate the abstract moral vision embodied 
in the notions of pleasure and pain together with the realities of rules, rights and obligations 
found in the letter of the law. The outcome of this integration is that the latter becomes rooted in 
the former, and the conditions for harmonious social interaction and advancement are 
established. Thus, it is interesting to note that the moral focus as evoked by the conditions of 
social interaction provides the basis for legal obligations owing to the crucial utilities derived 
from them. Notwithstanding this, however, it is not the fact of greater utility per se which 
dictates the necessity to act upon such obligations, but rather the force of sanctions imposed 
upon actions of non-compliance. ''Therefore, while the greater utility derived from these 
practices accounts for their utilitarian justification, their effectiveness as conclusive reasons for 
action does not depend on a utility calculation, but on the threat of sanctions".20 In effect, 
~ntham's moral justification of the legal process indicates his coillll!ex appreciation of the 
19 
20 
Idem at 64. 
Idem at 68. 
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interaction of morality with the threat of sanctions in providing an insight into the rationale and 
functioning of the law. 
While Bentham placed great store in the discourse of the law and the political establishment as 
the foundation for all utilities dependant upon expectation, he extended the veil of justification to 
include both legitimate and illegitimate expectations. Consequently, the position of a thief and 
his act of stealing is of relevance only insofar as the notion of property exists as protected by the 
law and provided the thief harbours the expectation of depriving some utility from the object in 
question.21 Conversely, in an ideal state of being in which no motivational tensions or 
conflicting desires exist the need for regulation is superfluous and a system of law, in effect, 
becomes redundant inasmuch as theft does not occur, property is not violated and personal 
interests do not clash. Given the realities of the human condition, however, the concept of 
justice together with conceptions such as property, rights and duties are required within any 
political society so as to provide its members with some security against the barrage of feuding 
identities. Thus, the necessity for, and existence of, a legal system is seen as an understandable 
attempt to marginalise the potential for contingency within human society and provide· one of 
the primary rationales for political commitment. For this reason, Bentham was averse to any 
form of tyrannical government or arbitrary rule as this simply magnified human uncertainties 
and injected them into the very heart of socio-political life. In this context, therefore, the law 
became viewed as the primary vessel from which societal expectations flowed and social 
interaction was moulded, and following on from this came the network of communal and 
individual moralities which sought to bolster and refine these broad ideals. Prior to the 
establishment of the law no formal political structure could operate and hence no expectations 
could be formulated as to the future. Therefore, Bentham distanced himself from any 
suggestions that peaceable interaction was possible without a source of authority and the threat 
of strictures. Moreover, the natural conclusion to be drawn from this is that 'individual identity' 
as we understand it is as much a political creation as it is a social phenomenon. Social 
interaction as established by the legal process and evidenced in the moral identity of a society 
also has a strong connection to economic activity. This is due to the fact that economic 
functions are a form of advanced social activity dependant upon . stable and predictable 
conventions of social interaction giving rise to particular expectations. Therefore, the existence 
21 
e.g. Either direct enjoyment of the object through use or from the proceeds accumulated 
through its subsequent sale to a third party. 
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of legal accountability presupposes some form of economic system (however crude) upon which 
to base presumptions regarding the relationship between persons and objects and subsequently 
the connection between different individuals in relation to objects. In this manner economic 
activity becomes a defining characteristic of individual identity insofar as it provides a rationale 
for the legal process. Accordingly, the economic arena plays a pivotal role in defining and 
supporting a particular societal regime and, by implication, is a fundamental tool of justification 
forthe law. 
Bentham appears to harbour paradoxical attitudes towards the morality of humankind. On the 
one hand, he acknowledges the essential selfishness and egoism of the individual, yet he also 
readily concedes the existence of human attributes such as philanthropy and self-sacrifice.22 In 
effect, Bentham advocates the principle of 'free will' inasmuch as man can be drawn to the 
pursuit of selfishness as much as selflessness.23 Moreover, by adopting the notions inherent in 
the principle of utility, Bentham seeks to espouse freedom of individual choice within a morally 
contained spectrum based on the greatest happiness to the greatest number. And it is within this 
framework that the justification of the law also divorces itself fro.m. the purely moral and 
becomes enmeshed in political and economic intrigue. Industrialisation, for example, is viewed 
by Bentham as a facilitator of altruistic desires inasmuch as its defining feature is the 
coexistence of a great many people in a relatively confined area. Given this matrix he maintains 
that the need arises for the individual to develop an acute awareness of self within the context of 
other individuals. In turn, this results in a mellowing of the ego and the desire to co-operate and 
compromise for the sake of the greater good of the extended community.24 It is at this critical 
juncture, too, that the practical functioning of the law can assist in the maintenance of societal 
cohesion. Inhuman and cruel practices, for example, ought to be prohibited or at least strictly 
22 
23 
In itself the integration of such conflicting motivations should come as no surprise given 
the sophistication of the human mind and the complexity of human ambitions. 
In this regard, it is arguable that there is a general bias towards the latter as evidenced 
through the tendency towards social cohesion rather than disunitx_in human affairs. 
Given the benefits of hindsight it could, however, be argued that industrialisation with its 
associated urban pressures has (paradoxically) served to alienate individuals' awareness 
of their communal context and societal obligations. Moreover, it would seem reasonable 
to suggest that as a result of the foundations laid by industrialization a culture of 
uncertainty and alienation has entrenched itself (as manifest through the avenues of 
modernism and post-modernism) in human thought. 
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regulated, and anti-social behaviour, in whatever form, should be strongly curtailed.25 Having 
said this, however, Bentham maintained that punishment and retribution ought to have the 
greatest apparent effect while producing the smallest actual expense. In other words, the 
physical retribution inflicted on the criminal must be minimal since this involves an expense for 
society, and yet the deterrent effect whieh such an action creates within the community must be 
harnessed to the fullest to ensure the greatest profit for all. In essence, the law must be utilised 
as a force for communal well-being and moral benevolence. In this regard, however, it is 
interesting to note that Bentham appears to have tacitly conceded that the legal process is 
justified in seeking to attain such ends through the medium of fear - fear of legislative 
retribution, fear of communal sanctions and fear of future uncertainties. Moreover, the task of 
unlocking and utilising the innate potential of legal reasoning was delegated by Bentham to the 
middle-classes, for in his eyes they had the most to fear and the most to lose from an unchecked 
legal system. As the greatest stakeholders in the stable survival of the law, therefore, the 
middle-class came to represent (for Bentham) the only social grouping with direction and with a 
future. 
Bentham's moral justification of the legal process is at times decidedly complex (not to mention 
confusing), particularly when one considers his apparent support for some form of legalised 
prostitution and short-term marital commitments which can lapse after a stated period. 
Nonetheless, his belief that such institutions deserve the protection of the law can be seen as an 
incidence of pragmatic resolve rather than moral turpitude. Therefore, while the principle of 
utility is based upon universal well-being it is still rooted in social reality. Consequently, the. 
task of the law is to facilitate the attainment of moral aspirations while acknowledging the 
existence of (and attempting to regulate) those regrettable areas of the social fabric which for 
one or other reason have become engrained in the mindset of a community. For the law to 
attempt otherwise by making sweeping statements condemning the continuation of such actions 
based on moral precepts alone would, after all, be unrealistic and unwise. This may thus be 
viewed as yet another instance where socio-political and economic influences modify any moral 
justification of the law and require a change in its emphasis. In this context, moreover, 
Bentham's use of the principle of utility appears to be based on relative criteria inasmuch as a 
25 In this regard it is interesting to note that Bentham viewed religion as a primary cause of 
misunderstanding and confrontation inasmuch as religions vie with one another for 
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private citizen could not possibly be expected to take into account the same broad ambit of 
pleasures and pains as a government agent acting in his official capacity, for example. On this 
basis, therefore, the justification of the legal process can be refined as a system of governance 
striving towards justice within a particular paradigmatic framework. This essentially means that 
not only does one apply idiosyncratic criteria in an analysis of legal justifications but one also, of 
necessity, infuses the concept of justice with relative bearings. In spite of all this; however, it 
becomes apparent from Bentham's application of the principle of utility that the only 
justification for theoretical activities is to be found in practical consequences. In this regard, 
therefore, the law's ambition to mould society as it ought to be from human materials as they are 
finds a pragmatic resolution in the form of judicial legislation. For it is at this nexus of 
understanding that personal interest and public duty can best be collated and controlled. 
Moreover, it is with this understanding in mind that Bentham believed all institutions of societal 
governance would benefit from an infusion of similar analytical foundations. Only if this were 
achieved could it be said that the government had succeeded in its duty to provide its subjects 
with rights and consequently benefits. In essence, the obligation of any effective legal system is 
to artificially adjust the course of human interaction wherever necessary so that societal 
integration and individual autonomy maintain an element of fluid equanimity. The fact that such 
adjustment will result in an element of discomfort (i.e. 'pain') is unfortunately inevitable, yet at 
the same time, acceptable in Bentham's paradigm given that the sole justification of the legal 
process is, above all, to facilitate the greatest happiness for the greatest number. Any sacrifice 
that has to be made, any punishment which must be meted out, and any evil which must be 
endured are consequently seen as integral components within the framework of utility. They are 
not in themselves justifiable entities but they do feed off a greater justification to the extent that 
they can be accounted for by means of a dedicated allegiance to the tenets of utility. 26 
26 
divine supremacy and in so doing also distract man from his present concerns due to 
their celestial promises: Op cit at 30. 
It should be mentioned at this point, however, that while the present object of inquiry has 
been the justificational foundations of the legal process per se, Bentham also explored 
the practical motivations of legislators in implementing particular laws. In this regard 
the genesis of an individual law rests in the legislators hands, and the rationale for its 
implementation is formulated in terms of an expression of will.by the sovereign. The 
importance of this motivational reality lies in the fact that it serves as an important 
reminder of the sociological setting of the legal process. Consequently, one is 
encouraged to make a single assumption, namely, that the field of legal endeavour 
comprises an amalgam of expressions of intent, and that it is only through a utilitarian 
analysis of such 'competing wills' that sense can be gleaned, progress made and 
ultimately justice attained. 
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The analysis so far clearly indicates that, for Bentham, the law is primarily a structure for 
effecting social control inasmuch as it is designed to facilitate communal interaction and 
encourage individual restraint. In itself, however, this framework is incapable of effecting its 
own ambitions without the infusion of a rational legal and moral basis in the guise of the 
principle of utility. The law, therefore, is justified in Bentham's eyes to the extent that it 
conforms to his utilitarian precepts and encourages a community to be happier than they would 
otherwise be without it. In this regard, moreover, the chief attributes of the legal process are the 
ability to bolster religious and moral countenances and to entrench a sense of security and 
certainty within a community's fabric.27 Inasmuch as the tenets of utility constitute Bentham's 
vision of morality, legal sanctions consequently remain justifiable only to the extent to which 
their implementation is shown to assist in the attainment of pleasure above pain. In essence, the 
morality of the law is qualified and the justificational scope of the legal process curtailed. In 
contrast to this confined legal framework, however, Al Milne28 maintains that Bentham's 
insistence of the primacy of the individual (which is born from his allegiance to 'psychological 
hedonism') as well as his belief in the fictitious nature of the community does not constitute a 
viable basis for moral justifications of the law. The reason for this is that Milne asserts that an 
individual can only be defined in terms of his communal context, and that it is only once this 
context has been identified or established that it can be said that a moral framework has been 
created. Only once this course has been concluded does the legal process itself become infused 
with a moral justification because morality is an indication of societal integrity, and the law 
becomes an expression of this communal vision. In essence, the acknowledgement of a 
communal identity is, in Milne's view, a prerequisite for the moral justification of the law. 
Moreover, whereas Bentham maintains that the moral justification of the law rests in its ability 
to make people happier than they would otherwise have been, Milne asserts that such a view is 
27 
28 
With regard to the former element, the law is seen to verify and succour the benevolent 
ambitions of religion and morality by means of its political sanctions which provide a 
motivational impetus for the avoidance (or at least control) of individual animosities; so 
far as the latter element is concerned, legal conceptions such as private ownership and 
the identification of property rights are (according to Bentham) essential for the 
fulfilment of the individual and hence the community - this is so because the possession 
of such rights constitutes an integral component of individual autonomy (i.e. the ability 
to acquire and dispose of goods as one wishes) resulting in greater individual fulfilment 
and collective satisfaction. 
Al Milne (ed) 'Bentham's Principle of Utility and Legal Philosophy' Jeremy Bentham -
Critical Assessment (1993) at 53-79. 
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too narrow since a legal system is in no way an integral component of a community's identity 
whereas morality is.29 Consequently, morality pre-dates law and whenever the latter element is 
formally entrenched in a community it simply attempts to reflect the moral understructure rather 
than being the source of it. The rationale for this is that the fundamental compulsion to abide by 
the law is moral in nature and does not arise merely from the structure of the legal process itself. 
In many ways, given the intricate rituals of human interaction and the diverse nature of societies, 
Bentham viewed the legal process as a universal means whereby individual differences could be 
resolved and communal integrity promoted. In this way apparently solitary instances of 
diverging opinions could be evaluated in a broader context and seen as indicative of deeper 
social tensions.30 In this regard, moreover, as a theorist of the components of state identity, 
Bentham regarded part of the justificational rationale of the law to be political in nature. It was 
the law's function, in his opinion, to facilitate institutional reforms which would enable the 
attainment of individual sovereignty and the prevention of arbitrary and inconsistent 
governmental directives within the framework of a democratic state. In fact, it has been argued 
by Ll Hume31 that the primary focus of Bentham's scholarly writings rests on the notion of 
power and how it is and ought to be distributed, exercised and controlled within the political 
state. Consequently, the morality of the law is only justified to the extent that it complies with, 
and is legitimised by, an appropriate political framework. However, having stated this, it is 
interesting to note that Hume maintains that Bentham's political theory and his monµ ideology 
did not strictly correspond with each other. The reason for this incongruency lay in the fact that 
Bentham's moral universe sought to reduce all variables to a pleasure-pain dichotomy (with 
pleasure as the sole ambition) while his political framework expanded beyond individual 
hedonism and introduced rival moral structures and factors into his theoretical understanding. 
29 
30 
31 
In this regard, Milne points to tribal communities and dictatorial social structures as 
instances of social interaction which maintain particular conceptions of morality but 
which lack formal legal institutions and autonomous legislature assemblies. 
It is worth noting, however, that while no mention is made of a specific legal regime, 
Bentham clearly constructed his arguments as a jurist versed in English law. While this 
may seem self-evident and not worthy of comment the importanc~ of this distinction lies 
in the realisation that while certain elements of Benthamite jurisprudence are global in 
application, other elements are born from and biased towards an English law foundation. 
Consequently, at times, what purport to be general comments on the nature of law per se 
amount to reasoning peculiar to the English law context. 
Ll Hume 'Bentham as a Social and Political Theorist' Jeremy Bentham - ·Critical 
Assessment (1993) AJ Milne (ed) at 482-500. 
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Moreover, not only did the resulting tension reverberate within Bentham's moral structure, it 
ultimately impacted upon his political principles and left both sadly depleted.32 
In many ways (criticism of Bentham's legal justifications aside) his ambitions for the law were 
admirable and the means for their attainment intricately crafted.33 However, if one could reduce 
the bulk of his writings to a single statement of intent, I submit that it would be composed in a 
similar vein to the following - The pursuit of certainty motivated by the desire for happiness. It 
is from this core intentionality that much of Bentham's ideology stems and from which his 
justification of the law emerges. The law was, after all, seen by Bentham as a social mechanism 
in need of reform so as to pursue the ends of utility effectively and thereby arrive at a state of 
certainty characterised by the motivational force of pleasure. 
Moving on from Bentham, John Rawls defines 'justice' as fairness, in terms of two criteria. 
Fairness, first, in the sense of equal individual entitlement to fundamental human freedoms to 
the extent that they do not infringe upon the equivalent freedoms of others; and secondly, 
fairness in terms of the arrangements of economic and social inequalities in such a manner that 
they are reasonably presumed to be to the advantage of all individuals and are, moreover, strictly 
attached to posts which are open to all. On this basis, Rawls can be seen to espouse Kantian 
undertones as evidenced in his 'social contract theory' and the concept of justice as embodied in 
the 'ideal observer'. Rawls, moreover, asserts that the justification for civil disobedience within 
a "reasonably just (though of course not perfectly just) democratic regime"34 should - be 
interpreted as a political phenomenon representing the majority's conception of justice in the 
face of injustice. 
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In contrast, HF Pitkin investigates Bentham's theoretical premises in a somewhat 
complimentary light: See 'Slippery Bentham .. .'Jeremy Bentham - Critical Assessment 
(1993) AJ Milne (ed) at 534-560. He notes that Bentham's writings contain tacit 
ambiguities which have enabled him to be "on both sides of the fence at once - on both 
sides of every major intellectual fence he encounters - without ever admitting that the 
fence is there": Idem at 537. 
It is for this reason that I chose to begin an examination of legal justifications with a 
fairly detailed analysis of certain aspects of Benthamite reasoning. Such an inquiry, in 
my view, not only provides a suitable point of entry into justificational issues but it also 
assists in constructing a sufficiently broad foundation from which moral, political and 
socio-economic justificational issues can be identified and expanded upon. 
Rawls A Theory of Justice (1971) at 125. 
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In essence, social institutions possess credibility based upon efficiency and justice, and Rawls 
maintains that given these factors individuals contribute to the continuance of such amicable 
interaction through a natural predisposition coupled with a moral obligation for doing so. In the 
context of a constitutional democracy, therefore, Rawls notes that the 'social contract theory' 
provides a suitable political foundation for the maintenance of this human balance. His theory is 
premised upon the belief that social arrangements in general and justice in particular must be 
judged against and conform to the paradigmatic principles to which "free and rational men 
would agree to in an original position of equal liberty".35 Consequently, "social arrangements 
are just or unjust according to whether they accord with the principles for assigning and securing 
fundamental rights and liberties which would be chosen in the [hypothetical] original position".36 
It should be noted, however, that while the parties in the original position are taken to have equal 
powers and rights they are denied absolute knowledge. More particularly, they are deemed to be 
unaware of the institutional structures around them as well as their individual positions in the 
hierarchy of natural talents and competencies, and most importantly, they have not rationalised 
their understanding of morality. As a result of these circumstances an equilibrium is maintained 
in which the individuals concerned make the critical assumption that justice prevails inasmuch 
as nature is not so divine as to make social co-operation unnecessary nor so dissonant as to make 
it impractical.37 On this basis, therefore, the social contract doctrine provides a viable rationale 
for the human need to comply with just social structures. However, one must also examine the 
basis for acquiescence with unjust laws since this is a factor of everyday existence. In this 
regard, Rawls expands upon the evolution of the 'social contract' from its origin in the original 
position (at which point the principles of justice are established), through to the development of 
a constitutional framework to facilitate the attainment of the chosen principles, and culminating 
in the enactment of laws by a legislative body which is influenced by the tenets of justice and 
regulated by a just constitution. At all stages in the development process "the contracting parties 
have the knowledge required to make their agreement rational from the appropriate point of 
view, but not so much as to make them prejudiced".38 Therefore, they are precluded from 
l~s 
' 36 
37 
38 
Idem at 126. 
Idem at 127. 
It should also be noted that within this system of existence represented by the 'original 
position' each individual acts with his own interests in mind in an effort to promote his 
paradigm of comprehension in whichever direction it develops and for whatever 
purposes its existence becomes apparent. 
Rawls op cit at 129. 
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manipulating the system in light of their hierarchical position since they remain unaware of this 
position to begin with. Within this paradigm the consequence of adherence to the different 
stages in the process inevitably results in the attainment of just laws. And for these purposes 
Rawls advocates the formation of constitutional democracies so as to facilitate the results 
envisaged by the principles of justice. Yet, the drawback in reality is that the process cannot be 
tailored so as to permit the enactment of only just and effective legislation to the exclusion of all 
else. Inevitably, injustice inhabits the system by virtue of the imperfect nature of the procedural 
safeguards in it.39 In accepting the benefits of a constitutional democracy one necessarily 
subordinates one's will to that of the majority in times when unanimity of opinion does not exist. 
Justice, thus, represents the foundational force which requires our allegiance to the just 
constitution as well as the unjust laws enacted in its name by the majority. However, as Rawls 
notes, "while we often have both an obligation and a duty to comply with what the majority 
legislates (as long as it does not exceed certain limits), there is, of course, no corresponding 
obligation or duty to regard what the majority enacts as itself just". All we as individuals are 
required to do is to "submit our conduct to democratic authority to the extent necessary to share 
. the burden of working a constitutional regime, distorted as it must inevitably be by men's lack of 
wisdom and the defects of their sense of justice". 40 
Within this paradigmatic context 'justice' in general and the notion of 'civil disobedience' in 
particular are viewed as political conceptions by virtue of the fact that they frame a vision of 
social interaction and societal interests grounded in morality. On this basis, a democracy retains 
its united structure by means of a shared vision of justice which guides its population in their 
administration of the mechanics of government and their application of the constitution. In 
times of civil disobedience, moreover, the protestors' actions are justified in terms of notions of 
political parity as evidenced among the many principles of justice. Thus, it seeks to reform 
injustices through the avenue of political expression and thereby make a tangible contribution 
towards social reintegration and institutional adaptation. Consequently, civil disobedience and 
the principles of justice are by no means mutually exclusive entities within the context of a 
democratic nation, provided certain guidelines are observed. In the first instance, Rawls notes 
39 
40 
This is principally due to the human agents in the process who constitute the 
membership of the various institutions coordinating the different levels of human 
interaction, and who may, intentionally or otherwise, permit a breach of such safeguards 
to occur. 
Op cit at 130-131. 
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that civil disobedience retains an allegiance to the rule of law owing to its 'public' and 'non-
violent' nature. Admittedly, it may border on volatility given the social disquiet which has given 
birth to it, however, it should never overstep this mark and degenerate into an unstructured 
reactionary backlash against government policies. Given the severe implications and 
possibilities arising out of actions of civil disobedience they should, therefore, be viewed as last 
ditch attempts to rectify the political process and not as convenient deterrents to be wielded at 
the drop of a hat. Secondly, by its nature, civil disobedience seeks to modify conceptions of 
justice by means of legally sanctioned (although extreme) measures and for this reason it should 
be restricted to blatant transgressions of justice as well as requiring those who dissent in this way 
to acknowledge the rights of others to likewise protest. Having regard to these considerations as 
the general conditions precedent for the exercise of civil·disobedience a final and most important 
tactical issue arises, namely, whether one should exercise one's .right in this regard in the first 
place and whether it will further one's desired ambitions;41 This is an issue which must be 
resolved by each individual having regard to his personal morality together with the principles of 
justice which fashion the process of legal interpretation. And ultimately, one must be prepared 
to account for the decisions that one has taken. 
In light of Rawls's comments on the role of the legal structure within the framework of the 
political process (and specifically the constitutional democracy) it becomes apparent that he 
seeks to justify the law in terms of political motivations leading towards a moral standpoint. Yet 
the politicisation of the process is not viewed with disdain or scepticism but is seen simply as the 
natural interaction of different human functions. Politics is, therefore, regarded as a necessary. 
component in the effective functioning of social intercourse since it creates a judicial cli~ate 
conducive to the adoption of particular legal processes and mechanisms. Without it human 
society would lack the ability to implement moral judgements since there would be no structured 
legal system to ensure compliance with social norms and enforce the morality of the community 
upon recalcitrant individuals. Consequently, to the extent that the law is a social process 
entrenched in political discourse it becomes apparent that its justification is the maintenance of 
41 Rawls notes that a test of reasonableness complemented with rational considerations 
should be used as the foundation for the enquiry. 
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an open avenue of communication between those managing the political process and those 
subject to it.42 
Out of the socio-political identity of the law there also emerges a strong economic justification 
for its existence. This is essentially a twofold enquiry indicating the manner in which the law 
impacts upon economic behaviour and the way in which particular economic interaction gives 
rise to a need for legal intervention. Within this framework the law is seen as a facilitator of 
resource allocation, and the method of such resource allocation is, in tum, viewed as the single 
most important factor which determines the environment in which all social interaction takes 
place. All actions are adjudged in terms of their respective costs and an effective legal system is 
deemed to be that which ensures their most cost-effective apportionment in the circumstances. 
Viewing the legal system in this manner, Richard Posner43 notes that economics embodies a 
supremely rational and compelling justification to all facets of human endeavour but particularly 
legal discourse. This is because the law represents one of the most potent mediums for adjusting 
and regulating human behaviour in a world of limited resources and knowledge. By applying 
economic justifications to the law, therefore, one focuses on that which is known and can be 
predicted thereby maximising human choices and knowledge of restricted resources. Any other 
measure of analysis based upon non-economic criteria is subsequently regarded as a misuse of 
analytical skills resulting in a misapplication of legal resources. Posner maintains that the 
beauty of economic reasoning in a legal context is that it is an essentially amoral exercise which 
does not seek to dictate appropriate conduct based on meritorious sensations and criteria, rather 
it endeavours to channel human conduct along natural lines of efficiency and in so doing create a 
42 
43 
In contrast to this point of view, however, Duncan Kennedy asserts that often the law 
represents a rigid composite of human aspirations and lacks the means to unleash its own 
potential due to the fact that legal education manages to stultify innovation: See D 
Kennedy 'Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy' The Politics of Law - A 
Progressive Critique (1982) R Somner (ed) at 40-61. According to Kennedy the primary 
reason for this is due to the fact that legal education seeks to entrench an unnecessary 
hierarchical structure upon its participants which only serves in preventing reasoned 
discussion and hindering future development. Far from providing an arena for reasoned 
discussion and pragmatic variations the law too often becomes a self-perpetuating 
mechanism through which 'the establishment' seeks to promote its own ends by means 
of convenient and self-indulgent justifications. 
Posner Economic Analysis of Law (1986) at 112-130, hereafter referred to as Economic 
Analysis. 
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suitable structure for individual and societal govemance.44 In this respect, its infusion into the 
legal process and its utilisation as a justification for the law can only reinforce the law's worthy 
ambitions and promote social cohesion. The reason for this is that in applying economic 
justifications to the law one is bestowing upon it a pro-active focus which enables legal 
discourse to adjust to, and cope with, changes in society's underlying timbre far more swiftly and 
efficiently than it would have otherwise been able to do.45 In contrast, any morally-laden 
rationale would, it is argued, distort the enquiry and deaden the potential impact of the law 
owing to the difficulty in establishing a mutually acknowledged frame of reference. Essentially, 
the 'economics' argument goes as follows - by focusing on non-essential46 factors such as 
morality to justify the law one loses sight of the fact that the legal system, and, in fact, all 
socially constructed institutions, take their directional cues from economic circumstances and 
policies. This is the bedrock upon which decisions are made and actions accounted for, the rest 
is mere diversion. 
In Posner's view the beneficial consequences of instilling economic reasoning into legal theory 
are fourfold in nature - first, the individuals subject to the legal process behave in a manner 
which seeks to rationally maximise their satisfactions; secondly, the internal workings of the 
legal system become imbued with the goal of promoting economic efficiency; thirdly, economic 
analysis encourages the development of legal reforms; and finally, the methodology of 
economic analysis enhances our understanding of the legal system. In essence, all four factors 
embrace the basic thesis of the 'Chicago School', namely, that the law's primary objective is the 
attainment of efficiency and that all legal reasoning is geared towards its realisation. Moreover, 
given these circumstances, the effectiveness of the law is judged in terms of its ability to 
promote the 'wealth maximisation principle' which is deemed to be the supreme indicator of 
efficiency.47 In this regard, the principle itself presupposes that individuals possess a range of 
44 
45 
46 
47 
In this light, for example, the economist's duty is not to disparage criminal activity or 
delictual actions per se but rather to show how they result in an inefficient allocation of 
resources which needs to be curtailed if society is to remain effectively run. 
This is largely due to the fact that economic criteria can easily be analysed in terms of a 
series of rational units of comprehension and accounted for as predictable circumstances 
or outcomes given a particular factual matrix. 
i.e. Fluid and irrational. 
The 'wealth maximization principle' lies at the heart of Posner's economic focus on the 
law. It asserts that the sum total of everything within society can be reduced to and 
accounted for, in terms of the concept of 'wealth'. In this regard, it is calculated by 
establishing the value at which individuals are prepared to exchange particular goods. 
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inalienable rights which can be assigned and reassigned from one to the other through the 
medium of free market forces. Throughout this process the legal system is designed to 
encourage the recalibration of market forces when the costs of market transactions become 
prohibitive, as well as providing for a body of legal remedies when rights have been infringed.48 
However, while the assumed efficiency of Posner's economic justifications are tantalising, the 
inherent bias of the value structure on which they are based ought to be remembered. After all, 
the 'wealth maximisation principle' reduces values to units of preference dependent upon 
willingness and ability to pay. Moreover, it is only market forces which have the ability and 
authority to determine which particular value from a range of competing values ought to be 
implemented based upon economic and efficiency criteria. Consequently, the possibility arises 
that certain legitimate and already marginalized values will be completely overlooked in the 
effort to promote the greatest efficiency for the majority. Such a situation is clearly of great 
concern since it can, at best, result in the perpetuation of insipid value structures and, at worst, in 
the entrenchment of insidious belief systems within a society. In turn, such a state of affairs 
would appear to undermine the facilitation of cohesion within society which is a sine qua non 
for any discussions on 'justice' .49 Moreover, in its attempt to define the legal process along 
structurally distinct lines, economic analysis appears to overlook the socio-political context of 
48 
49 
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Once these figures have been arrived at the efficiency of the law is then determined in 
terms of its ability to foster the continuation of the system in its present form: See 
Posner Economic Analysis at 126. 
It is interesting to note that while Posner asserts that the entire system which he 
constructs must be grounded in a medium of personal morality (so as to further reduce 
the cost of market transactions) he seeks to distance himself from the utilitarian tenet 
which unites morality with the existence of pleasure above pain. In this context, Posner 
maintains that the utilitarian ideal contains three fundamentally problematic propositions. 
First, it provides little guidance as to which classes of human beings are to be assessed in 
determining the pleasure/pain calculation (i.e. should the class only be confined to 
humans known to us; or, all existing human beings; or, all current and potential future 
generations?). Secondly, while utilitarianism requires a pleasure/pain calculation to be 
made it provides no concise formula for the arrival at such a resolution. Finally, 
utilitarianism does not take into account the fact that certain individuals are capable of 
deriving greater pleasure from permissible acts than others. In effect, this leads to a 
distortion in the pleasure/pain ratio and results in an inaccurate representation of the 
actual state of affairs: See Posner Economic Analysis at 128. 
As an aside and in addition to the concerns already expressed, t~ 'wealth maximization 
principle' rejects the concept of economic redistribution since such redistribution 
constitutes a re-assignment of wealth rather than an increase in its fundamental volume. 
However, given that one of the legal process' motivational forces ought to be the desire 
for 'equity', one can but wonder how the harsh judgements emanating from Posnerian 
reasoning would be accepted within society in general, and how they could be reconciled 
with the law's ambition for justice? 
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legal discourse together with its moral functioning. Nonetheless, Posner's retort to such a claim 
would be that while economic theory reduces the complexity of the law into a series of specific 
propositions this is a necessary precondition for purposes of analysis and does not detract from 
the basic truth of the economic message itself whose assumptions remain valid. 
As has been seen, legal justifications are essentially framed in terms of two camps of thought -
formalism and realism. Legal formalism denotes a rational order of pre-existing rights and rules 
which can be relied upon in making judicial decisions, while legal realism embodies the belief 
that the law is constructed from a myriad of conflicting points of consciousness, which cannot be 
reconciled with one another. Consequently, formalism presupposes that legal discourse 
represents a means of comprehension untainted by social uncertainty or political necessity and 
that the law contains an innate morality within its own identity. In contrast, realism asserts that 
formalism represents an impractical framework given the limits of human knowledge and the 
ambiguities of language. In this context all expressions of human contemplation are regarded as 
no more than incomplete rationalisations of inexplicable occurrences, and the law is seen to be a 
system which evolves in a complex and unpredictable manner in the light of antecedent social 
factors. The Critical Legal Studies movement whose defining feature is a belief in the radical 
indeterminacy of law is born of such realism. Through the channels of Critical Legal Studies 
understanding orthodox analyses of law are seen to mystify legal objectives and to legitimate 
legal decisions so as to bolster the political status quo. In so doing they deny the existence of a 
fundamental contradiction inherent in legal and political thought, namely, that conflict inhabits 
the core of human experience. Such conflict presents itself through our sense of self definition 
and individual identity which is at one and the same time a formulation of intensely personal 
expectations as well as a construction defined in terms of and connected to the existence of 
others. It is this contradiction within the nature of individuality and its attachment to other 
identities that Critical Legal Studies alleges is ignored by mainstream legal thought. Moreover, 
it is as a result of such inherent tension that the law can be manipulated and its justifications 
reinterpreted in . numerous ways. Mainstream legal thought fails to acknowledge such 
possibilities and tries to privilege one form of interpretation above another thereby stifling the 
range of legal justifications and the potential of legal discourse. 
Clearly, Critical Legal Studies can be accused of allowing itself to become so absorbed in issues 
concerning the contradictory nature of legal justifications that it ultimately regresses into a 
nihilistic void in which nothing can be accounted for, and in terms of which nothing can be 
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predicted with any sort of accuracy. This is a very real problem since it undermines Critical 
Legal Studies's attempt at constructing an alternative vision to orthodox legal reasoning. The 
notion that the law is indeterminate at its core as well as in its application is consequently a 
troublesome proposition which Critical Legal Studies adherents are obliged to confront in order 
to avoid accusations of nihilism. Some Critical Legal Studies scholars choose to approach this 
dilemma by asserting that the fact that the law does not need a rational justification does not 
automatically gear it towards an inevitable journey in the direction of nihilism. The reason for 
this is that nihilism requires an antecedent belief in the inability of actions to be foundationally 
justified in any way and it exhibits a real concern about such a state of affairs. In contrast, 
Critical Legal Studies refrains from regressing to the level of complete disillusionment (as 
embodied in nihilism) and acknowledges that there is a compelling human need to accept a 
range of beliefs and to assert an array of intuitions which underlie all human interaction even 
though they cannot be rationally explained. In this regard, the Critical Legal Studies movement 
stands in contradistinction to 'law and economics' reasoning and assumes an objectivist critique 
of such theories not for the sake of indicating its own pre-eminent analytical objectivity but as an 
indicator against which to hold such theories accountable in terms of their own aspirations. 
Despite such argumentation, however, Critical Legal Studies analysis remains open to criticism 
from quarters who believe that it requires a more advanced vocabulary and analytical approach 
in order to overcome formalistic dualities and to avoid the potential of a nihilistic paradox. To 
this end, Roberto Unger5° appears to provide certain valuable insights from within Critical Legal 
Studies itself so as to advance its ambitions and promote its understanding of the role and extent 
of legal justifications. 
Unger notes that human identity is forever understood in terms of social and cultural contextual 
settings which define the extent of possibilities on the one hand, and experiences and thoughts 
which transcend such context and cannot be effectively accounted for by means of language, on 
the other. This conflict translates itself into our 'existential dilemma' ,51 and it is with this in 
mind that the justifications of social institutions need to be understood. Unger maintains that 
~uman personality once cleansed of the restraining forces of imposed beliefs is capable of 
50 
51 
R Unger Law in Modern Society (1976) at 26. 
The manifestation of the dilemma is the longing of the individual psyche to be subsumed 
into a collective identity and its simultaneous revulsion at the possibility of losing its 
individual identity. 
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infinite potential. To interpret the law in terms of formalistic intentions is to stifle such 
potential, but to view it as a mechanism for the release of human personality is to facilitate the 
understanding of an important and universal aspiration. The inherent plasticity of human nature 
is regarded by Unger as the central and only predictable feature about our existence and the 
ability to harness such adaptability beyond particular contextual, circumstances is a supreme 
triumph.52 The possibility of arriving at the template of understanding is, consequently, not at 
issue since the progression towards more flexible interpretive structures is the factor of sole 
concern. The complexity of such reasoning, however, lies in the fact that it requires one to view 
the law as an ideology which is entrenched as a tool of political legitimation and which feeds off 
a sense of pervasive indeterminacy. It is only in understanding the Jaw in this light that one can 
appreciate the complexity of legal impulses and seek to assimilate the multitude of legal 
justifications in a coherent manner.53 In so doing the legal system is enabled to promote human 
discovery rather than perpetuate self-ignorance. Moreover, it is this sense of textuality and 
contextuality which will be re-emphasised when the fusion of legal and literary justifications is 
examined later. 
Critical Legal Studies is a movement primarily concerned with the development of political 
understanding. To this end it asserts that no single medium of political integration has perpetual 
or conclusive authority and that the most effective means of ensuring political advancement is 
through the continual re-assessment of political ideas and institutional mechanisms. In this 
regard, therefore, the ultimate justification of the law is to facilitate this quest through a constant 
re-appraisal of both its objectives and the means for their attainment. Furthermore, given that 
Critical Legal Studies theorists such as Unger abstain from promoting turbulent social revolution 
as the catalyst for political change, the onus falls even more heavily on the law to ensure a 
smooth transition in social identity and political belief.54 The balance of power at any given time 
52 
53 
54 
Unger acknowledges that for every context that is superseded another one is created with 
the result that we are never entirely free agents. However, contextual fluidity allows one 
to progress towards surroundings which are less structured and encourage questionin,g of 
their own pretences. It is this progression which unlocks human potential rather than 
necessarily arriving at an ultimate context-free state of being: Idem at 121. 
This may seem ironical given the fact that coherence is somehow taken to emerge from 
an array of vying points of reference, yet it is important to remember that Critical Legal 
Studies continually makes the point that the only meaningful vision of reality which we 
possess is one based upon our appreciation of the difference of things. 
With this in mind, it becomes apparent why Critical Legal Studies frowns upon 
formalism since the latter form of critique seeks to establish a particular and immutable 
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in history is subsequently never viewed by Critical Legal Studies scholars as an irrefutable state 
of affairs but is seen as an arena of vying political motivations which must be effectively 
assimilated through the channels of the law to ensure the maintenance of social progress and 
communal stability. 
3.2 Literary Justifications 
While the reasons for composing a literary work55 are as diverse as the myriad motivational 
forces influencing any one author, the underlying 'constant' within literature is that it embodies 
an attempt by man to identify some measure of justice in the sea of human chaos as well as 
representing a medium in which interpretative justice can be 'done' to the human condition. By 
this I mean that literature constitutes an endeavour to reformulate time and space within the 
confines of the written page so as to guide the reader towards a particular conclusion or 
realisation while, at the same time, rendering the interpretation of reality sufficiently meaningful 
to him despite the exclusion of a range of facts and stimuli which would have been present in the 
actual event. Consequently, while I will present numerous justifications of literature in this 
section, it should be borne in mind that the bedrock upon which they are all based is the desire to· 
comprehend the human condition which, in itself, constitutes a conception of justice.56 
Perhaps the most powerful attribute of literature is its ability to defy the linear constraints of time 
together with the specific constraints of place and in so doing, encourage man to reformulate his 
understanding of the world. Through the channels of literature one can regress in time, 
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means of legal analysis which fails to heed socio-political developments and 
consequently restricts the law from fully utilising its justificational foundation as the 
arbiter of ordered societal evolution. 
In this context, I use the word 'literature' in a broad sense to denote written adaptations 
and interpretations of human experience, both fictitious and factual. Admittedly, many 
societies have a strong oral literary tradition which could also be classed as a genuine 
representation of the 'literature' to which I refer. In many respects, I believe this 
assumption to be correct, however, for present purposes I have chosen to confine myself 
largely to the written word whose inherent characteristics may be taken as emblematical 
of the 'literacy' endeavour in its even broader sense. 
This is not to say that all human actions are necessarily 'just' for such an impression is 
both naive and imprecise. However, what it does imply is that through the act of 
analyzing and attempting to grasp the ramifications of the human condition one 
inevitably encounters and develops an awareness of the notion of justice and the manner 
in which a facet of it is reflected in the very act of being. 
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encounter different cultural identities, stimulate one's imagination of unseen or fictitious worlds, 
or even expand one's knowledge of the known universe. It is this unique ability to transcend the 
acknowledged present which constitutes literature's greatest asset. In this regard, especially 
considering the stunted integration of South Africa's heterogenous society, literature has often 
been used as a means of social commentary and has been rooted in political justifications. 
In the South African context, two literary traditions arose out of these specific circumstances, 
one which sought to justify the status quo and another which defied the authority of the law and 
the imposed morality of the state. This latter group has gained renewed prominence and 1 
I 
legitimacy in the years following the collapse of apartheid doctrines and has embarked upon a , 
systematic reappraisal of its ambitions while retaining an allegiance to its original justificatory 
precepts rooted in political struggle. It is. interesting to note, too, that this transition from a 
marginalised discourse to a mainstream one has been fraught with difficulties due to the new 
responsibilities, challenges and expectations of a steadily integrating society. For example, the 
new-found freedoms of expression of black authors together with their accounts of past 
injustices, are gradually being translated (where necessary) into other languages (particularly 
English) so that a dialogue can be established between different communities within South 
Africa as well as abroad. In this regard, moreover, it is vital to acknowledge the tacit connection 
between reality and fiction and the valuable role that the latter medium has in reflecting 
elements, particularly painful instances, of the former condition. It is my belief that as 
'marginalised literature' in South Africa develops so as to fill the vacuum left by discredited 
ideologies the message to be conveyed will have to be less militant and more conciliatory in 
tone. This is not to deny the pain which has taken place or the indignities which have occurred 
nor is it to denounce the political justifications which underlay this literature in the first place. 
The fact remains, however, that if one wishes social interaction to progress there is a need to 
convey one's experiences and beliefs - particularly if they are now regarded as legitimate - in a 1 
manner which ensures the greatest effect and the least affront. Only in this way are you likely to 1 ( 
win people over to your point of view and consequently bolster the position of your political ' 
justifications.57 Furthermore, regarding this process of transition in South African 'protest' 
57 As an aside in this regard, it is worth noting that the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC) was established as a forum for the expression of marginalised 
discourses. The ultimate aim of the process being a societal catharsis in which those 
previously denied a voice would be entitled to relate their experiences and confront their 
tormentors in the hope that the truth would emerge and justice would prevail. Yet, given 
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literature, the time has come to distance itself from an exclusive preoccupation with the past and! 
I 
develop an awareness of future possibilities. For it is in this arena that one of literature's greates~ 
potentials lies (i.e. the ability to look beyond both the past and the present) and through which it 
I 
can influence the course of law. The reason for this is that by its very nature the legal process is 
an institution with a retrospective focus always battling to meet or shape the expectations of the, 
present generation based upon the criteria established by, often, bygone social structures. Law' 
does not contain within itself the ability to formulate an accurate and detailed projection of 1 
future social scenarios. Consequently, literature can provide the keystone which enables the law( 
to connect past and present experience to a potential future context. 
Undoubtedly, a great deal of literature has a didactic and moralising function, particularly in 
newly-evolving societies and communities which are in a state of flux. In these contexts, the 
primary justification of the literary process is seen to be the imparting of a particular message or 
the conveying of basic moral tenets. Consequently, the manner in which the ideas are conveyed 
is designed to ensure the greatest effectiveness with the minimum of sophistication. In this 
sense literature can be seen to harbour definite socialising ambitions inasmuch as it seeks to 
dictate to a community the specific lines along which interaction ought to take place and the 
manner in which communal integrity should be viewed. 
Clearly, as societies advance, however, the overt didactic stress of literature recedes and is 
replaced by more subtle undertones while the task of regulating the behaviour of society falls 
more on the shoulders of carefully composed and instructed legal institutions. In this manner, 
literature develops a certain refinement and becomes elevated to the status of an imaginative 
the TRC's noble ambitions to utilize the literary process (in both its oral and written 
media) to facilitate understanding and promote cultural integration it would appear that 
its task has been somewhat sullied by the insertion of a pecuniary value and form of 
compensation in its analysis and assessment of individuals appearing before it. Arguably 
such fiscal recompense undermines the process on two grounds - first, it constitutes an 
unwarranted encroachment into the duties and jurisdictions of the legal process, and 
secondly, it fuels the dangerous perception that justice must be equated with financial 
1, compensation, in essence, 'blood money'. Given the unden.lable potential for the 
constructive reconstitution of society presented by the TRC, it is, therefore, unfortunate 
(to say the least) that it should hamper its own effectiveness because of poorly evaluated 
channels for the attainment of its goals. Any attempt to reduce a vehicle of literary 
understanding to a quasi-legal institution is indicative of a fundamentally flawed 
appreciation of the distinction between the two institutions as well as the margin of 
practical effectiveness which literature holds in its own right. 
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experience whose justification becomes the interpretation of reality rather than simply the 
prescription by a community to the individuals therein of particular moral and social 
expectations. Moreover, it is within this context that modernisation seeks to entrench the 
primacy of experience above the theory about experience - in essence, resulting in the 
perpetuation of a tension within human consciousness inasmuch as man is seen to embody the 
truth but is denied full knowledge thereof. Such an acknowledgement consequently serves to 
alert the human intellect to the power relations behind one~ understanding and the entrenched 
framework from within whose sphere one makes assumptions.58 However, the very modernist 
construction of existence would seem to deny the possibility of any denouement or ultimate 
frame of reference (i.e. the absolute form of narrative experience) given its complex appreciation 
of the relativity of reality in the first place. In spite of such a state of affairs, however, 
modernism itself simply expounds a system (albeit a system of disbelief) onto the 'formalistic' 
beliefs of legal discourse. The myth of literary clarification and control over the vagaries of 
existence is consequently perpetuated across the literary spectrum and is not reliant upon 
particular genres but is tied to the constant literary ideal - the search for justice. Be this as it may 
there is, nonetheless, a continued desire to come to terms with the complexity of experience, and 
a tacit resolve to effectively establish channels of communication through which justice might ' 
be attained. These ambitions are adopted by postmodemism as well by virtue of its allegiance to 
the literary ideal although it seeks to distance itself from the moral and humanistic justifications 
of literature which have been previously accepted. Through postmodern eyes literature is seen 
to represent nothing more than an illusory channel of perception indicating the meaninglessness 
of existence. Yet even this apparent sense of futility contains direction and is filled with 
meaning. It is aimed at discerning the true nature of human consciousness, rationality and 
reason and trying to formulate an interpretative template against which particular actions can be 
accounted for. In this respect, therefore, while postmodemism questions the traditional 
pretensions of literary scholarship by focusing upon the fragmentation of human knowledge and 
understanding this quest is nonetheless rooted in the natural human craving for justification and 
resolution. The reason for this is that by acknowledging the complexity and formlessness of 
existence, postmodemism does so from the tacit vantage point of systematic and rational 
interpretation. In other words, the very act of identifying the presence of a confused mass of 
58 In essence, modernism seeks to acknowledge the inherent tensions within human 
existence, thereby reflecting 'reality' more accurately and doing justice to the human 
condition. 
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being implies the ability to withdraw beyond it and impose some meaning upon it. For this 
reason even postmodern analyses of reality should be seen as containing a definite structure and 
fulfilling an essential function - the former denotes its justification (which is the search for 
meaning), and the latter embodies its desired resolution (which is the attainment of justice). The 
important element in this context, however, is that unlike legal rationality and to a greater degree 
than other measures of literary discourse (e.g. Romanticism), postmodemism is acutely aware of 
the irresolvable tension which exists between its implicit destiny (i.e. the search for justice) and 
its inevitable justification (i.e. the complexity of meaning and. the unavoidability of 
misunderstanding.59 
In all that has been said it becomes apparent that literature represents an arena in which human 
motivations are questioned and man's myth-making capacity analysed. Through literary 
symbols the greater symbolism of ordinary activities is revealed and human potential explored. 
Moreover, it is at the point at which literature engages with such ideas that it comes to constitute 
a powerful philosophical entity in its own right. This is not, however, to say that literature 
provides answers to all dilemmas in human understanding for such a claim would be immodest 
and untrue. Rather, literature poses questions and conducts enquiries which other disciplines 
overlook, and it is this factor which constitutes the core of its sublime insight. Furthermore, it is 
literature's unique ability to evolve in a remarkably fluid manner so as to reflect contemporary 
paradigms of understanding that gives it an analytical edge over more contemplatively inflexible 
discourses such as law. The mythical justification of literature represents a valuable field of 
exploration at a number of levels. First, the creation of myths serves to bridge gaps in human 
understanding through the formulation of circumstances which constitute definable points of. 
reference against an enigmatic backdrop of uncertainty. Secondly, myths provide the contextual 
framework from which literature gains its historical perspective and its analytical stimuli. This 
59 Taken to its extreme, postmodernism defies the need for any justification in both 
literature and life. The point being that the insistence on some form of justificational 
criteria is indicative of a failure to realize that things simply 'are' and motivelessness 
reigns. However, this extreme point of view appears to me to fall short of the 
sophisticated potential of the postmodern argument because it unquestioningly accepts 
the 'chaotic' status quo whereas the postmodern quest has long been concerned as to 
why things are in such a state of flux in the first place. After all, when one deconstructs 
the disorder of existence one is left with units of meaning and shared understanding 
which provide clues as to the justificational intent of literature and act as a basis from 
which to evaluate the descent into the disorder of reality. 
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is due to the fact that myths construct a past heritage of shared human endeavour around which 
literature evolves, while simultaneously providing a contemporary setting from which literature 
can fuel its efforts to define itself. Consequently, myth is both a justification and ambition of 
literature inasmuch as it is born of mythical projections, on the one hand, and it seeks to define 
reality in mythical terms, on the other. Thirdly, the power of myth stimulates the development 
of literary creation and it also provides an effective point of entry and means of interpretation of 
literary texts. Finally, myth is the element within literature which possesses the power to 
influence peoples' perceptions, alter their judgements and release their inhibitions. This is 
because through the mythical projection of 'the Self, individuals become more attuned to 
confirming their presence in the world and seeking to establish a particular mark of their 
existence in a profoundly 'Delphic' universe. 
The rationalisation of myth has undergone an interesting change in emphasis over time, 
reflecting the growing sophistication in literary comprehension. The initial purpose of myths 
was seen to be the communication of moral truths in an allegorical setting. With the rise of the 
'church state', however, political undertones began to filter into myth analysis and myths were 
legitimised to the extent that they did not undermine church policies. As the Enlightenment 
dawned, rationalistic philosophers then began to subvert classical mythology as a medium for 
the perpetuation of superstitious beliefs and wilful untruths. Ultimately, each philosophical 
generation has sought to adapt what has gone before it and to reinvent itself in the language of 
its own mythical understanding. In engaging with the mythical identities of preceding ages 
scholars have inevitably laid the foundations for their own frame of reference and the criteria by 
which they will be judged. So it is that myth should be understood as a manifestation of human 
consciousness closely associated with man's vision of his place in the world, rather than simply 
being a freely invented and value-neutral commodity. Bearing this in mind, myth comes to 
represent an integral component in the composition of cultural identity and the formulation of 
individual psychology. Moreover, in constituting a channel for the interpretation of reality, 
myth discloses a profound appreciation of the inter-relationship between the real and the ideal, 
the actual and the imagined. Neither sphere would appear to predominate and, both are 
interchangeable with each other resulting in the confluence of human imaginings.60 In primitive 
4"' 
societies it is interesting to observe the manner in which myth penetrates all aspects of language 
60 At a basic level this can be seen from the regular metamorphosis within mythology of 
divine gods into human characters and human characters into mythical entities. 
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and is, in turn, reflected in various forms of art. As communities advance, however, such 
interaction becomes increasingly restricted as the various modes of interpretation evolve into 
distinct entities vying with one another for legitimacy. In its present state of advancement 
Western society has already experienced this schism and the only remnant of mythical potential 
available to us is to be found through literary channels. For this reason and in order to re-affirm 
the mythical content of legal discourse we must first renew our acquaintance with the mythical 
justification of literature. Only in so doing can we fully appreciate and account for the perpetual 
tension present within legal discourse as between its stated desire for justice and its justifications 
born of the imperfections in human understanding and limitations in human knowledge. The 
reason for this is that in subsequently transposing the existence of myth into a legal justificatory 
setting we come to see that the apparent intentions of the law do not always coincide with its 
underlying justificational influences. In this regard, the law has undeniably and ironically 
constructed a mythical presumption of its own inasmuch as it would have one assume that no 
tensions or conflicting motivations exist within its own discoursive framework. Yet, somewhat 
paradoxically, by applying mythical assumptions and constructs to legal discourse one is able to 
unravel an otherwise overlooked portion of law's construction, namely, that it operates to a large 
extent within a mythical sphere of dual realities. By this I mean that the law overtly seeks to 
establish itself as an effective medium for the attainment of just ends, yet it also needs to be 
acknowledged that it is formulated through the existence of violence, discord and uncertainty in 
human affairs. The former state of being consequently represents one mode of reality which 
would be labelled 'the divine' in a mythological context, while the latter embodies the second 
manifestation of reality characterised as 'the mortal' sphere of existence within the myth. While 
the perpetual tension between these two modes of reality precludes the complete exclusion of 
either interpretation (and consequently the absolute attainment of only one) the mythical 
framework facilitates their interaction within the purview of its own creation. In so doing, man 
is not necessarily drawn to any conclusions, but his understanding of the human condition, in 
general, and legal discourse's interpretation thereof, in particular, is greatly enhanced. In this 
regard, the predominant sense to be drawn from such increased understanding is that legal 
discourse analysed solely on its own terms and intepreted exclusively through its own channels 
is both ineffective and distorted. What is required for a more thorough understanding of matters 
is the application of literary justifications to the legal process, culminating in a synthesis of 
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interpretations. 61 
The very existence of myth is an indication of the rich imagination of the human mind and its 
attempts to account for the unknown and to justify the tacitly perceived potential of man. In this 
regard, it remains as cogent a force in contemporary society as it was in bygone eras. However, 
the only point of distinction between these two ages in time is that the significance of myth has 
been largely forgotten in the modem world. It is this fact which is particularly unfortunate since 
through the marginalisation of myth we are denying ourselves the benefit of a notable narrative 
discourse and medium of interpretative understanding. In this regard, moreover, it should not be 
presumed that myth is somehow incompatible with the scientific advances of the modem age. 
Such a supposition is spurious because, in spite of the tangible consequences of modernisation 
and the scientific revolution, humankind remains subject to inherent deficiencies in knowledge. 
We are only able to comprehend so much of reality, the rest is a matter of our own creation, 
presumptions and intuition. At this level myth constitutes an effective forum for interpretation 
and expression of both human frailties and capabilities, and consequently provides a means by 
which they can be better understood. So it is that myth is essentially a philosophical quest 
framed in a narrative form. To this end, however, it should not be supposed that myth and 
literature are inter-changeable entities. Such a statement would be to confuse their individual 
identities since one cannot have literature without myth, but myth·is able to exist without the 
need for an established literary framework.62 In this regard, therefore, myth constitutes a 
justification of literary interpretation, and an appreciation of myth is necessary if one wishes to 
embark upon an effective analysis of literary ideals. 
3.3 Fusion of Justifications 
Law and literature symbolise different means through which man tries to comprehend the reality 
surrounding him and to define himself in terms of this understanding. In many respects not only 
do these two disciplines constitute divergent mechanisms of comprehension but they also serve 
different practical functions. Yet, while one must clearly acknowledge such dissimilar activities 
it is also necessary to analyse those instances where parallels can be drawn and where inter-
61 
62 
This element of the argument will, however, be discussed at greater length in the next 
section 'Fusion of Justifications'. 
Moreover, while literature is identified by the synthesized structure of its basic elements 
(i.e. words), myth embodies a far more indeterminate arrangement which is able to retain 
its essential integrity across a range of media (i.e. words, art, drama or dance). 
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disciplinary cross-pollination can prove fruitful. This is what I hope to highlight in this section. 
However, it should be remembered that given the emphasis of my argument up until now, I shall 
be concentrating on the beneficial influence which literary justifications can have within a legal 
context rather than vice versa. 
Within the framework of legal justifications the central issue regarding the nature of language is 
the extent to which it is able to effectively communicate man's perceptions and understanding of 
reality so that socio-political communities and economic systems can function successfully. 
Consequently legal rules are not only directional in application (i.e. they do not simply lay down 
guidelines as to how one should act), but are also justificatory in the sense that people are called 
upon to justify their conduct in terms of such regulations which are themselves rooted in a 
greater justification of their own. Thus, while the law and literature strive for 'justice', people 
are constantly obliged to justify their own actions within the framework of this greater ideal, and c · 
this ideal is itself counterpoised and limited by its own justificatory identity. In other words, 
referring to what has already been noted, it should be remembered that while law and literature 
are directed towards an interpretation of 'justice' they are denied the possibility of attaining it by 
virtue of their respective justifications which are to a great degree reliant upon the uncertainty of 
existence and the limited nature of human knowledge. Moreover, from a purely hypothetical 
point of view, if one were to divest law and literature of the justificatory functioning provided by 
uncertainty and limited human knowledge then it is reasonable to assume that they would loose 
both their authority and rationales as forces for the attainment of justice. The reason for this is · 
that in such a scenario 'justice' would presumably be an existing state of being since certainty 
and absolute knowledge would be entrenched in every human mind, consequently the need for a 
discoursive channel presenting a vision of 'justice' becomes superfluous. Therefore, when I 
note the beneficial implications of providing a 'fusion of justifications' I do so not in the belief 
that literary justifications applied in a legal context will necessarily assist in the attainment of 
'justice' ,63 but that such an integration of ideals will result in a more thorough evaluation of the 
potential of the legal process and of the relationship between the search for justice and the need 
for justification. 
63 The reason for this is that this argument contains two fundamental flaws - first, it fails to 
acknowledge the essential distinctions between law and literature and the fact that they 
cannot be reduced to a single entity with a uniform identity; and secondly, such an 
argument mistakenly assumes that the attainment of 'justice' in a legal context can be 
achieved simply through the importation of literary justifications. 
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In many respects literature assists in redefining law in terms of its own mythical projection. By 
this I mean that literature alerts one to the mythical content of legal identity, the way in which it 
operates and the consequence of its presence. For example, while legal discourse is preoccupied 
with projecting an air of focused certainty and fairness, literature assists in dispelling such 
presumptions by elaborating on the manner in which the law can be seen to provide occasions 
for the creation and perpetuation of conflict rather than for its resolution. This is evidenced 
through the condonation of varying degrees of violence within the legal process itself together 
with the fact that much of the law's legitimacy is drawn from the tumult of its surroundings 
rather than the integrity and effectiveness of its proposed resolutions to such circumstances. 
Consequently, the legal process is rooted in the disorder of existence yet its ideals strive towards 
greater ambitions beyond social reality (but within. human contemplation) and the factor which 
permits such contrasting circumstances to coexist is 'myth'. This is not to denigrate the ideals of 
the law since myth per se is an amoral concept, but merely to indicate that the law exists as 
much - if not more so - through myth as it does through reality. Moreover, the fact that myth is 
embedded in the identity of the law enables the legal process to account for the dual nature of its 
existence (i.e. simultaneously within and beyond society) as well as to acknowledge the 
unattainability of its desires given the continuation of the present factual matrix. In this context, 
'myth' embodies two separate concepts - the first is 'myth as illusion' and the second is 'myth as 
creation'. Regarding the former concept, the acknowledgement of myth within the law indicates 
the inherent and paradoxical tension present in the legal process as between the search for justice 
and the necessity for justification, while the latter concept denotes the potential for the greater 
understanding of legal discourse as a mythical creation much more complex and inconstant than 
its assumed certainty would suppose. In essence, myth provides a point of connection between 
the understood and the inexplicable, yet its potential for revelation within legal discourse has 
gone unharnessed owing to the illusion of rational certainty surrounding the legal process. It 
consequently proves to be beneficial to utilise the avenue of literature to deconstruct the 
formalistic pretensions of the law and thereby relocate the justification of the law in human 
flSpirations and capabilities, many of which are inextricably tied in with the notion of myth. 
In this regard the process of deconstruction is beneficial inasmuch as it serves to alert one to the 
fact that justice can only be attained if it has the ability to be implemented. In other words, 
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enforcability is a necessary prerequisite for an understanding of justice. This infuses the identity 
of justice with two important notions, namely, that violence64 is an inherent component in the 
creation of the 'just ideal', as well as the fact that such ideals are a compound of human identity 
and divine belief. Consequently, just as the law is born of the tensions of human uncertainty so, 
too, is its ambition - the attainment of justice - plagued by the pressures of brutality and 
turbulence in human existence. Of all the forms of experience the ideals of justice remain 
obsessively guarded by societies yet are little understood by them. This is not to say that no 
conclusions can be drawn as to the function or nature of justice, but merely that the ways in 
which it is accounted for are in need of re-evaluation. It is no longer a satisfactory exercise to 
presume that justice is undeniably attainable or entirely within human keri. Such presumptions 
detract from the complex universe which the concept of justice inhabits, yet it is these very 
notions (ironically) which legal discourse instils in human minds.65 For this reason it is vital to 
extend one's search beyond the bounds of purely legal reasoning while simultaneously 
deconstructing the monopoly of misunderstanding and misinformation which the law seeks to 
impose upon individuals. Admittedly, the ultimate consequence of such an enquiry is to 
highlight the complex inter-relationship between justice and justification and to render the 
viability of justice conceivable while declaring its attainment to be impractical. However, what · 
at first sight might be labelled an irrational statement takes on a critical truth when it is seen to 
reflect the fundamental contradiction of existence, namely, that man has the intellectual ability to 
bring his being into question yet he lacks the knowledge to advocate a specific resolution (in this 
case - justice) to consume all of his uncertainties. There will always be a sector of reality which 
subsequently remains unknown and there will forever remain a portion of the unknown which 
continues. to be unattainable. Deconstruction teaches man that his purpose is not to deny or 
retaliate against this state of affairs but rather to abide by it and formulate his being in 
accordance with it. rt) 
-- <)(:Dir 
Whereas the law imposes upon individuals a single discourse of interpretation ~egarding the 
concept of justice, literature intimates that justice can be more readily attained if one 
communicates in a language of mutual understanding (i.e. in the language of the other). Such an 
64 
65 
If one wishes one could use the term 'force' in lieu of 'violence', however the outcome 
is the same. 
Not only does the law seek to define justice in terms of tangible criteria but it also aims 
to be the sole regulator of all human actions in the light of its definition of justice. 
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observation clearly serves to humanise the dictates of the law, however it does not necessarily 
bring one to a just resolution in itself. The reason for this lies in the fact that the language of the 
other can only be spoken to the extent to which it is assumed by the party concerned, and i~ 
order to do this it must be appropriated and redefined in terms of a foreign frame of reference i · \ /~ 
the first place. The potential for justice is, therefore, always subject to an act of violence and / { .f/ 
embodies an instant of isolation in the very act of connection. Moreover, within the particularity 
of the circumstances in which justice is sought man desires to extract principles of universal 
application for all time. However, an unsullied allegiance cannot be shared between 'the Self} 
and the other, the specific and the universal, with the consequence that each attempt at justi 
must harbour the seeds of injustice. In essence, what is not said or done, the silence between 
words, and the individual isolation in the midst of community identity are all factors which have 
as strong a bearing on human understanding as all spoken words and actions. It is, after all, in 
this silence that the justifications of justice reside. Given this state of affairs the very 
foundations of justice remain, to some extent, shrouded from human comprehension, however, 
the onus is still on man to decipher and interpret to the best of his abilities the symbols at his 
disposal.66 This is clearly not the ideal situation since the essence of justice is irreducible; yet it 
is all we have to go on. In these circumstances, furthermore, human understanding and 
interpretation are acts of continual deconstruction inasmuch as intangibles are defined and 
intricacies unwound so as to embody an attainable level of human contemplation. In itself this 
presents no intellectual dilemma and, in fact, constitutes an avenue of greater understanding 
since we are thereby enabled to confront otherwise illusive notions and identities. However, the 
problem arises if we deem such reduced reflections to be untainted manifestations of the 
original. And it is with regard to this aspect of understanding that the law's potential often 
capitulates to its own formalistic pretensions. For this reason, more than any other, it is vital that 
legal discourse not be isolated from literature's sphere of influence, for where the law presumes, 
literature dares to question. 
66 In this sense the most cogent manner in which to 'do justice' to the notion of justice is by 
attempting to understand the situations out of which it arises and the resolutions which it 
seeks to impose in different circumstances. Nothing more than such finite solutions can 
or should be expected of man. 
165 
While the notion of justice retains a supremely abstract identity which resides beyond the 
present67 the course of human conduct requires that decisions be implemented with dispatch and 
without the consolidation of infinite knowledge as a justificatory stay. In this regard, the 
moment of decision always retains the mark of uncertainty by virtue of its own finitude and it is 
this element which humankind seeks to alleviate through the utilisation of legal discourse which 
provides one with a conceptual crutch inasmuch as it proffers resolutions to current human 
conflict which are allegedly steeped in certainty and equity. In effect, the law seeks to emulate 
the infinite wisdom of justice in a manner which provides for some temporary respite for 
societies from the onslaught of present dilemmas. Such an ambition is admirable inasmuch as it 
/assists in the continued maintenance of social cohesion and order in a dignified context. 
However, the problem arises when 'law' is equated with 'justice' and legal contemplation is 
elevated to the status of the supreme medium of enlightenment, while the identity of justice, in 
its entirety, is reduced to a number of basic legal tenets.68 Such incongruous correlations are 
indicative of a profound misunderstanding of the role of law and a misinterpretation of the 
identity and content of justice. In order to rectify these erroneous presumptions, however, a 
relatively straightforward procedure is required whereby one comes to recognise the failings and 
inconsistencies present in certain legal justifications and in so doing one facilitates a 
paradigmatic shift in emphasis and understanding. First, the claim to objectivity by the law 
ought to be viewed in a decidedly circumspect light. Not only is the law a socio-political 
institution but its implementation relies upon the motivations of human actors. Consequently, it 
should not be presumed that legal discourse can somehow detach itself from the foundations of 
its own subjectivity in order to render dispassionate outcomes for all occasions. Secondly, the 
law should be seen not so much as a forum centred around the notion of justice, but rather as a 
medium for the monopolisation of violence. While it has already been stated that implicit within 
an understanding of the just ideal there resides an appreciation of the role of violence one should 
not confuse the justifications of the law with its ambitions. In other words, while the law 
appears to be concerned with just accomplishments its authority is gleaned from its ability to 
harness and monopolise the violence in humanity which surrounds all channels of social 
67 
68 
The actions of justice can only be perceived with hindsight or hoped for in the future, but 
they can never be fully apprehended in the present. 
In many respects general legal scholarship may be seen to espouse such frivolous 
assumptions. 
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interaction.69 Thirdly, as with all human institutions, legal discourse is constructed around the 
certainty of the unknown, and its function is to placate the uncertainty which society feels in the 
wake of such an inevitable state of affairs. However, as with any interpretative discourse the 
law's vantage point remains clouded by human ignorance. Any legal justifications must 
consequently be seen merely as attempts to infuse social functioning with foundational 
constraints so as to prevent society from disintegrating altogether. In this regard, therefore, the 
realisation emerges that legal justifications do not necessarily meet the ambitions inherent in the 
notion of justice. This having been said, however, one should not presume that all is lost and 
that humanity is destined to a pedestrian existence in which any sense of justice is deemed to be 
~1 illusory. For while a state of justice may be denied to us the search for it remains very real and i \, the potential for better comprehending it becomes all the more possible with the assistance of a 1 literary perspective. 
The law necessarily creates expectations which regulate the practices of individuals and provides 
a broad regulatory framework in which they can, within reason, pursue their own conceptions of 
well-being. However, as has been shown, the legal process occupies a chamber of conflicting 
potentialities inasmuch as the law characterises actions in terms of their social value by means of · 
entitlements, while simultaneously creating the conditions in which confrontations over titles 
take place. Ironically, moreover, the law maintains a stubborn allegiance to the notion that the 
appearance of certainty is a necessary precondition for the exercise of effective authority. As a 
consequence thereof any affirmations regarding the existence of doubt are marginalised in legal ... 
settings, and where they are entertained they are seen to debase the ambitions of the law. In 
addition to representing an incomplete image of the tensions present within the legal process 
such legal reasoning lies in stark contrast to the legal visions of human disquiet presented and 
questioned in literature. Furthermore, while it might be argued that the legal system is obliged 
to sacrifice a measure of its own complexity in order to arrive at conclusive results in an 
expeditious manner this still begs the very issue whether results so obtained can, in fact, be said 
to be 'conclusive'? In relation to the factual matrix before the court they may well be, but in the 
69 In this sense, the only forms of violence which pose a threat to the authority of legal 
institutions are those which can formulate their justifications from beyond the bounds of 
contemporary legal orthodoxy. In other words, any action or event whose justification 
for the use of violence does not rely on purely legal authority constitutes an unwelcome 
challenge to legal supremacy. It is for this reason that the law seeks to regulate as much 
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larger and more salient context of the desire for human truths which facilitate the search for 
justice I would maintain that legal reasoning so devised only serves to entrench the authority of 
the law and to perpetuate the misguided illusions surrounding it. There would, of course, be no 
dilemma were legal discourse not to claim a mark of credibility by aligning itself with the notion 
of justice. However, such a connection lies at the heart of the law's legitimacy while its 
justifications provide the basis for its continued manipulation of human interaction. While there 
may be little hope of extricating legal expectations from this quandary there remains the distinct 
possibility of reformulating the situation with the aid of external stimuli so as to better 
understand the notion of justice, the bases of justifications and the levels of interaction between 
the two. This is what I have been attempting to achieve thus far with the aid of literary devices. 
Where I have deconstructed legal pretensions or injected an element of doubt into legal 
rationality I have done so in the belief that it is more important to openly acknowledge human 
frailties in our search for justice than it is to assert comfortable misconceptions in the light of our 
own ignorance. Bearing this in mind, my standpoint is at once nihilistic inasmuch as it is 
grounded in the eternal indeterminacy and unattainability of a state of justice while 
simultaneously conveying the markings of hope through the greater awareness of the human 
conditions which literary perceptions are able to reveal in legal contexts. It is this acute and 
perpetual contradiction which constitutes the basis for my theoretical journey. 
The lack of any ultimate frame of reference, or rather the inability on the part of human beings to 
arrive at such an infinite understanding does not necessarily represent a discouraging state of 
affairs however. The reason for this is that if one applies an active nihilism (as opposed to a 
negative or regressive nihilism)70 one still affirms the potential for a greater knowledge and 
reality beyond the context of present perceptions. The fact that our finite capacity impedes the 
attainment of such event is consequently irrelevant inasmuch as it is the act of visualization 
rather than the process of its fulfilment which is of consequence. In this regard, moreover, the 
70 
societal activity as possible so as to entrench its prerogative and to stave off vying 
centres of authority. 
An interpretation of the critical distinction between active - and negative nihilism is 
provided by CI Glicksberg: See CI Glicksberg The Ironic Vision in Modem Literature 
(1969) at 60. In essence, Glicksberg maintains that the latter notion denotes an air of 
resignation regarding the fruitlessness of existence, while the former concept goes 
beyond this initial sense of sufference to actively promote the destruction of human 
meaning in an effort ·to expedite 'the coming of the Lord'. While I agree with 
Glicksberg's general observations regarding active nihilism, I seek to show that negative 
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application of regressive nihilism to the process of justice-creation does not per se constitute the 
establishment of an impractical scenario. On the contrary, what such a perspective achieves is to 
unleash human potential from the chains of human finitude. In other words, the belief that no 
meta-narrative exists is indicative of the boundlessness in which human intellect reigns. While 
truth may be illusory and in this sense seen to be a mercurial construction of the individual mind, 
its protean nature is symptomatic of the fact that reality (of which truth and justice are two of the 
clearest manifestations) is itself an entity which requires the presence of a creative forethought 
for its existence. As a consequence, there is nothing which precedes the being of the mind; all 
things are tied into a process of perpetual becoming and eternal development with the mind as 
their only foundation. Far from plunging existence into a morose decline such an interpretation 
can be seen as a liberating influence in the midst of a life of uncertainty, for when human 
thought prevails a multitude of discourses abound each of which carries the seeds of greater 
understanding within itself. What such paradoxical flirtations within the boundlessness of 
nihilism. ultimately indicate is not that one should denounce legal justifications as hypocritical 
mutterings devoid of justice, but rather than one ought to re-evaluate their function in the light of 
a different perspective. This, in tum, requires a return to 'The Land of And' 71 where inflexible 
dichotomies can be abandoned and greater understanding achieved. 
Within this context, the infusion of Nietzschean ideology also has an important role to play in 
that it encourages one to focus 'beyond good and evil' .72 In this sense, even morality is seen as 
merely another manifestation of the 'will to power' and presents an interpretation of events 
which remains open to question.73 This is not to say that all motivations are indefinable, but 
rather that we should not seek to define them in terms of resolute and alienable identities. In 
other words, it is not sufficient simply to regard the framework of legal justifications as 
71 
72 
73 
nihilism need not culminate in mere frustration and that it, too, may harbour an element 
of possibility and hope. 
JO Cole 'Thought from the Land of And' (19.88) 39 Mercer Law Review 907. 
A Nehamas Nietzsche-Life as literature (1985) at 200-234. 
Orthodox ideologies, in contrast, assume that the spectre of morality always precedes the 
implementation of actions which may then be judged in either a 'moral' or an 'immoral' 
light. Consequently, all actions stem from and refer back to th~ definable foundation. 
Nietzsche, however, maintained that even this apparently constant and incontestable core 
bore flaws inasmuch as it sought to classify events along problematic lines which failed 
to take account of the fluidity of motivations. Of paramount concern for Nietzsche was 
the fact that he regarded morality as nothing more than the crystalization of majority 
will. In such a context, therefore, morality bore the markings of a sullied and irrational 
system of belief. 
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formalistic utterances. We must try to reinterpret their motivations in the context of the search 
for justice and in the light of the complex inter-relationship between the desire for justice and the 
necessity for justification. Moreover, because of the difficulty in assessing such interaction with 
a measure of sensitive detachment from within the realm of the law itself, I maintain that it is 
prudent to utilise the channels of literary discourse as a means for their better comprehension. 
Apart from being an important socio-political interpretative source beyond the confines of the 
law, literature also bears the distinction of having set a salient precedent with regard to the 
manner in which we comprehend ourselves and the 'realities' surrounding us. I am, of course, 
referring to the critical effect which the post-modem tool of 'deconstruction' has had on our 
perceptions. By imposing new demands on the human psyche, post-modernism has obliged us 
to re-evaluate accepted notions and to dispute previously affirmed beliefs. In the context of the 
law this is not, however, to imply that an allegiance to deconstruction requires one to refute the 
validity of legal discourse per se. In itself such an assumption is naive and ·antithetical inasmuch 
as it seeks bombastically to denounce the cogency of one discourse in favour of another and in 
so doing to propogate the belief in the primacy of a universal system based on easily 
distinguishable dichotomies. The application of a deconstructivist paradigm to legal discourse, 
therefore, should merely be viewed as a means for enriching our understanding of it, and not as 
an opportunity for denouncing its legitimacy. In this sense, the 'fusion of justifications' 
embodies a creative process grounded in reciprocity rather than the supremacy of an individual 
discourse. This brings about an important realization, moreover, in that it also alludes to the fact 
that legal-literacy interaction within a postmodern context should not be seen as a means for 
resolving the disparate motivations underlying human discourses on the one hand, and the desire 
for justice on the other. This is, after all, not the objective of postmodernism whose purpose 
remains simply to alter perceptions and to encourage questioning of accepted norms. 
Consequently, what we should aim to achieve through such channels is improved 
comprehension rather than comprehensive finality. 
Whereas traditional legal scholarship seeks to define justice in terms of attainable ambitions 
which are rationalised and executed through the medium of legal justifications, postmodernism 
regards such justifications as merely hollow legitimations for the imposition of constraints and 
the maintenance of violence. The same applies, to a certain extent, to the relationship between 
the justifications of the orthodox literary canon and its quest for justice, except that in this 
\ 
context the postmodern concern has more to do with the presence of self-deception than of 
violence. As a whole, however, the literary enterprise is far more capable of questioning its own 
\ 
j 
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)retensions than is legal discourse by virtue of the latter's insistence on its own indisputable ( 
authority. It is my belief that it is for this reason that postmodern thought has been able to "/ 
flourish in the environment provided by literary discourse. It is important, however, that it I 
\\ __ should now be applied to the mechanisms and stated intentions of the law in an attempt to re-
assess legal justifications in the light of their own alleged motivations. In so doing, the notion of 
justice is not per se denounced but merely reinterpreted in the light of its complex association 
with the justifications of literary and legal discourses. The complexity of the situation has to do 
with the fact that humans only exists in the present, while the past is steeped in a fictional 
identity and the future remains an uncertain potentiality. This is because the act of reflecting 
upon what has gone before constitutes a 'fictionalisation' (however extreme or minute) which 
subsumes the present reality of the circumstances beneath a cloak of imaginative re-creation, 
while the future, in tum, remains a sphere of doubt in relation to which only assumptions can be 
proffered. Viewed in terms of such a chronological continuum, justifications represent the 
present embodiment of past fictions designed to regulate future eventualities. In contrast, justice 
demands that this continuum be turned on itself so as to formulate a hermeneutic circle of 
understanding in which past, present and future meet in a moment of extreme comprehension. 
The fact that such imaginings will never materialise in our present state of awareness does not 
detract from their essential validity, but merely goes to indicate another unavoidable irony of 
human existence, namely, that we can conceive of and conceptualise realities beyond the present 
and yet we ourselves only exist to the extent to which we can be defined in the present. 
The chronology in terms of which man defines himself also takes an interesting tum when 
viewed from a different context. It is intriguing to note that from a cosmological point of view 
human perspective (i.e. the means by which we define ourselves) in all likelihood is rooted in 
the past but exists in the future. By this seemingly paradoxical statement, I mean that the only 
point of reference we have within our cosmic framework is a matrix consisting of planets, stars 
and galaxies which have been visually filtered to us over time and through space at the speed of 
light. Given the constraining features of such distance and speed (i.e. they are not instantaneous 
reactions because they are linked to the notion of time) the vision which reaches us in the present 
i~ilothing more than an illusion inasmuch as it is simply the representatiQp of activity within the 
" 
cosmos as it appeared millions, if not billions, of light years ago.74 Consequently, our only 
74 Although the time-frame may vary in extremity (e.g. the sun's rays are estimated to reach 
the earth's surface in only a matter of minutes) the principle remains the same. 
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present point of reference in astronomical terms is based upon past events. However, by 
implication, if what we are experiencing is a historical event then in practical terms at the very 
point at which we are subject to such stimuli a future event (millions of light years into the 
future) is actually occurring to those very same elements of matter which we are, at present, 
viewing. In effect, we are actually living in the future without the knowledge or ability to 
experience it.75 When viewed in such a universal dimension justice, yet again, resides at a point 
in space and time at which the past, present and future coincide in a single moment of primary 
shared experience which can be assimilated and enjoyed by human beings. Nonetheless, given 
what has already been said, it would appear that the attainment of such a moment (in present 
circumstances) will remain an unfulfilled desire and that the potential for justice will persist 
while never prevailing. However, in itself, such a state of affairs need not by any means 
represent an undesirable situation. The reason for this is that continued uncertainty regarding the 
future may be seen to encourage man to ceaselessly strive for such a time which may already 
have been determined, but of which he (as yet) remains unaware. The implication of such a 
postmodern argument is that in the event that the future was known by man he would either lose 
the desire to project himself towards it (the reason being that he already possesses the 
knowledge which the future contains and, therefore, he can simply content himself in the 
present) or the knowledge thereof would undermine the very essence of his humanity, in the first 
place, and destroy him. By following this dimension of time it becomes apparent that not even 
deconstructionism can hope to eclipse the schisms wrought among the three tenses of existence. 
Then again, from what has been said above it should not be presumed that it would wish to do 
so, anyway. Two of the primary impulses of postmodernism remain its continual struggle to try 
and redeem man's misapprehensions regarding the notion of justice, and to reformulate history 
as a human construct which is accessible only through the medium of the text rather than 
embodying a free-standing entity comprehensible in its own terms.76 As a result, it is to be 
inferred that postmodern ideology is all too aware of the implicit nihilistic dangers it faces by 
75 
76 
One must, of course, not allow oneself to be sucked into the bizarre void which is created 
by taking such a perspective to its extreme conclusion - i.e. the universe may already be 
dead and we might simply be surviving based upon past recollections. Moreover, if such 
finality has been attained prior to our existence, we have, in effect, died before we were 
born and subsequently have never existed! 
As Linda Hutcheon notes "In the past, history has often been used in criticism of the 
novel as a kind of model of the realistic pole of representation. Postmodern fiction 
problematizes this model to query the relation of both history to reality and reality to 
language": See J Natoli, L Hutcheon (eds) A Postmodern Reader (1993) at 256. 
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completely deconstructing the notion of justice while destroying all connections between the 
past and the present. And it is because of this realisation that it deepens our awareness of the 
relationship between justice and justification without attempting to extricate itself entirely from 
human constraints.77 
Consequently, it should not be supposed that any instances whatsoever of justice cannot be 
entertained in human society. On the contrary, individuals regularly deliberate the merits of 
actions and events in view of their conceptions of justice. There is, however, a distinction 
between the ability to conceptualise and the power to institute. The former represents an 
inherent trait of the human condition while the latter is an action that is primarily left to the 
discretion of the judicial structures of society. Yet at both levels (i.e. conceptualisation and 
institution) there remains an unbridgeable interstice of interpretation. Regarding the process of 
conceptualising, man's efforts remain frustrated by the fact that he is required to project the past, 
present and future into one moment of understanding in order to achieve the fundamentals of 
justice, yet he is required to go about all of this with a limited vision of existence beyond the 
present. The subsequent limitation in his knowledge then impairs the implementation of a 
structure which can candidly reflect the essences of justice to their original extent. As a result, 
all justifications relating to human discourses possess a cardinal flaw which distinguishes and 
severs them from the ultimate object of discoursive enquiry, namely, the search for justice. 
Admittedly, in this regard, different discourses are bolstered by disparate justifications some of 
I 
hich are not as ill-conceived as others. For this reason the value of embarking upon studies of 
inter-disciplinary nature should not be underestimated or regarded as a futile academic 
dulgence. It is from the pronouncements of such inquiries that greater human comprehension 
· ses whether it be with regard to our own potential or the impediments which hinder our 
77 In this sense, the postmodern condition is all the more painful to bear in that it must 
continually restrain its potential so as to avoid destroying the defining features of 
humanity from whence it stems. Moreover, given what has been said, it is interesting to 
note the close parallels between postmodernism and Christttrnity as to the tension 
between justice and justification. In the Christian context the notion of the fall destroys 
all possibility for the attainment of an inviolate world vision since the cardinal 
prelapsarian notion of justice has been disobeyed. Hence (as with postmodern theory), 
Christian ideology relates to the justice-justification connection as a relationship 
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(1 /1 \lbert Camus incisively depicted the human dilemma in the following words - ''The world is ~ ~.i~ ot reasonable, that is all that can be said. But what is absurd is the confrontation of the 
\ \ irrational and the wild longing for clarity whose call echoes in the human heart" .78 This 
\ ·irresoluable contradiction provides the indelible thread which has spurred man into a perpetual 
search for the signifying features of justice while ensuring that he will always fall short of 
perfection in his attempts to terminate his predicament. However, human actions are rooted in a 
morality of faith. Not necessarily a religious faith, but a faith which provides our actions with 
meaning and creates an incentive for our continued progression forwards into the realm of the 
unknown. The framework against which such actions are judged is the notion of justice, and the 
medium through which this concept is interpreted is the various discourses of human 
understanding (of which, law and literature are but two examples). When modernism and 
postmodernism centre justice within the vagaries of existence rather than positioning it beyond 
this uncertainty in an objective realm, the purpose is not to indicate the attainability of justice, 
but rather to point to its very ambiguity and inaccessibility from within such a human 
perspective. Postmodernism, in particular, seeks to undermine formalistic pretensions while 
tacitly counselling empathic reasoning in the interests of human integrity, yet it readily concedes 
that the ambitions of justice cannot be met given our present factual matrix. While the 
justifications for justice naturally abound in view of the fact that it remains the essential human 
ambition, it should also be remembered that it has captured our imagination due to the fact that it 
is not (or at least that it is no longer) a natural state of affairs. In other words, an understanding 
of justice requires one to embark on a conceptual progression out of comfortable surroundings 
and into challenging frontiers. This is what we strive for and yet if we are to retain our 
allegiance to the foundations of our humanity we must be prepared to acknowledge that all 
justifications are, by virtue of their very nature, tied in with our own imperfections. 
Consequently, the act of justifying marks the beginning of a journey whose horizon (i.e. the 
attainment of a state of justice) is visible but forever beyond the reach of those travelling along 
its path. In this regard, therefore, the focus lies not in quixotic attempts at verifying the 
permanence of justice in the here and now or in claims of its finite identity. Rather, the measure 
of one's actions is taken to be the manner in which one chooses to journey towards a greater 
comprehension of justice. In essence, therefore, the fusion of justifications represents the 
78 
perpetually grounded in tension, and it deems this to have existed from the time when the 
original vision for humanity was shattered in the Garden of Eden. 
A Camus The Myth of Sisyphus trans J O'Brien (1955) at 16, and as reproduced by D 
Granfield The Inner Experience of Law (1988) at 9. 
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foundation of my journey and the conclusions which can be drawn from it constitute my 
contribution. 
Conclusion 
In examining the concepts of legal and literary justifications, I have been at pains to avoid any 
suggestion that their individual identities should be dispensed with in the interests of creating 
some monolithic amalgam of interpretation. The reason for this, quite simply, is that law and 
literature satisfy different human requirements while serving a primary human desire. This 
alludes to the fact that while they are both immersed in the perennial search for justice, they do 
not undertake similar obligations as to either its composition or its attainability. In essence, their 
justifications are different. Given this situation, it appears prudent, therefore, to retain their 
individual integrity while seeking to establish their common fundamentals. Consequently, such 
an interdisciplinary and inter-contextual account i.s designed to intimate that legal justifications 
on their own are inadequate tools with which to structure a comprehensive vision of human 
aspirations. Literary discourse helps to frame legal interpretation in terms of both its socio-
political and economic motivations as well as releasing some of its dormant capacities through 
the disclosure of the law's mythical potential. Moreover, where legal discourse endeavours to 
impose certainty and finality on issues within its realm, literature emphasises the importance of 
acknowledging the existence of doubt and impulsive tensions within legal philosophy. In this 
regard, perhaps the ultimate insight which can be gleaned from literature is to be found in the 
fact that while human discourses seek to redeem our understanding of the world and of ourselves 
we must acknowledge the actuality that no such discourse can claim to embody the notion of 
justice in its totality by virtue of the fact that their own justifications are steeped in the 
imperfections of the world. As a result, at the very moment when literature elaborates on its 
interpretation of justice it tacitly concedes that it does so while dragging the fallibilities of the 
world along with it. It is this realisation which all discourses - particularly legal discourse - need 
to develop. 
One's appreciation of the unattainability of justice would appear to be proportional to one's 
comprehension of the magnitude of the notion itself as well as the manner in which justice and 
j~;tification counterpoise each other on the scales of human interpr~tion. However, this 
situation need not be regarded as utterly intolerable for as Thom Gunn79 states -
79 T Gunn The Cost of Consciousness B Taylor, R Bain (eds) at 14. 
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"At most, one is in motion; and at best, 
Reaching no absolute, in which to rest, 
One is always nearer by not keeping still" 
A great deal of wisdom is, therefore, to be gained in acknowledging that our ignorance grows 
exponentially in relation to each insight into justice which we are granted. Such an 
acknowledgement serves to emphasise that while we are constrained by basic human 
limitations, the defining characteristic of our humanity is the desire to project ourselves 
beyond the trivial and the mundane and into an arena in which we can glimpse our true 
potential, even though we may not currently be in a position to sustain it. The mere fact that 
the justifications underpinning certain discourses appear to misdirect or frustrate us in our 
ambitions should not be seen as cause enough to abandon our journey altogether. It is up to 
us to continue the search, to accept the frustrations and to attempt to facilitate the process 
through new modes of understanding and interpretation. 
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CHAPTER4 
A FLY'S PASSAGE INTO THE HEART OF DARKNESS 
Introduction 
Now that the mechanics of my argument have been analysed and my frame of reference 
explained, I propose to elaborate on what has already been said by discussing my views in the 
context of three literary texts, namely EM Foster's A Passage to India (1989), 
William Golding's Lord of the Flies (1996) and Joseph Conrad's Heart of Darkness (1989). It 
is my belief that all three works contain interesting and challenging views regarding the 
notion of justice as well as providing a range of settings in which to situate the tensions 
between justice and justification. Consequently, not only does this chapter constitute the 
continuation of the journey begun in earlier chapters, but it also represents a new turning in as 
much as we are now engaged in an area in which legal discourse finds expression through a 
literary format. In one sense we have, therefore, arrived at the best resolution possible, but in 
another sense the journey has just begun. 
It is plain that all three texts to which I refer constitute a vast body of material providing 
insights into a host of matters of human concern. However, by virtue of my present focus, 
I am obliged to exclude many elements from my discussion of these texts. While this 
narrows down my analytical ambit it should not, however, be seen as indicative of an 
erroneous interpretation of the texts. For while such analysis is undeniably incomplete it is 
not necessarily likewise inaccurate. 
When viewed as a socio-political chronicle, A Passage to India represents an interpretation of 
the effect which British rule had in India. In itself this is a perfectly sound frame of 
reference, however, its shortcoming is that it does not necessarily question the legitimacy of 
the vision which it embodies. To achieve this it is necessary to venture beyond the veil of the 
text and acquire a feel for the novel as an emblem of meanings rather than simply as an 
historical observation. In so doing, the reader's principal objective moves away from the 
passive enjoyment of the story and encompasses a critical interpra.tation of the values 
presented in the text. In essence, to understand the text, the reader must maximise his unique 
position both within and beyond the textual framework. Taking this as a starting point, 
therefore, when examining the issue of power (for example) in the novel one must do so at a 
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number of levels. The most obvious point at which to begin is by examining the political 
tensions presented in the relationship and interaction between English 'rulers' and their 
Indian 'subjects'. This is evidenced most notably at the trial of Dr. Aziz in which an Indian 
court based upon English legal principles has to determine whether he is guilty of having 
attempted to rape Ms. Adela Quested or not. Having structured the question in this light, 
moreover, it is important to note that I have sought to indicate a close association between the 
concept of socio-political power and the mechanics of the legal system. To a very large 
extent, the law seeks to regulate vying political and social identities (legal justification) under 
the banner. of justice-creation. However, as has previously been noted, the ability of the law 
to retain its impartiality in the light of such partisan notions as political judgement and social 
opinion is open to question. Moreover, the enquiry should not stop here. In one sense the 
court case presents a resolution of sorts to the tensions which have flowed through the text, 
yet in another more fundamental way the court case is merely an explicit 'marker' which 
hints at (but never explains) the deeper layers of distrust and misunderstanding which 
pervade the text. Consequently, it is insufficient simply to rely on the legal discourse as 
embodied in the context of the trial as presenting some tangible resolution to the fragile 
understanding between the characters. One needs to appreciate that the trial simply 
highlights the difficulties which the characters have in connecting with one another in the 
first place. While Adela's statements at the trial result in Aziz's acquittal, they in no way 
serve to forge a greater understanding across an ever increasing cultural and socio-political 
divide. 
By appreciating the failings of legal discourse to account for or resolve human injustice one 
comes to realise that underpinning the perceived unity of human understanding lies the 
ultimate failure of connection - the failure, at times, of the individual to connect with his own 
sense of Self. For not only is Adela distanced from Aziz after the trial but she is also 
alienated from herself since she has betrayed her integrity through her own actions. In this 
way the identities of the characters are inextricably intertwined With one another both through 
a linear progression over time, but more importantly, through a sense of shared experience 
beyond time. It is this innate sense of remembering beyond the past and projecting across the 
future that characterises human consciousness. But for this fact, Adela, Mrs. Moore and 
Fielding would not have realised the potential for connection and in so doing come to 
appreciate a sense of loss born of their inability to obtain it. Against such a backdrop the 
resolutions presented by the Trial are, in fact, affronts to human sensibilities in as much as 
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they marginalise the potential for any understanding to exist without temporal constraints. 
For legal discourse to obtain its ends (i.e. the attainment of justice through a process of 
justification) it must reduce a complex web of contemporaneous stimuli to an artificial and 
less complex casual sequence. There is no room for sensing a complex and combined mood 
of shared moments of experience. What the law demands is a clinical assessment of the 
impact of particular actions on one another at specific moments in time. Moreover, in its 
analysis of such temporal causality, the legal process also seeks to utilise the mechanism of 
time to distance itself from the brutal immediacy of the vision before it. Consequently, the 
law enters into a discourse of disassociation whereby it seeks to bolster its own legitimacy by 
emphasising its concern with justice while choosing to ignore the tensions inherent in the 
justice-justification paradigm off which it feeds. This is the mark of legal discourse - at once 
idealistic in its vision, yet pragmatic in its application. 
At a different level, and in subtle ways, A Passage to India seeks to question accepted 
Western social preconceptions relating to politics, cultural heritage, social identity and 
philosophical beliefs. By hinting at the existence of gaps in Western understanding, 
EM Foster draws our attention to the negative spaces which constitute an integral component 
of our identity and in so doing seeks not so much to destroy completely our understanding of 
concepts such as value, justice and self, but rather, to reformulate them in terms of an identity 
which is not unquestioningly subjugated to the will of a single authority such as the law. The 
inevitable consequence of this process is to problematise accepted norms and highlight the 
indeterminancy of social constructs. 
In all situations, language is based within a cultural and political framework which provides it 
with a template for interpretation. An environment of understanding is constructed by virtue 
of this socio-political heritage and a sense of 'the norm' gradually evolves and entrenches 
itself in people's reasoning. The integrity of literature is that, unlike legal discourse, it owes 
no fidelity to the dominant norms governing a society. Literature is at liberty to question and 
criticise inherited social values and encourage the evolution of new thought patterns within a 
,society. Clearly, not all literary works share the same success (or even the same level of 
~Qmmitment) in the task of expanding cultural and individual horizons. Some are designed to 
- ~ 
propagate the orthodox viewpoints of a governing class while others are content to avoid any 
suggestion of socio-political commentary whatsoever. Such literature, however, chooses to 
frustrate its own potential by denying its instinct for critical analysis. 
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the story are of relevance to the plot only insofar as they provide a familiar setting from 
within which to develop an intellectual arena in which meaning is both constructed and 
questioned.1 Ironically, however, at the heart of this analysis into meaning lay Foster's 
fundamental presumption that a great deal of human experience remains intrinsically 
non-verbal. Consequently, Foster's dilemma as a novelist was born of the fact that the 
non-verbal essence of meaning lost its potency to the extent that persuasive language could 
be employed to validate its existence. It is this paradox between what might be termed 'the 
expression of meaning' on the one hand and 'the experience of meaning' on the other which 
constitutes one of the fundamental tensions running throughout the body of the text. 
Moreover, it is a sign of Foster's literary astuteness that he does not make the fatal flaw of 
seeking to reconcile these two elements of meaning in an attempt to negate their differences. 
Rather, he acknowledges the limitations of language as a mechanism for the translation of 
meaning by virtue of the fact that we all seek to communicate and connect with others from 
within the unyielding shackles of 'the Self'. Yet, in spite of such inhibiting characteristics, 
Foster manages to utilise the medium of language (with all its intellectual constraints and 
entrenched hierarchies of value) to allow the reader to glimpse the inherent meaning of 
human existence which transcends hierarchical constraints and which is rooted in the 
unidentifiable and whose realm is silence. 
Consequently, it is important to note that any linguistic expression of a concept rooted in 
non-verbal origins represents an incomplete reflection of that original experience. The fact 
that we continue to utilise the avenue of language as an expression of understanding should 
not, therefore, be based on a perception of its inherent validity rather than the realisation that 
language serves to provide us with an 'echo' into a truth behind words which, in turn, reflects 
upon a universal silence beyond individual meaning. Seen in this light, Foster's characters 
undertake individual journeys of self-expression which call upon them to query the meaning 
which language attributes to essential features of human interaction such as, loyalty, honour, 
dignity and justice. Interestingly, the answers to these questions are not to be found in the 
words or tricks of verbal expression used by the characters but in their ability to assimilate 
In this context, I use the term 'familiar setting' to denote a set of circumstances with 
which the reader can identify. Clearly, such circumstances would be more immediate 
and meaningful to a readership constituted of people from Foster's generation who 
had experienced the impact of the Raj. Nevertheless, because the story merely 
constitutes an entrance into the body of the text and the plot, the socio-political 
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and come to terms with the present silence underlying this framework. K. Natwar-Singh2 
effectively expresses this important insight by stating "Expectancy has been celebrated. This 
heralds the crucial understanding that the moment itself (rather than the structures of potential 
realisation and futurity built upon it), when prolonged, absorbs eternity. Significance resides 
in waiting. That is the condition on which insight and understanding become available".3 
Of all the characters, Professor Godbole is most able to assimilate both the eternity of the 
moment and the silence beyond expression which eludes the other characters. However, the 
attainment of Godbole's vision rests on the detachment of the individual from his 
surroundings, from his fellow men and, most significantly, from his personal aspirations. 
Clearly, these are criteria which cannot be attained (not to mention, consistently sustained) in 
reality by an individual without sacrificing his identity. Godbole manages to maintain his 
persona-only because he is ultimately the creation of another's imagination and to that extent 
remains bound by the human characteristics in terms of which the author chooses to define 
him. In relation to his motives, however, "no eye could see what lay at the bottom of the 
Brahman's mind, and yet he had a mind and heart too, and all his friends trusted him without 
knowing why".4 It is this latter observation which is important as it indicates the great extent 
to which Godbole cannot be defined or understood in human terms. His presence is merely 
to be accepted while it is his ideas and philosophy which are to be analysed. In this regard, 
while Godbole presents a momentary vision of reconciliation he does so not on human terms, 
but merely within the ambit of human understanding. His vision can be comprehended but it 
cannot be implemented since it is based on the need to denounce the essential characteristics 
which constitute human personality (and which are bound by temporal constraints) namely, 
the ego, motive and desire. Consequently the supreme act of connecting with an infinite 
universe is played out in the actions of Godbole and the paradoxical cost of such connection 
is the alienation of Godbole the man from the ideas which he propounds as well as the other 
individuals whom he attempts to enlighten. The reason for this rests on the fact that the 
philosophy which Godbole expounds aims to facilitate the connection of different centres of 
consciousness at a level beyond the individual and the particular. Thus, at the very point at 
2 
3 
4 
climate in which the novel is set is not as important as the philosophical issues and 
dilemmas which are confronted in the plot and which are universal in character. 
K Natwar-Singh Modem Critical Interpretation: A Passage to India (1987). 
Idem at 70. 
EM Forster A Passage to India (1989) 0. Stallybrass (ed) at 184 
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which the effects of such connection are witnessed, the primacy and vitality of the individual 
are subsumed beneath a haze of interconnectedness. The character of the individual is 
replaced by a sense of unpartisan virtue, and a cautionary note is sounded, namely, that the 
process of connection entails an element of disassociation from the constituent parts of one's 
own Self. 
Few are able to attain such detachment, and the irony remains that those who do are 
invariably regarded by others as indifferent and ineffectual when judged against the standards 
of rationality imposed by social institutions such as the legal process. Yet, as has been noted, 
the legal process (as depicted by Foster) lacks the ability to confront, let alone account for, 
the dilemmas which beset the minds of the characters. The law is centred on apportioning 
blame in the light of physical 'markers' (e.g. Question: Was Aziz in fact with Adela in the 
caves? Answer: No) backed up with rational explanations (e.g. Reason: Adela was flustered 
by the heat outside the caves and the silence within them, causing her to imagine things), 
rather than looking beyond both these variables and deducing the poignancy of the situation 
in terms of an ingrained desire on the part of 'the Self' for a connection beyond itself. In 
essence, Adela's breakdown in the Marabar Caves was the culmination of the vain attempts of 
her Self to come to terms with the need for its connection at the cost of its identity. In a 
sense, Adela emerges from this trauma a wiser but defeated person. Wiser because she dared 
to look into the silence, but defeated because she was overcome by the enormity of it. 
While Adela has failed in her attempt to relate to this greater dimension in which a different 
understanding of justice reigns, her efforts have at least helped in creating a context in which 
Godbole's thoughts can be better appreciated. For while Adela's reaction centres on the 
'nothingness' of the caves, Godbole's wisdom perceives their infinite significance. There is 
little more that can be said so as to define Godbole's perceptions and insights. To specify and 
particularise his vision too much would be to undermine the powerful mysticism upon which 
it is based and reduce it to a rationally answerable assertion, which it is not. All that should 
be noted is that Godbole makes no assertions as to the attainability of his vision; all he does is 
to present his philosophy as an alternative medium through which a particular construction of 
justice may be glimpsed. This would suggest, moreover, that the significance of such a 
vision lies in its very existence rather than its actual attainment. 
It is important to note that the novel at no point discounts off-hand the possibility of some 
future reconciliation between 'the Self' and 'the other', nor does it deny the ability of 'the 
Self to reformulate itself in this greater image. The potential for such a metamorphosis 
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remains a real possibility beyond the novel since it does not conclude its vision with a 
'Never' but with a 'not yet'. 
Lord of the Flies presents interesting insights into the nature of justice by means of 
contextualising it within what JS Whitley refers to as a 'fable' .5 There are essentially two 
inter-related reasons for referring to the novel as a fable. First, the island setting in which the 
story unfolds constitutes a pristine sphere free from external distraction or influence. 
Consequently, the reader's attention becomes acutely focused on not merely the characters' 
interaction but also (and more importantly) on the moral implications of their decisions. 
Secondly, the story is able to present a powerful pattern of didactic symbols to the reader 
because the author's t~sk isgoverned by a particular premise and the rhythm of what is 
written always refers back to this initial presumption. In Lord of the Flies, Golding's premise 
is that man inhabits a post-lapsarian world in which he must come to terms with his fallen 
state and develop an awareness of the fact that the potential for both justice and evil reside 
within him. The task of making this discovery ironically falls on the relatively inexperienced 
shoulders of a group of pre-pubescent schoolboys. However, this seemingly incongruous 
combination of youthful naivety and philosophical sophistication on one level serves to 
parody the presumptions of staid rationality and refinement upon which the adult world is 
based while also drawing attention to the fact that the secrets of such wisdom are open to 
anyone (no matter how young) who is either willing or forced through various circumstances 
to view the truth residing within himself. In the context of the novel, the very fact that the 
boys are stranded on the island away from the secure environment of the 'grown up' world 
requires them involuntarily to initiate the process of reflecting upon their motivations, their 
aspirations and their failings. Their initial reaction is to externalise this discomfort and 
anxiety brought on by their own insecurity and to objectify it in the form of a 'beast' which 
inhabits the island and which they must hunt down and kill. As the novel unfolds, however, 
certain of the characters gradually become aware of the fact that the existence of the 'beast' is 
merely a tangible construct in their own minds of their fears and of the awful potential of 
ttieir motivations and desires. It is important to note, however, that th.is realisation does not, 
in itself, verify the existence of an irredeemable situation since the process of 
acknowledgement serves as a liberating influence which, at least temporarily, allows us to 
s JS Whitley Golding: Lord of the Flies (1970) at 7. 
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view our own shortcomings and reassess our potential for overcoming them. Where the 
danger lies is in not effectively identifying where our motivations are open to such solipsistic 
abuse and self-delusion. 
Of all the boys, the four whose characters are most clearly defined are Piggy, Jack, Ralph and 
Simon. Piggy embodies the rational precision of the adult world as he vainly attempts to 
retain his distance from the chaos and irrationality which envelopes the other boys. Jack 
comes to represent a focused and corporeal outlet for the latent evil present among all the 
boys. Ralph counterbalances the malign nature of Jack by means of a steady and 
well-intentioned desire to impose a semblance of order and dignity on the community. And 
Simon does not adhere to any logical or systematic form of comprehension but rather 
apprehends his surrounding circumstances by means of intuitive perceptions and reacts in 
accordance with such perceptions. Each one of them is crucially flawed by their inability to 
understand one another and yet all of them are, ironically, merely trying to resolve a common 
predicament (namely, the desire for justice) by means of differing interpretation. Piggy 
believes that by seeking to rationalise the actions and fears of the boys and to reason with 
them, the extreme burden of their predicament might be lessened and their senses shaken 
back into an orderly perspective of right and wrong, good and bad, justice and injustice. 
However, what Piggy fails to appreciate is that his perception of these notions is guided by a 
sense of time and place far removed from the present circumstances of the boys. There is 
little to be gained in seeking to impose the norms, values and beliefs of a different society 
(the 'adult world') on the interaction taking place among the boys on the island. Not only 
does this rationality as expressed by Piggy fail to account for the general anxiety felt by all 
the boys, it also inevitably seeks to perpetuate an inadequate template of understanding 
because it unquestioningly relies on the inherent authority of the law without seeking to 
clarify or question the underlying justification of the legal system which it advocates. 
Jack takes the notion of justice to an extreme based upon crude power relationships meted out 
by means of violence. He employs a simple equation in his dealings with the other boys, 
namely, those with strength deserve respect and those who follow must submit to their 
authority. Anyone who seeks to undermine this crude equation is victimised since there is no 
flexibility for accommodating disparate views. Justice simply becomes the rationale for 
maintaining the status quo as defined by those in authority. Moreover, there is no underlying 
moral template or reasoning behind such a system since justice is always given effect to 
through violence and it is neither conciliatory nor is it necessarily morally justified. There is 
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also no objective formula for its implementation which results m its principles being 
somewhat random and altogether unsatisfactory. 
In turn, Ralph relies on the existence and effective implementation of a legal system to 
provide a tangible indication of the orderly progress being made by the boys in their search 
for what is fair, reasonable and just, and moreover to ensure that they do not loose sight of it. 
His faith in the integrity of the law is absolute and he fails to appreciate that any system of 
rules and laws is open to abuse through the act of interpretation. For this reason, Ralph 
remains naively unconscious of the fact that Jack is not seeking to undermine the legal 
process through his actions but that he is simply interpreting the law in a different light based 
upon different presumptions. Ralph's mistake is that he incorrectly assumes that the legal 
process naturally channels all actions in a direction leading towards just resolutions. He does 
not view the Jaw as a discourse open to interpretation, manipulation and abuse. 
Unlike Ralph who places such great store in the integrity of the legal process, Simon remains 
detached from any of the systems, structures and discourses with which the boys seek to 
surround themselves. He embodies the absolute outsider from within, someone who leads a 
peripheral existence and whose actions and ideas constitute a counter-current to the flow of 
societal norms and identity. To the extent to which his tangential status provides Simon with 
the means to view the search for justice in an unpartisan light free from social stigmas and 
misconceptions, the very fact of his alienation from the dynamics of power within the 
community renders his conscious impotent. It is Simon who first acknowledges that the beast 
may in fact be nothing more than an expression of the psychological malaise besetting the 
boys in their misguided search for justice. Yet his inability to articulate these sentiments in 
such a manner so as to brand them with authenticity and conviction renders them impotent 
and exposes Simon to deepening prejudice from the other boys ultimately resulting in his 
own destruction. 
It would clearly be erroneous to presume from what has been said above that Golding is 
somehow distinguishing reason from passion in a crude dichotomy of good versus evil. What 
is occurring in the novel is something far more elaborately intertwined. It revolves around 
th~ inability of any of the boys to connect with one another across the divide of ideas and 
beliefs in a community of mutual respect. More poignantly, however, Golding weaves his 
story in such a manner as to indicate that the inability to connect stems from Piggy's, Jack's, 
Ralph's and Simon's fundamental failure to comprehend their own motions which would have 
186 
created a definable context of shared vulnerabilities and strengths. Instead they choose to 
remain isolated from one another through a barrier of misconstrued impressions and mistaken 
expectations which gradually destroys each one of them and permanently hinders any 
attempts at a later reconciliation which might facilitate some revelation as to the nature of 
justice. Each of the boys is implicated in his own downfall as well as that of the community 
as a whole thereby providing an echo to the philosophy of Professor Godbole in A Passage to 
India, namely, that when evil is committed all are implicated just as when good occurs all are 
responsible. It is unfortunate therefore that in view of this premiss which Golding espouses, 
the boys remain determined to distance themselves from the consequences of their own 
actions by conjuring up the image of a beast separate from themselves and onto which they 
can transpose their anger and sense of betrayal at being misunderstood. Moreover, it is even 
more misguided that in hunting for the beast they should choose to paint their faces so as to 
provide themselves with a disguise. All they are, in fact, doing is denouncing their 
accountability and deluding themselves in the belief that deeds can be committed without the 
burden of repercussions. The irony of this, of course, is that while it provides certain of the 
boys with the 'freedom' to commit acts which they might otherwise have felt restrained from 
performing this is not to say that they are any less accountable for the decisions which they 
take and the actions which occur as a result thereof. For this reason it is misleading to 
presume that the boys have retreated into a state of primal savagery since this suggests that 
their actions are now governed by a -different morality and must be adjudged in the light of 
different criteria. The truth is that the actions to which they have resorted always presented a 
natural undercurrent to their interaction but were simply kept in check by the constraints of 
the legal process as interpreted in the context of a 'civilised' social hierarchy. Consequently, 
while the element of morality has remained constant throughout the boys' transition from the 
adult world through to their experiences on the island and culminating in their rescue, the 
image of the legal process presented in the novel has developed from being viewed as a 
pre-ordained and static system of social and moral governance to a more fluid channel of 
interaction which is open to interpretation and which is not necessarily a tangible and 
unambiguous icon of justice. The very fact that the boys do not loose their morality is what 
makes their decisions and actions, at best, poignant and, at worst, tragic. The human 
conscience survives the individual decline and social degeneration which takes place in the 
novel and provides an indelible reminder to the reader of the magnitude of the boys' 
'discovery' namely that there is no mystique to the savagery and cruelty which they unleash 
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on one another, it is merely another facet of 'the Self' -same legal process which they initially 
considered to be above reproach. 6 
It should be remembered that the island environment did not change the boys or expose them 
to some extrinsic savagery, it only provided a setting in which the veneer of polite, civilised 
western society could be stripped away and its underlying core exposed. The powerful and 
extreme dynamics which the boys experience among themselves are, therefore, not rooted in 
their adoption of primitive rituals but rather are based on the fact that they create a setting 
without restraint. Everything is taken to extremes because there is nothing in terms of which 
to define justice with the consequence that the understanding of justice which develops 
among the boys is one of unrestrained power and uncompromising excess. Moreover, no 
solace is to be found in the fact that things might have been different but for the naivety, 
immaturity and inexperience of the boys: This fact is powerfully brought home by the 
discovery of the dead airman's body on the island which stand out as a symbol and a reminder 
of the brutality of humankind generally. The reader is, therefore, denied the comfort of 
supposing that but for the boys' age and their circumstances things might have been different. 
Golding's objective is to show that human nature remains constant whatever one's 
experiences and surroundings in terms of time or place. When understood in this context, the 
boys' rescue from the island and their inevitable return to the adult world is not to be viewed 
with unadulterated relief, for such a journey (no matter how geographically far it may be) can 
never provide the boys with the means to escape from themselves which is after all the single 
factor which constantly haunted them on the island. The return to the adult world is, 
therefore, a comfort only to the extent that it represents a familiar setting. However, such 
familiarity should not be interpreted as necessarily more moral or just. It is simply an 
inanimate surrounding in which pre-existing prejudices, desires and potentials interact with 
one another resulting in different means of expression and forms of self-deception. If 
anything, it would seem that the reader is cautioned against the temptation to unquestioningly 
accept the virtues of a particular socio-political matrix simply because it is familiar and to 
acknowledge that the gravest danger presented by such a setting is that of complacency. This 
i~ ~mphasised, moreover, by the poignant irony of the boys' situation at the moment of their 
. ~ 
rescue, for while their time on the island has brought them into contact with events of 
6 The unfortunate fact, however, is that the boys who most astutely appreciated the 
implications of such a 'discovery' have either been destroyed by the community 
(Piggy and Simon) or have been victimised to the point of destruction (Ralph). 
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immense gravity and exposed them to the depths of their own nature, the rescuing officer 
only sees a group of boisterous and dirty boys before him who have been lost a long way 
from home and who have begun to weep through a mixture of homesickness and relief at 
having been found. In truth, however, the boys' weeping is indicative of a shameful 
realisation of their actions on the island, the repercussions of which they are bound to carry 
with them event after they have departed from the island. Ralph, in particular, weeps because 
he finally understands a little bit more about what it is to be human, and this catharsis of 
experience brings with it the realisation that all actions are contextualised by their post-
lapsarian surroundings He comes to understand that no matter where or in what 
circumstances people interact they do so in the knowledge of a shared loss, and that those 
who are unaware of this loss are not innocent but merely ignorant. 
It is important to note, however, that the moment Ralph comes to appreciate this sense of 
shared loss it also represents a catharsis in his vision of justice. He realises that for all the 
serenity and orderliness which the adult would presents it suffers from the same tensions and 
disquiet which the boys have experienced. The only difference being that the former society 
(ironically through its own sophistication) diverts its gaze from its brutality by indulging in 
fancy word games and false appearances in the hope that such concealment might come to 
represent a new reality. To the extent to which legal discourse serves to perpetuate this 
illusion it cannot be regarded as serving the ends of justice in the way in which literature 
does. The fundamental reason for this is that legal discourse seeks to externalise conflict and 
violence and to regard them as unnatural and inanimate objects in an otherwise peaceful 
setting. It chooses to avoid seeing 'the Self' as the source of such conflict and consequently 
it neglects to develop the perception required to appreciate that a sense of justice is born from 
an acknowledgement of human frailties combined with a questioning of 'the Self. The 
simple truth is that 'meaning' (which contextualises and defines justice) is to be found in the 
boys and not in their surroundings. It is the boys, after all, who confer meaning onto their 
surroundings by virtue of their motives as expressed through their actions. However, the 
problem which arises (and which has already been noted) is that the boys are operating 
without an appreciation of the fact that they constitute the principal source of justice.7 Thus, 
it is literature which redirects our attention to the fact that justice is as much a concerted 
7 While Ralph, admittedly, comes to appreciate that this is where the source of justice 
resides, his knowledge exposes him to victimisation by the other boys and comes too 
late to save either Piggy or Simon. 
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effort and a frame of mind as it is an ideal, and it is literature which emphasises that the 
creation of a just society is a perpetual human responsibility and obligation. The law, on the 
other hand, merely seeks to dictate and to enforce the boundaries of cultural conformity 
without necessarily appreciating the social context in which it operates or the human cost of 
its realisation. Legal discourse requires a conscience in order to operate effectively and justly 
and literature provides just such an impetus allowing the law to be interpreted and 
rationalised in a different light. Above all, it should be borne in mind that the fact of Ralph's 
survival is a symbol of some future hope namely that, in spite of the fact he is re-entering the 
adult world, he does so with an altered vision and deepened perceptions as to that which has 
been and that which is to come. The ideal of justice is, therefore, maintained as a central 
feature of the novel right to the end and its potential fulfilment remains hinted at beyond the 
cries of the plot. 
Joseph Conrad's Heart of Darkness has been effectively described by Lillian Feder as 
containing three levels of meaning "on one level it is the story of a man's adventures; on 
another, of his discovery of certain political and social injustices; and on a third, it is a study 
of his initiation into the mysteries of his own mind".8 Marlow's literal journey into the heart 
of darkness provides a setting for a psychological journey of greater proportions and with 
substantial implications, not only for himself but also for the reader who accompanies him 
and who must decipher the nature and extent of the meaning being revealed to him. The 
narrative of Marlow serves to frame these concurrent journeys and to provide the reader with 
an accessible and identifiable. point of reference as the horrors of the story unfold and it 
becomes increasingly apparent that any meaning which is extracted from the tale told is not 
simply to be found in the words used but in the manner in which they are spoken and in the 
shadows of those things which are left unspoken. 
An ironic tension exists between the control which Marlow wields over the reader's 
interaction with the events of the story and the nature of the events themselves which are 
beyond the powers of manipulation or comprehension by any single character from within the 
_, 
lJody of the text (even if he is the narrator). Marlow might guide thereader by constructing 
an image for him of the arena in which the story takes place and the sequence of events 
8 Lillian Feder (ed) Heart of Darkness: An Authoritative Text, Backgrounds and 
Sources at 186-7. 
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leading towards the text's central revelation but even Marlow cannot dictate the pace of 
events themselves, or indeed, what those events are to be. He may choose to mention certain 
events and overlook others in the course of his narrative but even Marlow's motives are 
subject to interpretation by the reader and his actions are judged with the benefit of hindsight 
which only the reader possesses. In essence, Marlow's narrative guides the reader through the 
terrain of the text but falls short of the point at which meaning is extracted from all that has 
gone before. That task is the sole responsibility of each reader. 
The illusiveness of meaning is embodied in the character of Mr. Kurtz. Not only is Marlow 
unable to visualise what he might look like when he first hears of him but as Marlow's 
journey unfolds and more of Kurtz's history becomes apparent Kurtz evolves into a character 
of extreme contradictions and unresoluable cross-purposes. He is a creation of his age and 
culture and from all the reports of him which filter through to Marlow he is depicted as 
erudite, sophisticated, an effective ivory hunter, pragmatic and with an edge of arrogance 
born of his own success. Yet the closer Marlow comes to finding Kurtz, the more he 
becomes aware of the irrationality, barbarism, vulnerability and incoherence which has 
engulfed him. The man Marlow seeks is not the one who he finds and it is the fact of this 
discovery together with Marlow's gradual realisation of the wider implications of it which 
raise the novel above the level of a location specific, historical travelogue or a tale of one 
man's downfall. Kurtz's story is emblematical of more than just the rise of the industrial 
revolution and its consequences, it is principally a human journey in search of meaning. The 
journey is conceived out of a change in socio-economic and political circumstances brought 
about as a result of the advances of industrialisation, yet its focus is not solely (or primarily) 
concerned with such changes. In journeying towards Kurtz, Marlow perceives how he too is 
implicated in all that Kurtz has stood for and done, but more importantly by acknowledging 
this Marlow is required to re-evaluate all that he has taken for granted and accepted. 
Morality becomes tempered with uncertainty, integrity is tainted by injustice and virtue is 
undermined by greed. Within this haze, meaning is seen to reside in a constant flux without 
any comfort to be found in a discernible conclusion. The reader is not provided with a 
didactic framework to govern his interpretation of the text but is simply given the foundations 
u~.,on which to embark on an independent journey in search of an int~retative framework 
which is not presented as a conclusion but as a beginning. The fact that it is to be found in 
the heart of darkness is, therefore, not so much a threat as a challenge and an opportunity. 
The figure of Kurtz serves as a reminder of the dangers which are inexorably associated with 
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such a journey and his role should not be seen as either a warning against undertaking the 
journey in the first place or, more importantly, as a symbol of the inevitable conclusion of 
such journey. The journey is one which the, reader must make of his own volition and 
interpret through the prism of his own experience. Nothing is predetermined, and that which 
seems to be is not. It is this very misconception which Kurtz laboured under and which 
hastened his self-destruction. In essence, Kurtz dared to take things to the point of no return 
and paid heavily for his impetuous actions and the fact that he came to understand too late the 
implications of the journey on which he had embarked. 
It is out of this image of Kurtz ('the man') with all his attendant human frailties that Kurtz as 
a symbol of some greater meaning is born. As Marlow gradually begins to associate Kurtz's 
torment with his own discovery of Self, so too, the meaning of things which Kurtz 
symbolically comes to hint at becomes reflected in Marlow's own actions. Yet the supreme 
irony remains that as Marlow's journey progresses in pursuit of such meaning he comes to 
understand it not in terms of a point of finality but rather as a perpetual progression without 
any definable points of interpretation beyond 'the Self. The social safety net and any 
cultural comfort which it may provide to the individual is marginalised by virtue of Marlow's 
alien environment and this has the effect of focusing his thoughts beyond the reality which he 
has taken for granted and onto a search for some greater scheme of meaning underpinning it. 
It is this set of circumstances which leads Marlow to view the law for the first time as a 
socio-politically motivated system which harbours within it the subjective seeds of its own 
welfare. The powers inherent within the legal system are utilised in the novel to impose a 
governing regime on a foreign culture and to ensure that such system remains entrenched so 
that the economic and political benefits arising from it are harnessed for the benefit of the 
culture seeking to impose its ideals as well as to bolster the legitimacy of the legal system in 
question. Consequently, the law comes to be seen as a discourse in need of constant scrutiny 
(in much the same way as any other discourse would be scrutinised) so as to retain its 
allegiance to the ideals which it espouses and to ensure that it will be interpreted with a 
greater awareness of the predicaments facing it. Chief among the challenges facing the law is 
clearly the fact that, as with any human discourse, it is, on the one hand, an amoral system in 
search of a moral matrix and it is bound by the frailties of human experience in seeking to 
attain this and, on the other hand, it is guided by a primeval desire to use language as a means 
of expressing ideas which may not represent human reality but embody human aspirations. 
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Marlow's progress into the heart of darkness is as much a search for meaning as it is a battle 
with language. The only access which Marlow has into the motivations of Kurtz, the 
meaning of his journey and the lesson of his life is through language. Moreover, the story of 
Kurtz and the journey of Marlow are related to the reader through the narrative of the text. 
Yet the meaning which language is able to extract from the events so described fails to 
communicate the immediacy of the present (by virtue of the fact that the written word 
constitutes a historic account) as well as the fact that the true significance of the experiences 
conveyed to the reader inhabit a realm which language cannot penetrate. In this regard, the 
scream uttered by Kurtz - "The horror! The horror!"9 can be seen to relate to the underlying 
turmoil seething beneath the surf ace of the text. Significantly, however, even these words, 
which seek to embody the essence of that which is unspoken and which lies at the heart of all 
discourse, are unable to convey the entirety of the event. This is not, however, to imply that 
language is per se a meaningless exercise since at worst it conveys a stream of data and 
instructions between people, and at best, it serves as a channel for the communication, 
expression and translation of personalised experiences into instances of shared 
comprehension. It is in this latter arena that the potential of language is truly realised, yet it is 
also in this very context that language, ironically, comes to be seen as a fiction. By this I 
mean that once one interprets and utilises language for a purpose beyond the mere 
transmission of data and converts it into an expression of more sophisticated desires and 
beliefs, at that point one begins to sense that there are matters which even language cannot 
penetrate. Language then comes to be understood as a fiction designed to reflect matters 
which lie beyond its immediate grasp and to act as a verbal and visual connection between 
the meaning embedded in the human mind and the expression of such meaning which is 
within the ambit of human interpretation. This is not, however, to suggest that language is an 
elaborate hoax which serves to delude us into imagining the unreal and anticipating the 
impossible. If anything, language plays an essential part in structuring our interaction with 
one another and in ordering the tumult of thoughts, instincts, beliefs and desires within our 
own minds into some sort of comprehensible identity. Without language there would be no 
purposive outlet for the uncertainties and angst embedded within us. In interpreting 
l~nguage, however, the key is to view it as a surf ace along which we jo~{11ey so as to discover 
the existence of a reality which remains suspended beneath this surface. This is the ultimate 
experience which any meaningful interpretation of language seeks to apprehend. Moreover, 
9 J Conrad Heart of Darkness ( 1989) at 117. 
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the very nature of the journey so described means that to immerse oneself entirely below the 
surface of language one must unreservedly plunge into an alinguistic universe from which 
there is no return. It is into this universe which Kurtz has utterly receded and into which 
Marlow gazes from the relative safety of the discourse to which he clings as he peers over the 
edge into a world beyond the bounds of language and logic. To the extent that Kurtz's 
journey can be related, through the medium of Marlow, to the reader their fates are 
inextricably linked, for without someone to verbalise this non-linguistic rite of passage, 
Kurtz's journey would remain misinterpreted. Moreover, but. for the extreme nature of this 
journey, Marlow would never have had the opportunity or the need to acknowledge the 
existence of a level of human interaction beyond words. 
The nature of Kurtz's journey can never be fully understood or reasoned because it constitutes 
an intensely personal voyage into the heart of the unchartered psyche. Nothing is clearly 
delineated and it remains for the reader to try and piece together Kurtz 's story through the 
mirror of Marlow's narrative. In spite of Kurtz's self-destruction and Marlow's uncomfortable 
proximity to such disintegration, the reader is given access to the turmoil experienced in the 
text without ever having to abandon his faith in language itself. Instead of being overcome 
by the despair which has engulfed Kurtz or the uncertainty which plagues Marlow, the reader 
is left with an awareness of the maleability of language and the potent forces which lie 
beyond language. It is the reader's vision of the tension which he witnesses through the text 
which survives and raises the narrative to a level where the imagination can explore 
possibilities unavailable to the characters who are embedded in the text. Consequently, 
meaning is not to be found in the disintegration of Kurtz per se, but in the reader's response 
to, and interpretation of, the actions taking place in the context of the novel. Similarly, the 
law is not inevitably to be viewed as a malign process, but simply as a discourse labouring 
under its own frailties (namely, the 'justification' previously discussed in Chapter 3) and as a 
consequence of which it is open to misinterpretation and misapplication. 
Having traversed through the landscape of A Passage to India and Lord of the Flies the 'heart 
of darkness' into which the journey has descended is not to be viewed as a melancholic 
conclusion. It is, instead, emblamatical of the inevitable uncertainty surrounding meaning 
and the efforts of man to attain some comfort and finality on this point. Far from presenting a 
defeated vision, the darkness serves to acknowledge the frailty of human discourses in 
expressing concepts which are rooted in an understanding which itself lies beyond words. In 
turn, this state of affairs allows for greater fluidity of thought because one is no longer 
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compromised by the constraints of a particular discourse. In effect, one is now at liberty to 
utilise a range of discourses simultaneously to the extent that their combined effort may assist 
in releasing thoughts and perceptions which remain impregnable to a single discourse. The 
heart of darkness is, therefore, not a defeated vision nor does it embody finality. It is simply 
a method of understanding and interpretation designed to unlock meaning. Moreover, the 
effectiveness of it is a tool is inextricably linked to the role of the reader and his willingness 
to interact with the text in an intelligent and constructive manner. At no point in the novel is 
the reader presented with a pre-existing conclusion towards which he is unwittingly drawn by 
means of a didactic narrative. The effect of this is to heighten the reader's stature as an agent 
for interpretation while simultaneously preventing any general and superficial conclusions 
being drawn from the narrative itself. The object of the exercise is to create an arena of 
interaction in which the reader's ability to understand and intelligently respond to the 
circumstances related to him through the text allows him to gain an insight as much into the 
workings of his own mind as into the dilemmas, motivations and aspirations of the characters 
in the novel. Given this framework it becomes apparent that the author's ambition and the 
reader's focus are grounded in the development of a community of understanding predicated 
on integrity. In tum, such integrity requires the existence of a conceptual system able 
effectively to convey the potential meanings embedded in the text to the reader as well as 
allowing the reader to interpret and understand such meanings in the knowledge that the act 
of interpretation in itself constitutes a judgement call. The concept which embodies this vital 
point of connection between the reader and the author is justice. Without it there are no 
repercussions for decisions taken and choices made. In essence, there is everything to loose 
and nothing to gain. 
All discourses, of necessity, adhere to some conception of justice, for without it the very 
words which give rise to actions and processes are meaningless. However, the process of 
understanding requires one critically to interpret the conception of justice which is portrayed 
in a particular discourse rather than unquestioningly accepting the existence of an overriding 
and omnipotent concept. It is this form of analytical engagement with the text which all good 
Hterature demands of the reader. 
While my narrative journey through the three texts brings in itself no solace in the form of 
finality or ultimate certainty for the reader on the question of justice, it was never intended to 
do so. Rather, my ambition has been to dissolve the mystique of the law and highlight the 
problematical interaction within legal discourse between justice and justification. In doing 
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so, I have harnessed the literary imagination as a means of accessing legal reasoning and 
unleashing some of the latent potential within the law. The process can never be truly 
concluded, however, for to do so would require the identity of the one discourse to be 
completely subordinated to that of the other (and as previously argued this serves no useful 
purpose). The natural (and only) compromise, therefore, is to embark on a process of 
interaction (interaction between the reader and the author; interaction across different 
discourses; and interaction with ones own intellect) in which the journey is forever beginning, 
with no end in sight. 
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CONCLUSION 
I may be accused by some of having failed to provide more decisive conclusions as to the 
exact nature of justice, however, my retort is twofold. First, the desire to frame justice has 
been one of humankind's most enduring searches dating back to the time when man first 
began to reflect on his actions and consciously appreciate his being in the context of his 
surroundings and his society. The catalyst for such conscious reflection was the development 
of language as a means of expressing more than basic needs in the imperative tense. In other 
words, at the moment that man began to look both beyond 'the Self' and into 'the Self' he 
became aware of his psychological profile and his philosophical motivations. In this way, 
man hesitantly began to engage with his universe through the channels of language and to 
search for meaning through the spoken (and later the written) word. This philosophical 
genesis was premissed on a notion which bore many facets of expression but all facets of 
which were united under the title of 'justice'. While the source of this notion has shifted over 
time from an ambition which is external to man to a motivation centred within man, and from 
something which is unitary and universal in its application to something which is relative and 
plural, man's awareness of himself remains inextricably linked to his acknowledgement of 
the notion of justice. However, just as human consciousness is not a static concept, so too, 
our sense and understanding of justice evolves with the advancement of the ages. Secondly, 
given what has just been said, it is for this reason that I have chosen to predicate my analysis 
on the search for justice rather than situating my research within the context of a particular 
understanding of it. To have adopted the latter approach would have been to compromise my 
very argument because I would necessarily be confining my point of reference to a single 
conception or dialogue of justice. This is antithetical to the whole purpose of my 
interdisciplinary focus. In shifting the enquiry away from a single notion of justice and onto 
i 
the search for the plural identities of justice, my aim has been to encourage a re-evaluation of/ 
\ 
our relationship with the law. This has required the reader to enter into a cerebral dialogue \ 
with me through the medium of the text. As each person engages with the text, so a different 
matrix of issues arises, at once peculiar to the individual and common to the human 
condition. The task, therefore, becomes one of knowing what questions to pose rather than 
what the ultimate conclusion may be. It is often a difficult mental exercise to divorce a quest 
from a result (particularly when the quest is intangible). What I am not suggesting, however, 
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destination will only be attained when my narrative struggle has resolved itself which, in tum, 
will be reflected in the fact that both you and I will have discarded our identities and share a 
common and single ambition. As this cannot happen until such time as our self-awareness 
ascends to a different level, my focus must remain on the process itself and how we can seek 
to make sense of, and extract meaning from, that which we interpret. 
Postmodemism re-awakens our consciousness to the mechanics of legal discourse in an 
innovative manner and allows us to assimilate a body of theory into a world of experience 
and through such integration extract meaning. The attainment of such meaning (however 
incomplete it may be) is justice in itself. 
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